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THE PRINCE. By Machiavelli.
THE PRINCE

AND

OTHER PIECES

From the Italian

OF

NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY HENRY MORLEY

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INTRODUCTION.

Nicolò Machiavelli is one of the three great writers produced by Italy in the sixteenth century—Machiavelli, Ariosto, Tasso. He died in 1527, at the age of fifty-eight. Ariosto, who was five years younger, died six years later, at the age of fifty-nine. But Tasso was not born until eleven years after Ariosto's death. Machiavelli's "Prince" (Il Principe) was finished in 1513, and Ariosto was then writing his "Orlando Furioso," of which he published, after eleven years of work upon it, forty cantos in 1515. Each writer was a master of style; Machiavelli remains to this day without equal as a writer of Italian prose, and Ariosto would often spend a day in polishing a few lines written in the morning. Living in evil times, described by an Italian as times when in Italy the source of every noble feeling was dried up, family life corrupted, virtue mocked, the Church heathen, and faith dead, Machiavelli dealt directly, in the world and in the study, with the life, and with what seemed to him the pressing need, of his own time and country. Ariosto escaped from it all, and sang of Charlemagne and Roland with a playful grace that saved him from the vulgarity of having faith even in the tale he told. He was very far from any suggestion through it of the deeper life of man. And what of Machiavelli, who did speak for his time and country, and whose name has become proverbial for a crafty politician? "Am I politic? Am I subtle? Am I a Machiavel?" asks the host of the 'Garter' in "The Merry Wives of Windsor." In the third part of King Henry VI. Shakespeare changed an allusion in the older play from "the aspiring Catiline" to "the murderous Machiavel" that, in spite of chronology, he might use a more familiar by-word. "The Prince" is the famous text-book of Machiavelian policy on which this popular opinion rests.

Nicolò Machiavelli was born in Florence, on the 3rd of May, 1469. He was of a noble family that had given up small lordship at Monte Spertoli for broader rights of citizenship in the good days of Florence, and that had contributed from time to time thirteen Gonfalonieri and fifty-three Priors to the number of the citizens who had been trusted with authority. Machiavelli's father was a lawyer, and his mother, Bartolomea Nello, had a taste for poetry. After liberal training in the study of the classics, he entered, at the age of about twenty-nine, into the service of the Signory.

Lorenzo de' Medici, luxurious destroyer of the liberties of Florence, had died on the 8th of April, 1492. He had called to his death-bed the persecuted Savonarola, that angel who disturbed the waters, and for many a soul turned sickness into health: "Have faith in God," Savonarola said. "I have faith in God," answered the dying Lorenzo. "Restore," said the Friar, "or bid your sons restore, all that you have taken wrongfully from others." There was a pause of inward struggle, and Lorenzo bowed his head in assent also to this. "You must restore also her liberty to Florence." At this Lorenzo turned his face away, and from Savonarola he received no absolution. When Lorenzo died Machiavelli's age was twenty-three.

Lorenzo left three sons, of whom the eldest, Piero, twenty-one years old, succeeded to the rule of Florence; the second, Giovanni, who was eighteen years old, and had lately been made a cardinal, became in
after years Pope Leo X. Three months after the death of Lorenzo followed that of the Pope, Innocent VIII., and the succession of Alexander VI. involved Piero in a question of property, that brought, in 1493, Milan and Venice into league with the Pope against Florence and Naples. This led to the invitation into Italy of the French armies of Charles VIII., which might aid one side by fighting for the French claim to the crown of Naples. The French invasion menaced Florence. Savonarola preached for a month on the construction of Noah's ark as a type of the ark of refuge that was to be built for Florentines out of the faith of a reclaimed people. He was still preaching on the Ark when Charles entered Turin, on the 5th of September, 1494. On the 21st of September, when the cathedral was crowded with people, he had reached a text which he uttered in a voice that thrilled all hearers—Pico della Mirandola, who was present, said that it sent a shudder through his frame and set his hair on end—"Behold, I will bring the waters over the earth!"

As the flood rolled nearer, the excited Florentines became tumultuous in discontent against Piero. Piero suddenly resolved to visit the French king and make terms. He conceded all that was asked, gave up important fortresses within the territory of Florence, but when he went back to tell the Signory what he had done, he was pronounced a rebel and an outlaw, and the Medici were cast out of the city. Then followed eighteen years during which the Republic was restored, and of this republic Machiavelli was a loyal servant for fourteen years and five months before the return of the Medici in 1512. It was a Signory of this Republic that, on the 23rd of May, 1498, burnt Savonarola, and scattered his ashes from the Ponte Vecchio into the Arno, a few weeks after young Machiavelli had first entered the service of the State. Head of the Church in those days was Alexander VI., a Borgia who exulted in the profligacy of his life, father of Cesar Borgia and Lucrezia.

After a little service in another department of the State, on the 14th of July, 1498, Machiavelli was made Secretary to the office of the Ten Magistrates of Liberty and Peace—that is to say, chief Secretary to the Government of the Republic. He had charge of the political correspondence, home and foreign, and the draughting of treaties. His rare ability caused him to be sent twenty-three times on embassies, and to represent the Republic on many commissions to dependent towns.

His first foreign mission was in 1500 to Louis XII. of France, after the raising of the siege of Pisa. King Louis, who had succeeded Charles VIII. in April, 1498, had claims on the Dukedom of Milan, which were convenient to Florence. Mercenaries upon one side fought with mercenaries on the other. There was no cause that secured their fidelity; fidelity was only to the fuller purse. Swiss paid by the Duke of Milan sold him to Swiss paid by the King of France, who carried him away to a French prison. Florence rejoiced, but presently failed in the long effort to recover Pisa, because there were delays at last in the supply of money to the mercenaries hired by France. The French king was displeased, and Machiavelli spent five months in the vain endeavour to content His Majesty with words. Satisfaction had to be given in money.

In 1502 Machiavelli was sent on a mission to Cesar Borgia. Cesar, who had first been made a cardinal, had passed from the Church into the world by succeeding to the possessions and dignities of a brother whom he had caused to be assassinated and thrown into the Tiber.
By a marriage that allied him to the royal blood of France he had become Duke of Valentinois, whence he was called Duke Valentine. He had then, with aid of French troops, taken from Caterina Sforza the towns of Imola and Forli, and asked leave from the Florentines to send troops through their territory against the lordship of Piombino. Florence believed that he was aiming at the mastery of Pisa. Cesare Borgia, with the aid of French arms, seized, early in 1501, the lordships of Pesaro and Rimini. He took Faenza by perfidy. Infamous deeds blotted his whole career, but success justified his policy, and there was then no chief in Italy more popular with the great captains of the time. When Cesar Borgia came into the Val d'Arno with Pietro de' Medici in his train, whose neighbourhood, he knew, would stir the city in some way that might be turned to advantage, he obtained no less than the appointment for three years as Captain-General of Florence, with thirty thousand ducats a year, on condition that he marched away without injuring the country. More complications, all twistings and turnings of greed and dishonour, caused serious concern in Florence. For reasons told in his account of the murder of Vitelli, Machiavelli went on embassy to Cesar Borgia, whom he also regarded as a great master of policy. He was sent also to the Pope, again to France, to Sienna, to Piombino, and elsewhere. In all employments he was faithful to the Republic. To the wealth and strength of the Republic he was ready as any other Italian to sacrifice all sense of private right.

When a rising of their party in Florence, with the aid of Spanish troops, restored the Medici in August, 1512, Machiavelli lost his office in the State. The first of the Medici to return were Giuliano, younger brother of the Cardinal, and Lorenzo, son of Piero. Piero had died in 1504, and the young Lorenzo was then about twenty-one years old. In the following year Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici became Pope Leo X. Two young men, Agostino Capponi and Pietro Boscoli, having agreed to destroy as tyrants the young chiefs of the house of Medici, were themselves seized and executed. Machiavelli also fell under suspicion. He was imprisoned, and put to the torture. When released, by amnesty, on the accession of Pope Leo X., he was banished from the city of Florence, and being condemned to live in the surrounding territory, retired in poverty to a little patrimony near San Casciano, and in the first years of this retirement wrote "The Prince." There were nine years of such leisure.

Machiavelli had married Marietta Corsini, and had five children, four boys and a girl. A letter of his to a friend, Francisco Vettore, written while he was at work on "The Prince," tells how he rose before the sun, spent two hours in a little wood of his that was being cut down to raise money, saw how the work went on for a couple of hours, and talked with the woodcutters, who had always some great dispute in hand. From the wood he would go to a spring, then to his bird-nets, with a book or two under his arm, Dante or Petrarch, Tibullus or Ovid. Having read with enjoyment, he would stroll to the tavern, talking with any whom he met, and noting the different tastes and fancies of men. Then came dinner time, and he ate what his little fields could afford, returned to the tavern, where he generally met the innkeeper, a butcher, a miller, and two oven-men, with whom he played at cricca and trictrac, over which they raised a thousand quarrels for a farthing, and shouted so that they might be heard at San Casciano. Thus he kept his head from
troubling him, until at evening he went home, took off the muddy peasant's coat he wore by day, entered his study in decent dress, to be for four hours happy in companionship with the ancients, and noting with his pen what he had learnt from them and from the world. So Machiavelli lived when he wrote "The Prince," not without hope that the presentation of it to Giuliano de' Medici at Florence, might bring about his recall to ease and worldly occupation.

But Giuliano, younger brother of the Pope, died in March, 1516. Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, corrupt son of Piero de' Medici, survived until 1519, when he died, seven days after the French wife whom he had lately married, leaving fatherless and motherless the infant Catherine de' Medici, who practised afterwards Italian policy in France. Leo X. died in 1521. Before his death he had recalled Machiavelli to Florence, and sought counsel from him.

Under the next Pope, Giulio de Medici, who succeeded as Clement VII., Machiavelli's genius again was recognized. Again he was employed on embassies till 1527, when the Medici were again expelled from Florence. Misfortune was again bed-fellow with Machiavelli. The city he had sought in any way to strengthen was decaying in corruption. The one source of strength—that to which Italians in the days of Machiavelli paid no heed—was wanting. Of classical culture there was plenty, but fine scholarship without a faith in God had failed to save the State. Of shrewd policy there was plenty, and Machiavelli, with a style perfect in grace and vigour, and a clear logic in working out problems of public policy on ground cleared of the hindrances of private justice, had shown only the road to ruin. A State that makes distinction between public and private morality, supposing that high politics have nothing to do with vulgar estimates of right and wrong, will fall, as the Italian cities fell. They boasted of high policy from which the savages would turn with shame; high culture, while for all essentials of life their taste was with the swine. Machiavelli, having failed in health after his last reverses, increased his ailment by an overdose of castor oil, a medicine then in particular repute, and died two days afterwards, on the 22nd of June, 1527.

Besides "The Prince," Machiavelli wrote Discourses upon Livy, through which he further illustrated his political ideas. He wrote also upon the Art of War, and had much at heart the formation in each State of a standing army of its citizens that should deprive the mercenaries of their functions. He wrote also a History of Florence, in which his fidelity to the idea of the State as he conceived it is conspicuous. The firm establishment of the body politic being his one aim, his ideal was Republican; but if the people could only be knitted together by force of a single man's strong will, then, rather than anarchy, he would support a tyranny. When it was said to him that he had taught tyrants to be strong, he replied that he had also taught the people how they could dispense with tyranny.

He painted life also in comedy. Machiavelli and Ariosto were the founders of Italian comedy. Machiavelli's "Calandra" represents the corruption of family life in his time, and his prose story, "Belphegor," given in this volume with some other characteristic pieces, illustrates playfully in another way this cause of the weakness of Italy in the sixteenth century.

The translation of "The Prince" here given is from the folio of 1674.
Those who desire the favour of a prince do commonly introduce themselves by presenting him with such things as he either values much or does more than ordinarily delight in; for which reason he is frequently presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, jewels, and such ornaments as are suitable to his quality and grandeur. Being ambitious to present myself to your Highness with some testimony of my devotions towards you, in all my wardrobe I could not find anything more precious (at least to myself) than the knowledge of the conduct and achievements of great men, which I learned by long conversation in modern affairs and a continual investigation of old. After long and diligent examination, having reduced all into a small volume, I do presume to present to your Highness; and though I cannot
think it a work fit to appear in your presence, yet my confidence in your bounty is such, I hope it may be accepted, considering I was not capable of more than presenting you with a faculty of understanding in a short time, what for several years, with infinite labour and hazard, I had been gathering together. Nor have I beautified or adorned it with rhetorical ornations, or such outward embellishments as are usual in such descriptions. I had rather it should pass without any approbation than owe it to anything but the truth and gravity of the matter. I would not have it imputed to me as presumption, if an inferior person, as I am, pretend not only to treat of, but to prescribe and regulate the proceedings of princes; for, as they who take the landscape of a country, to consider the mountains and the nature of the higher places do descend ordinarily into the plains, and dispose themselves upon the hills to take the prospect of the valleys, in like manner, to understand the nature of the people it is necessary to be a prince, and to know the nature of princes it is as requisite to be of the people. May your Highness, then, accept this book with as much kindness as it is presented and if you please diligently and deli-
berately to reflect upon it you will find in it my extreme desire that your Highness may arrive at that grandeur which fortune and your accomplishments do seem to presage; from which pinnacle of honour, if your Highness vouchsafes at any time to look down upon things below, you will see how unjustly and how continually I have been exposed to the malignity of fortune.

CHAPTER I.

The several sorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained.

There never was nor is at this day any government in the world by which one man has rule and dominion over another, but it is either a commonwealth, or a monarchy. Monarchies are either hereditary, where the ancestors of the sovereign have been a long time in possession, or where they are but new. The new are either so wholly and entirely (as Milan was to Francis Sforza), or annexed to the hereditary dominions of the conqueror (as the kingdom of Naples to the kingdom of Spain). These territories thus acquired are accustomed either to be subject to some
prince, or to live at liberty and free, and are subdued either by his auxiliaries or own forces, by his good fortune or conduct.

CHAPTER II.

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I shall omit speaking of commonwealths, as having discoursed of them largely elsewhere, and write in this place only of principalities, and how, according to the foregoing division, the said principalities may be governed and maintained. I do affirm, then, that hereditary states, and such as have been accustomed to the family of their prince, are preserved with less difficulty than the new, and because it is sufficient not to transgress the examples of their predecessors, and next to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur. So that, if the prince be a person of competent industry, he will be sure to keep himself in the throne, unless he be supplanted by some great and more than ordinary force; and even then, when so supplanted, fortune can never turn tail, or be adverse to the usurper, but he will
stand fair to be restored. Of this Italy affords us an example in the Duke of Ferrara, who supported bravely against the invasion of the Venetians in 1484, and afterwards against Pope Julius X., upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that government; for a natural prince has not so much occasion or necessity to oppress his subjects, whereby it follows he must be better beloved, and retain more of the affections of his people, unless some extraordinary vices concur to make him odious; so that the succession and coherence of his government takes away the causes and memory of innovations; for one new change leaves always (as in buildings) a tooth ing and aptitude of another.

CHAPTER III.

Of Mixed Principalities.

But the difficulties consist in governments lately acquired, especially if not absolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the usurper, in which case such a government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in such monarchies
proceed from a natural crossness and difficulty in all new conquests; for men do easily part with their prince upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel; but most commonly they are mistaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worse.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause, necessitating the new prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartering his army upon them, taxes, or a thousand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual consequents of conquest. So that you make them your enemies who suffer, and are injured by your usurpation, but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you, because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation, or employ strong remedies against them, by reason of your obligations; wherefore, though an usurper be never so strong, and his army never so numerous, he must have intelligence with the natives if he means to conquer a province. For these reasons Louis XII. of France quickly subdued Milan, and lost it as quickly; for the same people which opened him their gates, finding themselves deceived in their hopes, and disappointed in the future benefits which
they expected, could not brook nor comport with the haughtiness of their new sovereign: it is very true countries that have rebelled and are conquered the second time are recovered with more difficulty; for the defection of the people having taken off all obligation or respect from the usurper, he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing the suspected, and fortifying wherever he finds himself weak; so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time only by harassing and infesting its borders, the second time he recovered it it was necessary for him to arm and confederate the whole world against the said king, and that his army should be beaten and driven out of Italy; and this happened from the aforesaid occasions: nevertheless the French were twice dispossessed. The general reasons of the first we have already discoursed, it remains now that we take a prospect of the second, and declare what remedies the said King Louis had, or what another may have in his condition, to preserve himself better in his new conquests than the King of France did before him. I say, then, that provinces newly acquired, and joined to the ancient
territory of him who conquered them, are either of the same country, or language, or otherwise. In the first case they are easily kept, especially if the people have not been too much accustomed to liberty; and to secure the possession there needs no more than to extirpate the family of the prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no discrepancy in their customs, men do acquiesce and live quietly, as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy, Bretagne, Gascoigne, and Normandy, which have continued so long under the government of France; for though there be some difference in their language, nevertheless, their laws and customs being alike, they do easily consist. He therefore who acquires anything, and desires to preserve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particularly; one is, that the family of the former prince be extinguished; the other, that no law or taxes be imposed: whereby it will come to pass, that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old principality. But where conquest is made in a country differing in language, customs and laws, there is the great difficulty; their good fortune and great in-
Industry is requisite to keep it. And one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it would be for the usurper to live there himself, which would render his possession more secure and durable, as the great Turk has done in Greece, who, in despite of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection, had he not fixed his imperial residence there would never have been able to have effected it. For being present in person, disorders are discovered in the bud and prevented, but being at a distance in some remote part, they come only by hearsay, and that, when they are got to a head, are commonly incurable. Besides, the province is not subject to be pillaged by officers, by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their prince, which disposes those to love him who are good, and those to dread him who are otherwise; and if any foreigner attacks it, he must do it with more care and circumspection, in respect that the prince's residence being there it will be harder for him to lose it.

There is another remedy, rather better than worse, and that is, to plant colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that State, and either that must be done of necessity, or an army of
horse and foot be maintained in those parts, which is much worse; for colonies are of no great expense; the Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon such as he is constrained to dispossess of their houses and land for the subsistence and accommodation of the new inhabitants, who are but few, and a small part of the State; they also who are injured and offended, living dispersed and in poverty, cannot do any mischief, and the rest being quiet and undisturbed, will not stir, lest they should mistake and run themselves into the same condition with their neighbours.

I conclude, likewise, that those colonies which are least chargeable are most faithful and inoffensive, and those few who are offended are too poor and dispersed to do any hurt, as I said before; and it is to be observed, men are either to be flattered and indulged or utterly destroyed—because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot—so that injury is to be done in such a manner as not to fear any revenge. But if instead of colonies an army be kept on foot, it will be much more expensive, and the whole revenue of that province being consumed in the keeping it, the
acquisition will be a loss, and rather a prejudice than otherwise, by removing the camp up and down the country, and changing their quarters, which is an inconvenience every man will resent and be ready to revenge, and they are the most dangerous and implacable enemies who are provoked by insolences committed against them in their own houses. In all respects, therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other side colonies are useful. Moreover, he who is in a province of a different constitution, as is said before, ought to make himself head and protector of his inferior neighbours, and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said province with as much power as he; for it will always happen that somebody or other will be invited by the malcontents, either out of ambition or fear. This is visible in the Etolians, who brought the Romans into Greece, who were never admitted into any province but by the temptation of the natives. The common method in such cases is this: as soon as a foreign potentate enters into a province, those who are weaker or obliged join themselves with him out of emulation
and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect of these inferior lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gained, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the State that is conquered. Only the conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong, nor be entrusted with too much authority, and then he can easily with his own forces and their assistance keep down the greatness of his neighbours, and make himself absolute arbiter in that province. And he who acts not this part prudently shall quickly lose what he has got, and even whilst he enjoys it be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The Romans in their new conquests observed this course, they planted their colonies, entertained the inferior lords into their protection without increasing their power; they kept under such as were more potent, and would not suffer any foreign prince to have interest among them. I will set down only Greece for an example. The Etolians and Achaians were protected, the kingdom of the Macedonians was depressed and Antiochus driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the Achaians and Etolians could never procure them any increase of authority, nor the persuasions and applica-
tions of Philip induce the Romans to be his friends till he was overcome, nor the power of Antiochus prevail with them to consent that he should retain any sovereignty in that province: for the Romans acted in that case as all wise princes ought to do who are to have an eye not only upon present but future incommodities, and to redress them with all possible industry; for dangers that are seen afar off are easily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unseasonable and the malady incurable. And it falls out in this case, as the physicians say of an hectic fever, that at first it is easily cured and hard to be known, but in process of time, not being observed or resisted in the beginning, it becomes easy to be known but very difficult to be cured. So it is in matters of state, things which are discovered at a distance—which is done only by prudent men—produce little mischief but what is easily averted; but when through ignorance or inadvertency they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable. The Romans, therefore, foreseeing their troubles afar off, opposed themselves in time, and never swallowed any injury to put off a war, for they
knew that war was not avoided but deferred thereby, and commonly with advantage to the enemy; wherefore they chose rather to make war upon Philip, and Antiochus in Greece, than suffer them to invade Italy; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either; they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the mouths of our new politicians "to enjoy the present benefit of time," but preferred the exercise of their courage and wisdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to France, and examine if what was there done was conformable to what is prescribed here; and to this purpose I shall not speak of Charles VIII. but of Louis XII., as of a prince whose conduct and affairs (by reason his possession was longer in Italy) were more conspicuous, and you shall see how contrary he acted in everything that was necessary for the keeping of so different a State. This Louis was invited into Italy by the Venetians, who had an ambition to have got half Lombardy by his coming. I will not condemn the expedition, nor blame the counsels of that King for being desirous of footing in
Italy, and having no allies left in that country, but all doors shut against him (upon the ill-treatment which his predecessor Charles had used towards them) he was constrained to take his friends where he could find them, and that resolution would have been lucky enough had he not miscarried in his other administration; for he had no sooner subdued Lombardy but he recovered all the reputation and dignity that was lost by King Charles. Genoa submitted, Florence courted his friendship, the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madam de Furli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesoro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino; the Lucchesi, Pisani, Sanesi, all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity; then the Venetians began to consider and reflect upon their indiscretion, who, to gain two towns in Lombardy, had made the King of France master of two-thirds of all Italy. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the said king might have kept up his reputation in that country if he had observed the rules aforesaid and protected his friends, who being numerous, and yet weak and fearful (some of the Pope, and some of the Venetians), were always under a necessity of standing by him, and with their assist-
ance he might easily have secured himself against any competitor whatever. But he was no sooner in Milan but he began to prevaricate and send supplies to Pope Alexander to put him in possession of Romagna, not considering that thereby he weakened himself and disobliged his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms, and aggrandized the Church by adding to its spiritual authority (which was so formidable before) so great a proportion of temporal; and having committed one error, he was forced to proceed so far as to put a stop to the ambition of Pope Alexander, and hinder his making himself master of Tuscany; the said Louis was forced into Italy again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the Church and deserted his friends, but out of an ardent desire to the kingdom of Naples he shared it with the King of Spain; so that whereas before he was sole umpire in Italy, he now entertained a partner, to whom the ambitious of that province and his own malcontents, might repair upon occasion; and whereas the King of that kingdom might have been made his pensioner, he turned out him to put in another that might be able to turn out himself.
It is very obvious, and no more than natural, for princes to desire to extend their dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to achieve they are applauded, at least not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compass it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If France, then, with its own forces alone, had been able to have enterprised upon Naples, it ought to have been done; but if her own private strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the division of Lombardy, to which he consented with the Venetian, was excusably, it was because done to get footing in Italy; but this partition of Naples with the King of Spain is extremely to be condemned, because not pressed or quickened by such necessity as the former. Louis therefore committed five faults in this expedition. ① He ruined the inferior lords; ② he augmented the dominion of a neighbour prince; ③ he called in a foreigner as puissant as himself; ④ he neglected to continue there in person; ⑤ and planted no colonies—all which errors might have been no inconvenience whilst he had lived, had he not been guilty of a sixth, and that was depressing the power of the
Venetian. If indeed he had not sided with the Church, nor brought the Spaniards into Italy, it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the Venetian; but pursuing his first resolutions, he ought not to have suffered them to be ruined, because whilst the Venetian strength was entire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon Lombardy, to which the Venetian would never have consented, unless upon condition it might have been delivered to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from France to have given it to them; and to have contended with them both nobody would have had the courage. If it be urged that King Louis gave up Romagna to the Pope, and the kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain, to evade a war, I answer, as before, that a present mischief is not to be suffered to prevent a war, for the war is not averted but protracted, and will follow with greater disadvantage.

If the King's faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprise for him be objected, and that he did it to recompense the dissolution of his marriage, and the cap which at his intercession his Holiness had conferred upon the Legate of Amboise,
I refer them for an answer to what I shall say hereafter about the faith of a prince, how far it obliges. So then King Louis lost Lombardy because he did not observe one of those rules which others have followed with success in the conquest of provinces, and in their desire to keep them; nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reason. To this purpose, I remember I was once in discourse with the Cardinal d'Amboise at Nantes, at the time when Valentino (for so Cæsar Borgia, Pope Alexander's son was commonly called) possessed himself of Romagna. In the heat of our conference, the Cardinal telling me that the Italians were ignorant of the art of war, I replied that the French had as little skill in matters of State; for if they had had the least policy in the world they would never have suffered the Church to have come to that height and elevation. And it has been found since by experience, that the grandeur of the Church and the Spaniard in Italy is derived from France, and that they in requital have been the ruin and expulsion of the French.

From hence a general rule may be deduced, and such a one as seldom or never is subject to exception,—
viz., that whoever is the occasion of another's advancement is the cause of his own diminution; because that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the donor, either of which become suspicious at length to the person preferred.

CHAPTER IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius, usurped by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors, after Alexander was dead.

The difficulties encountered in the keeping of a new conquest being considered, it may well be admired how it came to pass that Alexander the Great, having in a few years made himself master of Asia, and died as soon as he had done, that State could be kept from rebellion; yet his successors enjoyed it a long time peaceably without any troubles or concussions but what sprung from their own avarice and ambition. I answer that all monarchies of which we have any record were governed after two several manners; either by a prince and his servants whom he vouchsafes out of his mere grace to constitute his ministers, and admits of their assistance in the government of his kingdom; or else by a prince and
his barons; who were persons advanced to that quality, not by favour or concession of the prince, but by the ancientness and nobility of their extraction. These barons have their proper jurisdictions and subjects, who own their authority and pay them a natural respect. Those States which are governed by the prince and his servants have their prince more arbitrary and absolute, because his supremacy is acknowledged by everybody; and if another be obeyed, it is only as his minister and substitute, without any affection to the man. Examples of these different governments we may find in our time in the persons of the Grand Signor and the King of France. The whole Turkish monarchy is governed by a single person, the rest are but his servants and slaves; for distinguishing his whole monarchy into provinces and governments (which they call Sangiacchi) he sends when and what officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleases. But the King of France is established in the middle, as it were, of several great lords, whose sovereignty having been owned, and families beloved a long time by their subjects, they keep their pre-eminence; nor is it in the king's power to deprive them without inevitable danger to
himself. He, therefore, who considers the one with the other will find the Turkish empire harder to be subdued; but when once conquered more easy to be kept. The reason of the difficulty is, because the usurper cannot be called in by the grandees of the empire, nor hope any assistance from the great officers to facilitate his enterprise, which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for being all slaves and under obligation they are not easily corrupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the aforesaid reasons to bring them any party: so that whoever invades the Turk must expect to find him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force than any disorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their army beyond the possibility of a recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is nobody remaining to be afraid of but the family of the emperor, which, being once extinguished, nobody else has any interest with the people, and they are as little to be apprehended after the victory as they were to be relied upon before. But in kingdoms that are governed according to the model of France it happens quite contrary, because having gained some of the
barons to your side (and some of them will always be discontented and desirous of change), you may readily enter; they can, as I said before, give you easy admission and contribute to your victory. But to defend and make good what you have got brings a long train of troubles and calamities with it, as well upon your friends as your foes. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the race of the king; forasmuch as other princes will remain, who, upon occasion, will make themselves heads of any commotion, and they being neither to be satisfied nor extinguished, you must of necessity be expelled upon the first insurrection.

Now, if it be considered what was the nature of Darius's government, it will be found to have been very like the Turks, and therefore Alexander was obliged to fight them, and having conquered them, and Darius dying after the victory, the empire of the Persians remained quietly to Alexander, for the reasons aforesaid; and his successors, had they continued united, might have enjoyed it in peace, for in that whole empire no tumults succeeded but what were raised by themselves. But in kingdoms that are constituted like France it is otherwise, and impossible to possess
them in quiet. From hence sprung the many defec-
tions of Spain, France and Greece from the Romans,
by reason of the many little principalities in those
several kingdoms of which, whilst there remained
any memory, the Romans enjoyed their possession
in a great deal of uncertainty; but when their
memory was extinct by power and diuturnity of
empire, they grew secure in their possessions, and
quarrelling afterwards among themselves, every officer
of the Romans was able to bring a party into the
field, according to the latitude and extent of his
command in the said provinces; and the reason was,
because the race of their old princes being extirpate,
there was nobody left for them to acknowledge but
the Romans. These things, therefore, being con-
sidered, it is not to be wondered that Alexander
had the good fortune to keep the empire of Asia,
whilst the rest, as Pyrrhus and others, found such
difficulty to retain what they had got; for it came
not to pass from the small or great virtue of the
victor, but from the difference and variety of the
subject.
CHAPTER V.

How such Cities and Principalities are to be governed who lived under their own Laws before they were subdued.

When States that are newly conquered have been accustomed to their liberty, and lived under their own laws, to keep them three ways are to be observed: the first is utterly to ruin them; the second, to live personally among them; the third is (contenting yourself with a pension from them) to permit them to enjoy their old privileges and laws, erecting a kind of Council of State, to consist of a few which may have a care of your interest, and keep the people in amity and obedience. And that Council being set up by you, and knowing that it subsists only by your favour and authority, will not omit anything that may propagate and enlarge them. A town that has been anciently free cannot more easily be kept in subjection than by employing its own citizens, as may be seen by the example of the Spartans and Romans. The Spartans had got possession of Athens and Thebes, and settled an oligarchy according to their fancy; and yet they lost them again. The Romans, to keep Capua, Carthage and Numantia,
ordered them to be destroyed, and they kept them by that means. Thinking afterwards to preserve Greece, as the Spartans had done, by allowing them their liberty, and indulging their old laws, they found themselves mistaken; so that they were forced to subvert many cities in that province before they could keep it; and certainly that is the safest way which I know; for whoever conquers a free town and does not demolish it commits a great error, and may expect to be ruined himself; because whenever the citizens are disposed to revolt, they betake themselves of course to that blessed name of liberty, and the laws of their ancestors, which no length of time nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate; and let all possible care and provision be made to the contrary, unless they be divided some way or other, or the inhabitants dispersed, the thought of their old privileges will never out of their heads, but upon all occasions they will endeavour to recover them, as Pisa did after it had continued so many years in subjection to the Florentines. But it falls out quite contrary where the cities or provinces have been used to a prince whose race is extirpated and gone; for being on the one side accustomed to obey,
and on the other at a loss for their old family, they can never agree to set up another, and will never know how to live freely without; so that they are not easily to be tempted to rebel, and the prince may oblige them with less difficulty, and be secure of them when he hath done. But in a commonwealth their hatred is more inveterate, their revenge more insatiable; nor does the memory of their ancient liberty ever suffer, or ever can suffer them to be quiet; so that the most secure way is either to ruin them quite, or make your residence among them.

CHAPTER VI.

Of Principalities acquired by one's own proper conduct and arms.

Let no man think it strange if in speaking of new governments, either by princes or states, I introduce great and eminent examples; forasmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing they propose to themselves some pattern of that nature; nevertheless, being impossible to come up
exactly to that, or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you desire to imitate; a wise man ought always to set before him for his example the actions of great men who have excelled in the achievement of some great exploit, to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection, it may at least come as near as is possible, and receive some tincture thereby. Like experienced archers, who observing the mark to be at great distance, and knowing the strength of their bow, and how far it will carry, they fix their aim somewhat higher than the mark, not with design to shoot at that height, but that by mounting their arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the nearer to the mark they intend. I say, then, that principalities newly acquired by an upstart prince are more or less difficult to maintain, as he is more or less provident that gains them. And because the happiness of rising from a private person to be a prince presupposes great virtue or fortune, where both of them concur they do much facilitate the conservation of the conquest; yet he who has committed least to fortune has continued the longest. It prevents much trouble likewise, when the prince (having no better residence else-
where) is constrained to live personally among them. But to speak of such who by their virtue, rather than fortune, have advanced themselves to that dignity, I say that the most renowned and excellent are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like. And though Moses might be reasonably excepted, as being only the executioner of God's immediate commands, yet he deserves to be mentioned, if it were only for that grace which rendered him capable of communication with God. But if we consider Cyrus, and the rest of the conquerors and founders of monarchies, we shall find them extraordinary; and examining their lives and exploits, they will appear not much different from Moses, who had so incomparable a Master; for by their conversations and successes they do not seem to have received anything from fortune but occasion and opportunity, in introducing what forms of government they pleased; and as without that occasion the greatness of their courage had never been known, so had not they been magnanimous, and taken hold of it, that occasion had happened in vain. It was necessary, therefore, for Moses that the people of Israel should be in captivity in Egypt that to free themselves from bondage they
might be disposed to follow him. It was con-
that Romulus should be turned out of A
exposed to the wild beasts when he was you
he might afterwards be made King of Rom
founder of that great empire. It was not un
likewise, that Cyrus should find the Persians m
at the tyranny of the Medes, and that the Medes
should be grown soft and effeminate with their long
peace. Theseus could never have given proof of his
virtue and generosity had not the Athenians been
in great trouble and confusion. These great ad-
vantages made those great persons eminent, and
their great wisdom knew how to improve them to the
reputation and enlargement of their country. They,
then, who become great by the ways of virtue (as the
princes aforesaid) do meet with many difficulties
before they arrive at their ends, but having compassed
them once they easily keep them. The difficulties
in the acquisition arise in part from new laws and
customs which they are forced to introduce for the
establishment and security of their own dominion;
and this is to be considered, that there is nothing
more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to succeed,
and more dangerous to manage, than to make one's
self prince, and prescribe new laws. Because he who innovates in that manner has for his enemies all those who made any advantage by the old laws; and those who expect benefit by the new will be but cool and lukewarm in his defence; which lukewarmness proceeds from a certain awe for their adversaries, who have their old laws on their side, and partly from a natural incredulity in mankind, which gives credit but slowly to any new thing, unless recommended first by the experiment of success. Hence it proceeds, that the first time the adversary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskness and vigour; but the defence is so trepid and faint, that for the most part the new prince and his adherents perish together. Wherefore for better discussion of this case it is necessary to inquire whether these innovators do stand upon their own feet, or depend upon other people; that is to say, whether in the conduct of their affairs they do make more use of their rhetoric than their arms. In the first case they commonly miscarry, and their designs seldom succeed; but when their expectations are only from themselves, and they have power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed, they run little or
no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further eviction, the Scripture shows us that those of the prophets whose arms were in their hands, and had power to compel, succeeded better in the reformations which they designed; whereas those who came only with exhortation and good language suffered martyrdom and banishment, because (besides the reasons aforesaid) the people are inconstant and susceptible of any new doctrine at first, but not easily brought to retain it; so that things are to be ordered in such manner that when their faith begins to stagger they may be forced to persist. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus could never have made their laws to have been long observed had they not had power to have compelled it; as in our days it happened to Friar Jerome Savonarola, who ruined himself by his new institutions as soon as the people of Florence began to desert him, for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his opinion, nor to constrain such as dissented. Therefore such persons meet with great difficulty in their affairs; all their dangers are still by the way, which they can hardly overcome, but by some extraordinary virtue and excellence; nevertheless, when
once they have surmounted them, and arrived at any degree of veneration, having supplanted those who envied their advancement, they remain puissant and firm, and honourable and happy. I will add to these great examples another, perhaps not so conspicuous, but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest, and shall satisfy me for all others of that nature. It is of Hiero of Syracuse, who of a private person was made prince of that city, for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occasion, because the Syracusans being under oppression chose him for their captain, in which command he behaved himself so well he deserved to be made their prince, for he was a person of so great virtue and excellence that those who have written of him have given him this character, that even in his private condition he wanted nothing but a kingdom to make him an admirable king. This Hiero subdued the old militia, established a new; renounced the old allies, confederated with others, and having friends and forces of his own, he was able upon such a foundation to erect what fabric he pleased, so that though the acquisition cost him much trouble he maintained it with little.
CHAPTER VII.

Of new Principalities acquired by accident and the supplies of other people.

They who from private condition ascend to be princes, and merely by the indulgence of fortune, arrive without much trouble at their dignity, though it costs them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their passage, being hurried as it were with wings, yet when they come to settle and establish then begins their misery. These kind of persons are such as attain their dignity by bribes, or concession of some other great prince, as it happened to several in Greece, in the cities of Ionia, and upon the Hellespont, where they were invested with that power by Darius for his greater security and glory, and to those emperors who arrived at the empire by the corruption of the soldiers. These persons, I say, subsist wholly upon the pleasure and fortune of those who advanced them, which being two things very valuable and uncertain, they have neither knowledge nor power to continue long in that degree; know not, because, unless he be a man of extraordinary qualities and virtue, it is not reasonable to think he can know
how to command other people, who before lived always in a private condition himself; cannot, because they have no forces upon whose friendship and fidelity they can rely. Moreover, States which are suddenly conquered (as all things else in Nature whose rise and increase is so speedy) can have no root or foundation but what will be shaken and supplanted by the first gust of adversity, unless they who have been so suddenly exalted be so wise as to prepare prudently in time for the conservation of what fortune threw so luckily into their lap, and establish afterwards such fundamentals for their duration as others (which I mentioned before) have done in the like cases. About the arrival at this authority either by virtue, or good fortune, I shall instance in two examples that are fresh in our memory; one is Francis Sforza, the other Cæsar Borgia; Sforza, by just means and extraordinary virtue, made himself Duke of Milan, and enjoyed it in great peace, though gained with much trouble. Borgia, on the other side (called commonly Duke of Valentine), got several fair territories by the fortune of his father Pope Alexander, and lost them all after his death, though he used all his industry, and employed all the arts which a wise
and brave prince ought to do to fix himself in the sphere where the arms and fortune of other people had placed him: for he, as I said before, who laid not his foundation in time, may yet raise his superstructure, but with great trouble to the architect and great danger to the building. If, therefore, the whole progress of the said Duke be considered, it will be found what solid foundations he had laid for his future dominion, of which progress I think it not superfluous to discourse, because I know not what better precepts to display before a new prince than the example of his actions; and though his own orders and methods did him no good, it was not so much his fault as the malignity of his fortune.

Pope Alexander the Sixth had a desire to make his son Duke Valentine great, but he saw many blocks and impediments in the way, both for the present and future. First, he could not see any way to advance him to any territory that depended not upon the Church; and to those in his gift he was sure the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would never consent; for Faenza and Riminum had already put themselves under the Venetian protection. He was likewise sensible that the forces of Italy, especially
those who were capable of assisting him, were in the hands of those who ought to apprehend the greatness of the Pope, as the Ursini, Colonnesei, and their followers, and therefore could not repose any great confidence in them; besides, the laws and alliances of all the States in Italy must of necessity be disturbed before he could make himself master of any part, which was no hard matter to do, finding the Venetians, upon some private interest of their own, inviting the French to another expedition into Italy, which his Holiness was so far from opposing that he promoted it by dissolution of King Louis's former marriage. Louis therefore passed the Alps by the assistance of the Venetians and Alexander's consent, and was no sooner in Milan but he sent forces to assist the Popè in his enterprise against Romagna, which was immediately surrendered upon the king's reputation. Romagna being in this manner reduced by the Duke, and the Colonnesei defeated, being ambitious not only to keep what he had got, but to advance in his conquests, two things obstructed: one was the infidelity of his own army, the other the aversion of the French; for he was jealous of the forces of the Ursini who were in his service, suspected they
would fail him in his need, and either hinder his conquest or take it from him when he had done; and the same fears he had of the French. And his jealousy of the Ursini was much increased when, after the expugnation of Faenza, assaulting Bologna, he found them very cold and backward in the attack. And the King's inclination he discovered when, having possessed himself of the Duchy of Urbin, he invaded Tuscany, and was by him required to desist. Whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no longer upon fortune and foreign assistance, and the first course he took was to weaken the party of the Ursini and Colonni in Rome, which he effected very neatly by debauching such of their adherents as were gentlemen, taking them into his own service, and giving them honourable pensions and governments and commands, according to their respective qualities; so that in a few months their passion for that faction evaporated, and they turned all for the Duke. After this he attended an opportunity of supplanting the Ursini, as he had done the family of the Colonni before, which happened very luckily, and was as luckily improved: for the Ursini, considering too late that the greatness of the Duke and the Church
tended to their ruin, held a council at a place called Magione, in Perugia, which occasioned the rebellion of Urbin, the tumults in Romagna, and a thousand dangers to the Duke besides; but though he overcame them all by the assistance of the French, and recovered his reputation, yet he grew weary of his foreign allies, as having nothing further to oblige them, and betook himself to his artifice, which he managed so dexterously that the Ursini reconciled themselves to him by the mediation of Seignor Paulo, with whom for his security he comported so handsomely by presenting with money, rich stuffs, and horses, that being convinced of his integrity, he conducted them to Sinigaglia, and delivered them into the Duke's hands. Having by this means exterminated the chief of his adversaries, and reduced their friends, the Duke had laid a fair foundation for his greatness, having gained Romagna and the Duchy of Urbin, and insinuated with the people by giving them a gust of their future felicity. And because this part is not unworthy to be known for imitation sake, I will not pass it in silence. When the Duke had possessed himself of Romagna, finding it had been governed by poor and inferior lords, who had
rather robbed than corrected their subjects, and
given them more occasion of discord than unity, in-
somuch as that province was full of robberies, riots,
and all manner of insolencies; to reduce them to
unanimity and subjection to monarchy, he thought
it necessary to provide them a good governor, and
thereupon he conferred that charge upon Remiro
d'Orco, with absolute power, though he was a cruel
and passionate man. Orco was not long before he
had settled it in peace, with no small reputation to
himself. Afterwards, the Duke, apprehending so
large a power might grow odious to the people, he
erected a court of judicature in the middle of the
province, in which every city had its advocate, and
an excellent person was appointed to preside. And
because he discovered that his past severity had
created him many enemies, to remove that ill opinion,
and recover the affections of the people, he had a
mind to show that, if any cruelty had been exercised,
it proceeded not from him but from the arrogance of
his minister; and for their further confirmation, he
caused the said governor to be apprehended, and
his head chopped off one morning in the market-
place at Cesena, with a wooden dagger on one side
THE PRINCE.

of him and a bloody knife on the other; the ferocity of which spectacle not only appeased but amazed the people for a while. But resuming our discourse, I say, the Duke finding himself powerful enough, and secure against present danger, being himself as strong as he desired, and his neighbours in a manner reduced to an incapacity of hurting him, being willing to go on with his conquests, there remaining nothing but a jealousy of France, and not without cause, for he knew that king had found his error at last, and would be sure to obstruct him. Hereupon he began to look abroad for new allies, and to hesitate and stagger towards France, as appeared when the French army advanced into the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who had besieged Cajeta. His great design was to secure himself against the French, and he had doubtless done it if Alexander had lived. These were his provisions against the dangers that were imminent; but those that were remote were more doubtful and uncertain. The first thing he feared was lest the next Pope should be his enemy, and reassume all that Alexander had given him, to prevent which he proposed four several ways. The first was by destroying the whole line of those lords
whom he had dispossessed, that his Holiness might have no occasion to restore them. The second was to cajole the nobility in Rome, and draw them over to his party, that thereby he might put an awe and restraint upon the Pope. The third was, if possible, to make the College his friends. The fourth was to make himself so strong before the death of his father as to be able to stand upon his own legs and repel the first violence that should be practised against him. Three of these four expedients he had tried before Alexander died, and was in a fair way for the fourth; all the disseized lords which came into his clutches he put to death, and left few of them remaining; he had insinuated with the nobility of Rome, and got a great party in the College of Cardinals; and as to his own corroboration, he had designed to make himself master of Tuscany, had got possession of Perugia and Piombino already, and taken Pisa into his protection. And having now farther regard of the French (who were beaten out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniard, and both of them reduced to necessity of seeking his amity), he leaped bluntly into Pisa, after which Lucca and Sienna submitted without much trouble, partly in hatred to the Floren-
tines, and partly for fear; and the Florentines were grown desperate and without any hopes of relief; so that had these things happened before, as they did the same year in which Alexander died, doubtless he had gained so much strength and reputation that he would have stood firm by himself upon the basis of his own power and conduct, without depending upon fortune or any foreign supplies. But his father died five years after his son had taken up arms, and left him nothing solid and in certainty, but Romagna only, and the rest were in nubibus, infested with two formidable armies, and himself mortally sick. This Duke was a man of that magnanimity and prudence, understood so well which way men were to be wheedled, or destroyed, and such were the foundations that he had laid in a short time, that had he not had those two great armies upon his back, and a fierce distemper upon his body, he had overcome all difficulties and brought his designs to perfection. That the foundations which he had laid were plausible appeared by the patience of his subjects in Romagna, who held out for him a complete month, though they knew he was at death's door, and unlikely ever to come out of Rome, to which place, though the
Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Ursini returned, seeing there was no likelihood of his recovery, yet they could not gain any of his party, nor debauch them to their side. It is possible he was not able to put who he pleased into the Pontifical chair, yet he had power enough to keep any man out who he thought was his enemy; but had it been his fortune to have been well when his father Alexander died, all things had succeeded to his mind. He told me himself, about the time that Julius XI. was created, that he had considered well the accidents that might befall him upon the death of his father, and provided against them all, only he did not imagine that at his death he should be so near it himself. Upon serious examination, therefore, of the whole conduct of Duke Valentine, I see nothing to be reprehended; it seems rather proper to me to propose him, as I have done, as an example for the imitation of all such as by the favour of fortune, or the supplies of other princes, have got into the saddle; for his mind being so large, and his intentions so high, he could not do otherwise, and nothing could have opposed the greatness and wisdom of his designs but his own infirmity and the death of his father. He, therefore,
who thinks it necessary in the minority of his
dominion to secure himself against his enemies, to
gain himself friends; to overcome, whether by force
or by fraud; to make himself beloved or feared by
his people; to be followed and reverenced by his
soldiers; to destroy and exterminate such as would
do him injury; to repeal and suppress old laws, and
introduce new; to be severe, grateful, magnanimous,
liberal, cashier and disband such of his army as were
unfaithful, and put new in their places; manage
himself so in his alliances with kings and princes that
all of them should be either obliged to requite him
or afraid to offend him: he, I say, cannot find a
fresher or better model than the actions of this
prince. If in anything he is to be condemned, it is
in suffering the election of Julius XI., which was
much to his prejudice; for though, as is said before,
he might be unable to make the Pope as he pleased,
yet it was in his power to have put any one by, and
he ought never to have consented to the election of
any of the cardinals whom he had formerly offended,
or who, after their promotion, were like to be jealous
of him; for men are as mischievous for fear as for
hatred. Those cardinals which he had disobliged
were, among others, the cardinals of St. Peter ad Vincula, Collonno St. George, and Ascanius. The rest, if any of them were advanced to the Papacy, might well be afraid of him, except the Spanish cardinals and the cardinal of Roan; the Spaniards by reason of their obligations and alliance, and the other by reason of his interest in the kingdom of France. Wherefore, above all things, the Duke should have made a Spanish cardinal Pope; and if that could not have been done, he should rather have consented to the election of Roan than St. Peter ad Vincula; for it is weakness to believe that among great persons new obligations can obliterate old injuries and disgusts. So that in the election of this Julius XI. Duke Valentine committed an error that was the cause of his utter destruction.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of such as have arrived at their Dominion by wicked and unjustifiable means.

Now because there are two ways from a private person to become a prince, which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to fortune or manage-
ment, I think it not convenient to pretermit them, though of one of them I may speak more largely where occasion is offered to treat more particularly of Republics. One of the ways is, when one is advanced to the sovereignty by any illegal nefarious means; the other, when a citizen by the favour and partiality of his fellow-citizens is made prince of his country. I shall speak of the first in this chapter, and justify what I say by two examples, one ancient, the other modern, without entering further into the merits of the cause, as judging them sufficient for any man who is necessitated to follow them. Agathocles, the Sicilian, not only from a private, but from a vile and abject, condition was made king of Syracuse; and being but the son of a potter, he continued the dissoluteness of his life through all the degrees of his fortune; nevertheless, his vices were accompanied with such courage and activity that he applied himself to the wars, by which, and his great industry, he came at length to the pretor of Syracuse. Being settled in that dignity, and having concluded to make himself prince, and hold that by violence, without obligation to anybody, which was conferred upon him by consent, he settled an intelligence with
Amilcar the Carthaginian, who was then at the head of an army in Sicily, and calling the people and Senate of Syracuse together one morning, as if he had been to consult them in some matter of importance to the State, upon a signal appointed he caused all his soldiers to kill all the senators and the most wealthy of the people; after whose death he usurped and possessed the dominion of that city without any obstruction; and though afterwards he lost two great battles to the Carthaginians, and at length was besieged, yet he was not only able to defend that city, but leaving part of his forces for the security of that, with the rest he transported into Africa, and ordered things so that in a short time he relieved Syracuse, and reduced the Carthaginians into such extreme necessity that they were glad to make peace with him, and contenting themselves with Africa, leave Sicily to Agathocles. He then who examines the exploits and conduct of Agathocles will find little or nothing that may be attributed to fortune, seeing he rose not, as is said before, by the favour of any man, but by the steps and gradations of war, with a thousand difficulties and dangers having gotten that government, which he maintained afterwards
with as many noble achievements. Nevertheless it cannot be called virtue in him to kill his fellow-citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pity, or religion; these are ways may get a man empire, but no glory or reputation. Yet if the wisdom of Agathocles be considered, his dexterity in encountering and overcoming of dangers, his courage in supporting and surmounting his misfortunes, I do not see why he should be held inferior to the best captains of his time. But his unbounded cruelty and barbarous inhumanity, added to a million of other vices, will not permit that he be numbered amongst the most excellent men. So then, that which he performed cannot justly be attributed to either fortune or virtue; for he did all himself, without either the one or the other. In our days, under the Papacy of Alexander VI., Oliverotto da Fermo being left young many years since by his parents, was brought up by his uncle by the mother’s side, called John Fogliani, and in his youth listed a soldier under Paulo Vitelli, that having improved himself by his discipline, he might be capable of some eminent command. Paulo being dead, he served under Vitellezzo, his brother, and in a short time by the acuteness of his
parts and the briskness of his courage, became one of the best officers in his army. But thinking it beneath him to continue in any man's service, he conspired with some of his fellow-citizens of Fermo (to whom the servitude of their country was more agreeable than its liberty) by the help of Vitellesco to seize upon Fermo. In order to which, he wrote a letter to his uncle John Fogliano, importing that, having been absent many years, he had thoughts of visiting him and Fermo, and taking some little diversion in the place where he was born, and because the design of his service had been only the gaining of honour, that his fellow-citizens might see his time had not been ill-spent, he desired admission for a hundred horse of his friends and his equipage, and begged of him that he would take care they might be honourably received, which would redound not only to his honour, but his uncle's, who had had the bringing him up. John was not wanting in any office to his nephew, and having caused him to be nobly received, he lodged him in his own house, where he continued some days, preparing in the meantime what was necessary to the execution of his wicked design. He made a great entertainment, to
which he invited John Fogliani and all the chief citizens in the town. About the end of the treatment when they were entertaining one another, as is usual at such times, Oliverotto very subtilly promoted certain grave discourses about the greatness of Pope Alexander and Cæsar his son, and of their designs. John and the rest replying freely to what was said, Oliverotto smiled, and told them those were points to be argued more privately, and thereupon removing into a chamber, his uncle and the rest of his fellow-citizens followed. They were scarce sat down before soldiers (which were concealed about the room) came forth and killed all of them, and the uncle among the rest. After the murder was committed, Oliverotto mounted on horseback, rode about, and rummaged the whole town, having besieged the chief magistrate in his palace; so that for fear all people submitted, and he established a government of which he made himself head. Having put such to death as were discontented, and in any capacity of doing him hurt, he fortified himself with new laws, both military and civil, insomuch as in a year's time he had not only fixed himself in Fermo, but was become terrible to all that were about him; and he would have been
as hard as Agathocles to be supplanted, had he not suffered himself to have been circumvented by Cæsar Borgia, when at Singalia (as aforesaid) he took the Ursini and Vitelli; where also he himself was taken a year after his parricide was committed, and strangled with his master Vitellozzo, from whom he had learned all his good qualities and evil.

It may seem wonderful to some people how it should come to pass that Agathocles, and such as he, after so many treacheries and acts of inhumanity, should live quietly in their own country so long, defend themselves so well against foreign enemies, and none of their subjects conspire against them at home, seeing several others, by reason of their cruelty, have not been able, even in times of peace as well as war, to defend their government. I conceive it fell out according as their cruelty was well or ill applied; I say well applied (if that word may be added to an ill action), and it may be called so when committed but once, and that of necessity for one's own preservation, but never repeated afterwards, and even then converted as much as possible to the benefit of the subjects. Ill applied are such
cruelties as are but few in the beginning, but in time do rather multiply than decrease. Those who are guilty of the first do receive assistance sometimes both from God and man, and Agathocles is an instance. But the others cannot possibly subsist long. From whence it is to be observed, that he who usurps the government of any State is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occasion to renew them often, but that by his discontinuance he may mollify the people, and by his benefits bring them over to his side. He who does otherwise, whether for fear or ill counsel, is obliged to be always ready with his knife in his hand; for he can never repose any confidence in his subjects, whilst they, by reason of his fresh and continued inhumanities, cannot be secure against him. So then injuries are to be committed all at once, that the last being the less, the distaste may be likewise the less; but benefits should be distilled by drops, that the relish may be the greater. Above all, a prince is so to behave himself towards his subjects that neither good fortune nor bad should be able to alter him; for being once assaulted with adversity, you have no
time to do mischief; and the good which you do, does you no good, being looked upon as forced, and so no thanks to be due for it.

CHAPTER IX.

Of Civil Principality.

I SHALL speak now of the other way, when a principal citizen, not by wicked contrivance or intolerable violence, is made sovereign of his country, which may be called a civil principality, and is not to be attained by either virtue or fortune alone, but by a lucky sort of craft; this man, I say, arrives at the government by the favour of the people or nobility, for in all cities the meaner and the better sort of citizens are of different humours, and it proceeds from hence that the common people are not willing to be commanded and oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are not to be satisfied without it. From this diversity of appetite one of these three effects do arise—principality, liberty, or licentiousness. Principality is caused either by the people or the great ones, as either the one or the
other has occasion; the great ones, finding themselves unable to resist the popular torrent, do many times unanimously confer their whole authority upon one person, and create him prince, that under his protection they may be quiet and secure. The people, on the other side, when overpowered by their adversaries, do the same thing, transmitting their power to a single person, who is made king for their better defence. He who arrives at the sovereignty by the assistance of the great ones preserves it with more difficulty than he who is advanced by the people, because he has about him many of his old associates, who, thinking themselves his equals, are not to be directed and managed as he would have them. But he that is preferred by the people stands alone without equals, and has nobody, or very few, about him but what are ready to obey; moreover, the grandees are hardly to be satisfied without injury to others, which is otherwise with the people, because their designs are more reasonable than the designs of the great ones, which are fixed upon commanding and oppressing altogether, whilst the people endeavour only to defend and secure themselves. Moreover, where the people are adverse the prince can
never be safe, by reason of their numbers; whereas the great ones are but few, and by consequence not so dangerous. The worst that a prince can expect from an injured and incensed people is to be deserted; but, if the great ones be provoked, he is not only to fear abandoning, but conspiracy and banding against him; for the greater sort being more provident and cunning, they look out in time to their own safety, and make their interest with the person who they hope will overcome. Besides, the prince is obliged to live always with one and the same people; but with the grandees he is under no such obligation, for he may create and degrade, advance and remove them as he pleases. But for the better explication of this part, I say, that these great men are to be considered two ways especially; that is, whether in the manner of their administration they do wholly follow the fortune and interest of the prince, or whether they do otherwise. Those who devote themselves entirely to his business, and are not rapacious, are to be valued and preferred. Those who are more remiss, and will not stick to their prince, do it commonly upon two motives, either out of laziness or fear (and in those cases they may
be employed, especially if they be wise and of good counsel, because, if affairs prosper, thou gainest honour thereby; if they miscarry, thou needest not to fear them) or upon ambition and design, and that is a token that their thoughts are more intent upon their own advantage than thine. Of these a prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care, and order them as if they were enemies professed; for in his distress they will be sure to set him forwards, and do what they can to destroy him. He, therefore, who comes to be prince by the favour and suffrage of the people is obliged to keep them his friends, which (their desire being nothing but freedom from oppression) may be easily done.

But he that is preferred by the interest of the nobles against the minds of the commons, is, above all things, to endeavour to ingratiate with the people, which will be as the other if he undertakes their protection; and men receiving good offices, where they expected ill, are endeared by the surprise, and become better affected to their benefactor than perhaps they would have been had he been made prince by their immediate favour. There are many ways of insinuating with the people of which no certain rule can be
given, because they vary according to the diversity of the subject, and therefore I shall pass them at this time, concluding with this assertion—that it is necessary, above all things, that a prince preserve the affections of his people, otherwise, in any exigence, he has no refuge or remedy. Nabides, Prince of the Spartans, sustained all Greece and a victorious army of the Romans, and defended the government and country against them all; and to do that great action it was sufficient for him to secure himself against the machinations of a few; whereas, if the people had been his enemy, that would not have done it. Let no man impugn my opinion with that old saying, "He that builds upon the people builds upon the sand." That is true, indeed, when a citizen of private condition relies upon the people, and persuades himself that when the magistrate or his adversary goes about to oppress him they will bring him off, in which case many precedents may be produced, and particularly the Gracchi in Rome, and Georgio Scali in Florence. But if the prince that builds upon them knows how to command, and be a man of courage, not dejected in adversity, nor deficient in his other preparations,
but keeps up the spirits of his people by his own valour and conduct, he shall never be deserted by them, nor find his foundations laid in a wrong place.

These kind of governments are most tottering and uncertain when the prince strains of a sudden, and passes, as at one leap, from a civil to an absolute power; and the reason is, because they either command and act by themselves or by the ministry and mediation of the magistrate. In this last case their authority is weaker and more ticklish, because it depends much upon the pleasure and concurrence of the chief officers, who, in time of adversity especially, can remove them easily, either by neglecting or resisting their commands; nor is there any way for such a prince, in the perplexity of his affairs, to establish a tyranny, because those citizens and subjects who used to exercise the magistracy retain still such power and influence upon the people, that they will not infringe the laws to obey his; and in time of danger he shall always want such as he can trust. So that a prince is not to take his measures according to what he sees in times of peace, when of the subjects, having nothing to do but to be governed, every one runs, every one
promises, and every one dies for him when death is at a distance; but when times are tempestuous, and the ship of the State has need of the help and assistance of the subject, there are but few will expose themselves, and this experiment is the more dangerous because it can be practised but once. So, then, a prince who is provident and wise ought to carry himself so that in all places, times, and occasions the people may have need of his administration and regiment, and ever after they shall be faithful and true.

CHAPTER X.

How the strength of all Principalities is to be computed.

To any man that examines the nature of principalities, it is worthy his consideration whether a prince has power and territory enough to subsist by himself, or whether he needs the assistance and protection of other people. To clear the point a little better, I think those princes capable of ruling who are able, either by the numbers of their men or the greatness of their wealth, to raise a complete army, and bid battle to any that shall invade them; and
those I think depend upon others, who of themselves dare not meet their enemy in the field, but are forced to keep within their bounds and defend them as well they can. Of the first we have spoken already, and shall say more as occasion is presented. Of the second no more can be said, but to advise such princes to strengthen and fortify the capital town in their dominions, and not to trouble themselves with the whole country; and whoever shall do that, and in other things manage himself with the subjects as I have described, and perhaps shall do hereafter, shall with great caution be invaded; for men are generally wary and tender of enterprising anything that is difficult, and no great easiness is to be found in attacking a town well fortified and provided, where the prince is not hated by the people.

The towns in Germany are many of them free; though their country and district be but small, yet they obey the Emperor but when they please, and are in no awe either of him or any other prince of the empire, because they are all so well fortified. Every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a work of great difficulty and time, their walls being so strong, their ditches so deep, their works so
regular and well provided with cannon, and their stores and magazines always furnished for a twelve-month. Besides which, for the aliment and sustenance of the people, and that they may be no burden to the public, they have workhouses where, for a year together, the poor may be employed in such things as are the nerves and life of that city, and sustain themselves by their labour. Military discipline and exercises are likewise in much request there, and many laws and good customs they have to maintain them.

A prince then who has a city well fortified, and the affections of his people, is not easily to be molested, and he that does molest him is like to repent it; for the affairs of this world are so various, it is almost impossible for any army to lie quietly a whole year before a town without interruption. If any objects that the people having houses and possessions out of the town will not have patience to see them plundered and burned, and that charity to themselves will make them forget their prince, I answer, that a wise and dexterous prince will easily evade those difficulties by encouraging his subjects and persuading them, sometimes
their troubles will not be long; sometimes inculcating and possessing them with the cruelty of the enemy; and sometimes by correcting and securing himself nimbly of such as appear too turbulent and audacious. Moreover, the usual practice is for the enemy to plunder and set the country on fire at their first coming; whilst every man's spirit is high and fixed upon defence; so that the prince needs not concern himself, nor be fearful of that, for those mischiefs are passed, and inconveniencies received, and when the people in three or four days' time begin to be cool, and consider things soberly, they will find there is no remedy, and join more cordially with the prince, looking upon him as under an obligation to them for having sacrificed their houses and estates in his defence. And the nature of man is such to take as much pleasure in having obliged another as in being obliged himself. Wherefore, all things fairly considered, it is no such hard matter for a prince not only to gain, but to retain, the affection of his subjects, and make them patient of a long siege, if he be wise and provident, and takes care they want nothing either for their livelihood or defence.
CHAPTER XI.

Of Ecclesiastical Principalities.

There remains nothing of this nature to be discoursed but of Ecclesiastical Principalities, about which the greatest difficulty is to get into possession, because they are gained either by fortune or virtue, but kept without either, being supported by ancient statutes universally received in the Christian Church, which are of such power and authority they do keep their prince in his dignity, let his conversation or conduct be what it will. These are the only persons who have lands and do not defend them; subjects, and do not govern them; and yet their lands are not taken from them, though they never defend them; nor their subjects dissatisfied, though they never regard them: so that these principalities are the happiest and most secure in the world, by being managed by a supernatural power, above the wisdom and contrivance of man. I shall speak no more of them, for, being set up and continued by God Himself, it would be great presumption in any man who should undertake to dispute them. Nevertheless, if
it should be questioned how it came to pass that in temporal things the Church is arrived at that height; seeing that, before Alexander's time, the Italian princes, not only such as were sovereigns, but every baron and lord, how inconsiderable soever in temporal affairs, esteemed of them but little; yet, since it has been able not only to startle and confront the King of France, but to drive him out of Italy, and to ruin the Venetians, the reason of which, though already well known, I think it not superfluous to revive in some measure.

Before Charles, King of France, passed himself into Italy, that province was under the empire of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. It was the interest of these potentates to have a care, some of them that no foreign prince should come with an army into Italy, and some that none among themselves should usurp upon the other. Those of whom the rest were concerned to be most jealous were the Pope and the Venetians; to restrain the Venetians all the rest were used to confederate, as in the defence of Ferrara. To keep under the Pope, the Roman barons contributed much, who, being divided into two factions
(the Ursini and Colonna, in perpetual contention, with their arms constantly in their hands under the very nose of the Pope), they kept the pontifical power very low and infirm; and although now and then there happened a courageous Pope, as Sextus, yet neither his courage, wisdom, nor fortune was able to disentangle him from those incommodities, and the shortness of their reign was the reason thereof; for ten years' time, which was as much as any of them reigned, was scarce sufficient for the suppression of either of the parties; and when the Colonna, as a man may say, were almost extinct, a new enemy sprang up against the Ursini, which revived the Colonna and re-established them again. This emulation and animosity at home was the cause the Pope was no more formidable in Italy. After this, Alexander VI. was advanced to the Papacy, who, more than all that had ever been before him, demonstrated what a Pope with money and power was able to do. Having taken advantage of the French invasion, by the ministry and conduct of Duke Valen
tine, he performed all that I have mentioned elsewhere among the actions of the said Duke. And though his design was not so much to advantage the
Church as to aggrandize the Duke, yet what he did for the one turned afterwards to the benefit of the other; for, the Pope being dead and Valentine extinct, what both of them had got devolved upon the Church. After him Julius succeeded, and found the Church in a flourishing condition. Romagna was wholly in its possession, the barons of Rome exterminated and gone, and their factions suppressed by Pope Alexander, and, besides, a way opened for raising and hoarding of money never practised before; which way Julius improving rather than otherwise, he began to entertain thoughts, not only of conquering Bologna, but mastering the Venetians and forcing the French out of Italy; all which great enterprises succeeding, it added much to his honour that he improperly nothing, but gave all to the Church. He maintained also the Colonnesei and Ursini in the same condition as he found them; and though in case of sedition there were those ready on both sides to have headed them, yet there were two considerations which kept them at peace: one was the greatness of the Church, which kept them in awe; the other was their want of cardinals, which indeed was the original of their discontent, and will never cease till some of them be
advanced to that dignity; for by them the parties in Rome and without are maintained, and the barons obliged to defend them. So that the ambition of the prelates is the cause of all the dissension and tumults among the barons.

His present Holiness Pope Leo had the happiness to be elected at a time when it was most powerful, and it is hoped, if they made the Church great by their arms, he, by the integrity of his conversation and a thousand other virtues, will enlarge it much more, and make it more venerable and august.

CHAPTER XII.

How many Forms there are of Military Discipline, and of those Soldiers which are called Mercenary.

Having spoken particularly of the several sorts of principalities, as I proposed in the beginning; considered in part the reasons of their constitution and their evil, and the ways which many have taken to acquire and preserve them; it remains that I proceed now in a general way upon such things as may conduce to the offence or defence of either of them.

We have declared before that it is not only ex-
pedient but necessary for a prince to take care his foundations be good, otherwise his fabric will be sure to fail.

The principal foundations of all States—new, old, or mixed—are good laws and good arms; and because there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where the arms are good there must be good laws, I shall pass by the laws and discourse of the arms.

I say the arms, then, with which a prince defends his State are his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. The mercenary and auxiliary are unprofitable and dangerous, and that prince who founds the duration of his government upon his mercenary forces shall never be firm or secure; for they are divided, ambitious, undisciplined, unfaithful, insolent to their friends, abject to their enemies, without fear of God or faith to men; so the ruin of that person who trusts to them is no longer protracted than the attempt is deferred; in time of peace they divorce you, in time of war they desert you, and the reason is because it is not love nor any principle of honour that keeps them in the field; it is only their pay, and that is not a consideration strong enough to prevail
with them to die for you; whilst you have no service to employ them in, they are excellent soldiers; but tell them of an engagement, and they will either disband before or run away in the battle.

And to evince this would require no great pains; seeing the ruin of Italy proceeded from no other cause than that for several years together it had reposed itself upon mercenary arms, which forces it is possible may have formerly done service to some particular person, and behaved themselves well enough among one another; but no sooner were they attacked by a powerful foreigner, but they discovered themselves, and showed what they were to the world. Hence it was that Charles VII chalked out his own way into Italy; and that person was in the right who affirmed our own faults were the cause of our miseries. But it was not those faults he believed, but those I have mentioned, which being committed most eminently by princes, they suffered most remarkably in the punishment. But to come closer to the point, and give you a clearer prospect of the imperfection and infelicity of those forces. The great officers of these mercenaries are men of great courage, or otherwise; if the first,
you can never be safe, for they always aspire to make themselves great, either by supplanting of you who is their master, or oppressing of other people whom you desired to have preserved; and, on the other side, if the commanders be not courageous, you are ruined again. If it should be urged that all generals will do the same, whether mercenaries or others, I would answer, that all war is managed either by a prince or republic. The prince is obliged to go in person, and perform the office of general himself; the republic must depute some one of her choice citizens, who is to be changed if he carries himself ill; if he behaves himself well he is to be continued, but so straitened and circumscribed by his commission that he may not transgress. And indeed experience tells us that princes alone, and commonwealths alone, with their own private forces have performed great things, whereas mercenaries do nothing but hurt. Besides, a martial commonwealth that stands upon its own legs and maintains itself by its own prowess is not easily usurped, and falls not so readily under the obedience of one of their fellow-citizens as where all the forces are foreign. Rome and Sparta maintained their own
liberty for many years together by their own forces and arms. The Swiss are more martial than their neighbours, and by consequence more free. Of the danger of mercenary forces we have an ancient example in the Carthaginians, who, after the end of their first war with the Romans, had like to have been ruined and overrun by their own mercenaries, though their own citizens commanded them.

After the death of Epaminondas the Thebans made Philip of Macedon their general, who defeated their enemies and enslaved themselves. Upon the death of Duke Philip the Milanese entertained Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and Francesco, having worsted the enemy at Caravaggio, joined himself with him, with design to have mastered his masters. Francesco's father was formerly in the service of Joan, Queen of Naples, and on a sudden marched away from her with his army and left her utterly destitute, so that she was constrained to throw herself under the protection of the King of Arragon; and though the Venetians and Florentines both have lately enlarged their dominion by employing these forces, and their generals have rather advanced than enslaved them, I answer that the
Florentines may impute it to their good fortune, because of such of their generals as they might have rationally feared some had no victories to encourage them, others were obstructed, and others turned their ambition another way. He that was not victorious was Giovanni Acuto, whose fidelity could not be known because he had no opportunity to break it, but everybody knows, had he succeeded, the Florentines had been all at his mercy. Sforza had always the Braccheschi in opposition, and they were reciprocally an impediment the one to the other. Francesco turned his ambition upon Lombardy, Braccio upon the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But to speak of more modern occurrences. The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their general, a wise man, and one who from a private fortune had raised himself to a great reputation. Had Paul taken Pisa, nobody can be insensible how the Florentines must have comported with him; for should he have quitted their service and taken pay of their enemy they had been lost without remedy, and to have continued him in that power had been in time to have made him their master. If the progress of the Venetians be considered, they will
be found to have acted securely and honourably, whilst their affairs were managed by their own forces (which was before they attempted anything upon the *terra firma*); then all was done by the gentlemen and common people of that city, and they did very great things; but when they began to enterprise at land, they began to abate of their old reputation and discipline and to degenerate into the customs of Italy; and when they began to conquer first upon the continent, having no great territory, and their reputation being formidable abroad, there was no occasion that they should be much afraid of their officers; but afterwards, when they began to extend their empire under the command of Car-mignola, then it was they became sensible of their error; for having found him to be a great captain by their victories, under his conduct, against the Duke of Milan, perceiving him afterwards grow cool and remiss in their service, they concluded no more great things were to be expected from him; and being neither willing, nor indeed able, to take away his commission, for fear of losing what they had got, they were constrained for their own security to put him to death. Their generals after him were Bar-
tolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, and the Conte de Pitigliano, and such as they, under whose conduct the Venetians were more like to lose than to gain, as it happened not long after at Vaila, where in one battle they lost as much as they had been gaining eight hundred years with incredible labour and difficulty; which is not strange, if it be considered that by those kind of forces the conquests are slow, and tedious, and weak; but their losses are rapid and wonderful. And because I am come with my examples into Italy, where for many years all things have been managed by mercenary armies, I shall lay my discourse a little higher, that their original and progress being rendered more plain, they may with more ease be regulated and corrected. You must understand that in later times, when the Roman empire began to decline in Italy, and the Pope to take upon him authority in temporal affairs, Italy became divided into several States; for many of the great cities took arms against their nobility, who, having been formerly favoured by the emperors, kept the people under oppression, against which the Church opposed, to gain to itself a reputation and interest in temporal affairs; other cities were sub-
due by their citizens, who made themselves princes; so that Italy, upon the translation of the empire, being fallen into the hands of the Pope and some other commonwealths, and those priests and citizens unacquainted with the use and exercise of arms, they began to take foreigners into their pay. The first man who gave reputation to these kind of forces was Alberigo da Como of Romagna; among the rest, Braccio and Sforza (the two great arbiters of Italy in their time) were brought up under his discipline, after whom succeeded the rest who commanded the armies in Italy to our days; and the end of their great discipline and conduct was, that Italy was overrun by Charles, pillaged by Louis, violated by Ferrand, and defamed by the Swiss. The order which they observed was, first to take away the reputation from the foot and appropriate it to themselves; and this they did, because their dominion being but small, and to be maintained by their own industry, a few foot could not do their business, and a great body they could not maintain. Hereupon they changed their militia into horse, which, being digested into troops, they sustained and rewarded themselves with the commands, and
by degrees this way of cavalry was grown so much in fashion that in an army of 20,000 men there were scarce 2,000 foot to be found. Besides, they endeavoured with all possible industry to prevent trouble or fear, either to themselves or their soldiers, and their way was by killing nobody in fight, only taking one another prisoners, and dismissing them afterwards without either prejudice or ransom. When they were in leaguer before a town, they shot not rudely amongst them in the night, nor did they in the town disturb them with any sallies in their camp; no approaches or intrenchments were made at unseasonable hours, and nothing of lying in the field when winter came on; and all these things did not happen by any negligence in their officers, but were part of their discipline, and introduced, as is said before, to ease the poor soldier both of labour and danger, by which practices they have brought Italy both into slavery and contempt.
CHAPTER XIII.

Of Auxiliaries, Mixed, and Natural Soldiers.

Auxiliaries (which are another sort of unprofitable soldiers) are when some potent prince is called in to your assistance and defence; as was done not long since by Pope Julius, who, in his enterprise of Ferrara, having seen the sad experience of his mercenary army, betook himself to auxiliaries, and capitulated with Ferrand, King of Spain, that he should come with his forces to his relief. These armies may do well enough for themselves, but he who invites them is sure to be a sufferer; for if they be beaten, he is sure to be a loser; if they succeed, he is left at their discretion; and though ancient histories are full of examples of this kind, yet I shall keep to that of Pope Julius XI., as one still fresh in our memory, whose expedition against Ferrara was very rash and inconsiderate, in that he put all into the hands of a stranger; but his good fortune presented him with a third accident, which prevented his reaping the fruit of his imprudent election; for his subsidiary troops being broke at Ravenna, and the Swiss coming in
and beating off the victors, beyond all expectation he escaped being a prisoner to his enemies, because they also were defeated, and to his auxiliary friends, because he had conquered by other people's arms. The Florentines, being destitute of soldiers, hired 10,000 French for the reduction of Pisa, by which counsel they ran themselves into greater danger than ever they had done in all their troubles before. The Emperor of Constantinople, in opposition to his neighbours, sent 10,000 Turks into Greece, which could not be got out again when the war was at an end, but gave the first beginning to the servitude and captivity which those infidels brought upon that country. He, then, who has no mind to overcome may make use of these forces, for they are much more dangerous than the mercenary, and will ruin you out of hand, because they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people; whereas the mercenaries, after they have gotten a victory, must have longer time and more occasion before they can do you a mischief, in respect they are not one body, but made up out of several countries entertained into your pay, to which, if you add a general of your own, they cannot
suddenly assume so much authority as will be able to do you any prejudice. In short, it is cowardice and sloth that is to be feared in the mercenaries, and courage and activity in the auxiliaries. A wise prince, therefore, never made use of these forces, but committed himself to his own, choosing rather to be overcome with them than to conquer with the other, because he cannot think that a victory which is obtained by other people’s arms. I shall make no scruple to produce Cæsar Borgia for an example. This Duke invaded Romagna with an army of auxiliaries, consisting wholly of French, by whose assistance he took Imola and Furli; but finding them afterwards to totter in their faith, and himself insecure, he betook himself to mercenaries as the less dangerous of the two, and entertained the Ursini and Vitelli into his pay; finding them also irresolute, unfaithful, and dangerous, he dismissed them, and for the future employed none but his own. From hence we may collect the difference betwixt these two sorts of forces, if we consider the difference in the Duke’s reputation when the Ursini and Vitelli were in his service and when he had no soldiers but his own. When he began to stand upon
his own legs his renown began to increase, and, indeed, before his esteem was not so great till everybody found him absolute master of his own army.

Having begun my examples in Italy I am unwilling to leave it, especially whilst it supplies us with such as are fresh in our memory; yet I cannot pass by Hiero of Syracuse, whom I have mentioned before. This person, being made general of the Syracusan army, quickly discovered the mercenary militia was not to be relied upon, their officers being qualified like ours in Italy, and, finding that he could neither continue nor discharge them securely, he ordered things so that they were all cut to pieces, and then prosecuted the war with his own forces alone, without any foreign assistance. To this purpose the Old Testament affords us a figure not altogether improper. When David presented himself to Saul, and offered his service against Goliath, the champion of the Philistines, Saul, to encourage him, accoutred him in his own arms; but David, having tried them on, excused himself, pretending they were unfit, and that with them he should not be able to manage himself; wherefore he desired he
might go forth against the enemy with his own arms only, which were his sling and his sword. The sum of all is, the arms of other people are commonly unfit, and either too wide, or too strait, or too cumbersome.

Charles VII, the father of Louis XI., having by his fortune and courage redeemed his country out of the hands of the English, began to understand the necessity of having soldiers of his own, and erected a militia at home, to consist of horse as well as foot, after which his son, King Louis, cashiered his own foot and took the Swiss into his pay, which error being followed by his successors (as is visible to this day) is the occasion of all the dangers to which that kingdom of France is still obnoxious; for, having advanced the reputation of the Swiss, he villified his own people by disbanding the foot entirely, and accustoming his horse so much to engage with other soldiers that, fighting still in conjunction with the Swiss, they began to believe they could do nothing without them; hence it proceeds that the French are not able to do anything against the Swiss, and without them they will venture upon nothing; so that the French army is mixed, consists of mercenaries
and natives, and is much better than either mercenaries or auxiliaries alone, but much worse than if it were entirely natural, as this example testifies abundantly; for doubtless France would be insuperable if Charles's establishment was made use of and improved. But the imprudence of man begins many things which, savouring of present good, conceal the poison that is latent, as I said before of the hectic fever; wherefore, if he who is raised to any sovereignty foresees not a mischief till it falls upon his head, he is not to be reckoned a wise prince, and truly that is a particular blessing of God bestowed upon few people. If we reflect upon the first cause of the ruin of the Roman empire, it will be found to begin at their entertaining the Goths into their service, for thereby they weakened and enervated their own native courage, and, as it were, transfused it into them.

I conclude, therefore, that without having proper and peculiar forces of his own, no prince is secure, but depends wholly upon fortune, as having no natural and intrinsic strength to sustain him in adversity; and it was always the opinion and position of wise men, that nothing is so infirm and
unstable as the name of power not founded upon forces of its own. Those forces are composed of your subjects, your citizens, or servants; all the rest are either mercenaries or auxiliaries: and as to the manner of ordering and disciplining these domestics, it will not be hard if the orders which I have prescribed be perused, and the way considered which Philip the father of Alexander the Great, and many other princes and republics, have used in the like cases, to which orders and establishments I do wholly refer you.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia.

A PRINCE, then, is to have no other design, nor thought, nor study but war and the arts and disciplines of it; for, indeed, that is the only profession worthy of a prince, and is of so much importance that it not only preserves those who are born princes in their patrimonies, but advances men of private condition to that honourable degree. On the other side, it is frequently seen, when princes have addicted themselves more to delicacy and softness than to
arms, they have lost all, and been driven out of their States; for the principal thing which deprives or gains a man authority is the neglect or profession of that art. Francesco Sforza, by his experience in war, of a private person made himself Duke of Milan, and his children, seeking to avoid the fatigues and incommodities thereof, of dukes became private men; for, among other evils and inconveniences which attend when you are ignorant in war, it makes you contemptible, which is a scandal a prince ought with all diligence to avoid, for reasons I shall name hereafter; besides, betwixt a potent and an impotent, a vigilant and a negligent prince, there is no proportion, it being unreasonable that a martial and generous person should be subject willingly to one that is weak and remiss, or that those who are careless and effeminate should be safe amongst those who are military and active; for the one is too insolent and the other too captious ever to do anything well together: so that a prince unacquainted with the discipline of war, besides other infelicities to which he is exposed, cannot be beloved by, nor confident in, his armies. He never, therefore, ought to relax his thoughts from the exercises of war
not so much as in time of peace; and, indeed, then he should employ his thoughts more studiously therein than in war itself, which may be done two ways, by the application of the body and the mind. As to his bodily application, or matter of action, besides that he is obliged to keep his armies in good discipline and exercise, he ought to inure himself to sports, and by hunting and hawking, and such like recreation, accustom his body to hardship, and hunger, and thirst, and at the same time inform himself of the coasts and situation of the country, the bigness and elevation of the mountains, the largeness and avenues of the valleys, the extent of the plains, the nature of the rivers and fens, which is to be done with great curiosity; and this knowledge is useful two ways, for hereby he not only learns to know his own country and to provide better for its defence, but it prepares and adapts him, by observing their situations, to comprehend the situations of other countries, which will perhaps be necessary for him to discover; for the hills, the vales, the plains, the rivers, and the marshes (for example, in Tuscany), have a certain similitude and resemblance with those in other provinces; so that,
by the knowledge of one, we may easily imagine the rest; and that prince who is defective in this, wants the most necessary qualification of a general; for by knowing the country, he knows how to 'beat up' his enemy, take up his quarters, march his armies, draw up his men, and besiege a town with advantage. In the character which historians give of Philopomenes, Prince of Achaia, one of his great commendations is, that in time of peace he thought of nothing but military affairs, and when he was in company with his friends in the country, he would many times stop suddenly and expostulate with them: If the enemy were upon that hill, and our army where we are, which would have the advantage of the ground? How could we come at them with most security? If we would draw off, how might we do it best? Or, if they would retreat, how might we follow? So that as he was travelling, he would propose all the accidents to which an army was subject; he would hear their opinion, give them his own, and reinforce it with arguments; and this he did so frequently, that by continual practice and a constant intention of his thoughts upon that business, he brought himself to that perfection, no accident
could happen, no inconvenience could occur to an army, but he could presently redress it. But as to the exercise of the mind, a prince is to do that by diligence in history and solemn consideration of the actions of the most excellent men, by observing how they demeaned themselves in the wars, examining the grounds and reasons of their victories and losses, that he may be able to avoid the one and imitate the other; and above all, to keep close to the example of some great captain of old (if any such occurs in his reading), and not only to make him his pattern, but to have all his actions perpetually in his mind, as it was said Alexander did by Achilles, Cæsar by Alexander, Scipio by Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will find how much Scipio advantaged his renown by that imitation, and how much in modesty, affability, humanity, and liberality he framed himself to the description which Xenophon had given him. A wise prince, therefore, is to observe all these rules, and never be idle in time of peace, but employ himself therein with all his industry, that in his adversity he may reap the fruit of it, and when fortune frowns, be ready to defy her.
CHAPTER XV.

Of such things as render Men (especially Princes) worthy of Blame or Applause.

IT remains now that we see in what manner a prince ought to comport with his subjects and friends; and because many have written of this subject before, it may perhaps seem arrogant in me, especially considering that in my discourse I shall deviate from the opinion of other men. But my intention being to write for the benefit and advantage of him who understands, I thought it more convenient to respect the essential verity than the imagination of the thing (and many have framed imaginary commonwealths and governments to themselves which never were seen nor had any real existence); for the present manner of living is so different from the way that ought to be taken, that he who neglects what is done to follow what ought to be done, will sooner learn how to ruin than how to preserve himself; for a tender man, and one that desires to be honest in everything, must needs run a great hazard among so many of a contrary principle. Wherefore it is necessary for a prince who is willing to subsist to
harden himself, and learn to be good or otherwise according to the exigence of his affairs. Laying aside, therefore, all imaginable notions of a prince, and discoursing of nothing but what is actually true, I say that all men when they are spoken of, especially princes, who are in a higher and more eminent station, are remarkable for some quality or other that makes them either honourable or contemptible. Hence it is that some are counted liberal, others miserable (according to the propriety of the Tuscan word Misero, for Quaro in our language is one that desires to acquire by rapine or any other way; Misero is he that abstains too much from making use of his own), some munificent, others rapacious; some cruel, others merciful; some faithless, others precise; one poor-spirited and effeminate, another fierce and ambitious; one courteous, another haughty; one modest, another libidinous; one sincere, another cunning; one rugged and morose, another accessible and easy; one grave, another giddy; one a devout, another an atheist. No man, I am sure, will deny but that it would be an admirable thing and highly to be commended to have a prince endued with all the good qualities aforesaid; but because it is
impossible to have, much less to exercise, them all by reason of the frailty and crossness of our nature, it is convenient that he be so well instructed as to know how to avoid the scandal of those vices which may deprive him of his state, and be very cautious of the rest, though their consequence be not so pernicious, but where they are unavoidable he need trouble himself the less. Again, he is not to concern himself if run under the infamy of those vices without which his dominion was not to be preserved; for if we consider things impartially we shall find some things in appearance are virtuous, and yet, if pursued, would bring certain destruction; and others, on the contrary, that are seemingly bad, which, if followed by a prince, procure his peace and security.

CHAPTER XVI.

Of Liberality and Parsimony.

To begin, then, with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say, it would be advantageous to be accounted liberal; nevertheless, liberality so used as not to render you formidable does but injure you.
for if it be used virtuously and as it ought to be, it will not be known, nor secure you from the imputation of its contrary. To keep up, therefore, the name of liberal amongst men, it is necessary that no kind of luxury be omitted, so that a prince of that disposition will consume his revenue in those kind of expenses, and he be obliged at last, if he would preserve that reputation, to become grievous, and a great exactor upon the people, and do whatever is practicable for the getting of money, which will cause him to be hated of his subjects and despised by everybody else when he once comes to be poor; so that offending many with his liberality and rewarding but few, he becomes sensible of the first disaster, and runs great hazard of being ruined the first time he is in danger; which, when afterwards he discovers, and desires to remedy, he runs into the other extreme, and grows as odious for his avarice. So, then, if a prince cannot exercise this virtue of liberality so as to be publicly known, without detriment to himself, he ought, if he be wise, not to dread the imputation of being covetous, for in time he shall be esteemed liberal when it is discovered that by his parsimony he has increased his revenue
to a condition of defending him against any invasion, and to enterprise upon other people without oppressing of them; so that he shall be accounted noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number, and near and parsimonious only to such few as he gives nothing to.

In our days we have seen no great action done but by those who were accounted miserable, the other have been always undone. Pope Julius XI. made use of his bounty to get into the Chair, but, to enable himself to make war with the King of France, he never practised it after, and by his frugality he maintained several wars without any tax or imposition upon the people, his long parsimony having furnished him for his extraordinary expenses. The present King of Spain, if he had affected to be thought liberal, could never have undertaken so many great designs nor obtained so many great victories. A prince, therefore, ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not poor and despicable, nor commits rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that is one of those vices which fortifies his dominion. If
any one objects that Cæsar by his liberality made his way to the empire, and many others upon the same score of reputation have made themselves great, I answer, that you are actually a prince, or in a fair way to be made one. In the first case, liberality is hurtful; in the second, it is necessary, and Cæsar was one of those who designed upon the empire. But when he was arrived at that dignity, if he had lived, and not retrenched his expenses, he would have ruined that empire. If any replies, many have been princes, and with their armies performed great matters, who have been reputed liberal, I rejoin that a prince spends either of his own, or his subjects', or other people's. In the first case he is to be frugal; in the second, he may be as profuse as he pleases, and baulk no point of liberality. But that prince whose army is to be maintained with free quarter and plunder and exactions from other people, is obliged to be liberal, or his army will desert him; and well he may be prodigal of what neither belongs to him nor his subjects, as was the case with Cæsar, and Cyrus, and Alexander; for to spend upon another's stock rather adds to than subtracts from his reputation; it is spending of his own that is so mortal and
pernicious. Nor is there anything that destroys itself like liberality: for in the use of it, taking away the faculty of using it, thou comest poor and contemptible, or, to avoid that poverty, thou makest thyself odious and a tyrant; and there is nothing of so much importance to a prince to prevent as to be either contemptible or odious, both which depend much upon the prudent exercise of your liberality. Upon these considerations it is more wisdom to lie under the scandal of being miserable, which is an imputation rather infamous than odious, than to be thought liberal and run yourself into a necessity of playing the tyrant, which is infamous and odious both.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is best for a Prince to be beloved or feared.

To come now to the other qualities proposed, I say every prince is to desire to be esteemed rather merciful than cruel, but with great caution that his mercy be not abused; Cæsar Borgia was counted cruel, yet that cruelty reduced Romagna, united it, settled it in peace, and rendered it faithful: so that if well considered, he will appear much more merciful
than the Florentines, who rather than be thought cruel suffered Pistoia to be destroyed. A prince, therefore, is not to regard the scandal of being cruel, if thereby he keeps his subjects in their allegiance and united, seeing by some few examples of justice you may be more merciful than they who by an universal exercise of pity permit several disorders to follow, which occasion rapine and murder; and the reason is, because that exorbitant mercy has an ill effect upon the whole universality, whereas particular executions extend only to particular persons. But among all princes a new prince has the hardest task to avoid the scandal of being cruel by reason of the newness of his government, and the dangers which attend it: hence Virgil in the person of Dido excused the inhospitality of her government.

Res dura, & regni novitas, me talia cogunt
Moliri, & itae fines Custode tueri.

My new dominion and my harder fate
Constrains me to't, and I must guard my State.

Nevertheless, he is not to be too credulous of reports, too hasty in his motions, nor create fears and jealousies to himself, but so to temper his administrations with prudence and humanity that neither
too much confidence may make him careless, nor too much diffidence intolerable. And from hence arises a new question, Whether it be better to be beloved than feared, or feared than beloved? It is answered, both would be convenient, but because that is hard to attain, it is better and more secure, if one must be wanting, to be feared than beloved; for in the general men are ungrateful, inconstant, hypocritical, fearful of danger, and covetous of gain; whilst they receive any benefit by you, and the danger is at a distance, they are absolutely yours, their blood, their estates, their lives and their children, as I said before, are all at your service; but when mischief is at hand, and you have present need of their help, they make no scruple to revolt; and that prince who leaves himself naked of other preparations, and relies wholly upon their professions, is sure to be ruined; for amity contracted by price, and not by the greatness and generosity of the mind, may seem a good pennyworth; yet when you have occasion to make use of it, you will find no such thing. Moreover, men do with less remorse offend against those who desire to be beloved than against those who are ambitious of being feared, and the reason is because
love is fastened only by a ligament of obligation, which the ill-nature of mankind breaks upon every occasion that is presented to his profit; but fear depends upon an apprehension of punishment, which is never to be dispelled. Yet a prince is to render himself awful in such sort that, if he gains not his subjects' love, he may eschew their hatred; for to be feared and not hated are compatible enough, and he may be always in that condition if he offers no violence to their estates, nor attempts anything upon the honour of their wives, as also when he has occasion to take away any man's life, if he takes his time when the cause is manifest, and he has good matter for his justification; but above all things he is to have a care of intrenching upon their estates, for men do sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony; besides, occasions of confiscation never fail, and he that once gives way to that humour of rapine shall never want temptation to ruin his neighbour. But, on the contrary, provocations to blood are more rare, and do sooner evaporate; but when a prince is at the head of his army, and has a multitude of soldiers to govern, then it is absolutely necessary not to value the
epithet of cruel, for without that no army can be kept in unity, nor in disposition for any great act.

Among the several instances of Hannibal's great conduct, it is one that, having a vast army constituted out of several nations, and conducted to make war in an enemy's country, there never happened any sedition among them, or any mutiny against their general, either in his adversity or prosperity: which can proceed from nothing so probably as his great cruelty, which, added to his infinite virtues, rendered him both awful and terrible to his soldiers, and without that all his virtues would have signified nothing. Some writers there are, but of little consideration, who admire his great exploits and condemn the true causes of them. But to prove that his other virtues would never have carried him through, let us reflect upon Scipio, a person honourable not only in his own time, but in all history whatever; nevertheless his army mutinied in Spain, and the true cause of it was his too much gentleness and lenity, which gave his soldiers more liberty than was suitable or consistent with military discipline. Fabius Maximus upbraided him by it in the Senate, and called him corrupter of the Roman Militia; the
inhabitants of Locris having been plundered and destroyed by one of Scipio's lieutenants, they were never redressed, nor the legate's insolence corrected, all proceeding from the mildness of Scipio's nature, which was so eminent in him, that a person undertaking to excuse him in the Senate, declared that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themselves than to punish it in other people; which temper would doubtless in time have eclipsed the glory and reputation of Scipio, had that authority been continued in him; but receiving orders and living under the direction of the Senate, that ill quality was not only not discovered in him, but turned to his renown. I conclude, therefore, according to what I have said about being feared or beloved, that forasmuch as men do love at their own discretion, but fear at their prince's, a wise prince is obliged to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power, not that which depends on other people, but, as I said before, with great caution that he does not make himself odious.
CHAPTER XVIII.

How far a Prince is obliged by his Promise.

How honourable it is for a prince to keep his word, and act rather with integrity than collusion, I suppose everybody understands: nevertheless, experience has shown in our times that those princes who have not pinned themselves up to that punctuality and preciseness have done great things, and by their cunning and subtilty not only circumvented, and darted the brains of those with whom they had to deal, but have overcome and been too hard for those who have been so superstitiously exact. For further explanation you must understand there are two ways of contending, by law and by force: the first is proper to men; the second to beasts; but because many times the first is insufficient, recourse must be had to the second. It belongs, therefore, to a prince to understand both, when to make use of the rational and when of the brutal way; and this is recommended to princes, though abstrusely, by ancient writers, who tell them how Achilles and several other princes were committed to the education of Chiron the Centaur, who was to keep them under his dis-
cipline, choosing them a master, half man and half beast, for no other reason but to show how necessary it is for a prince to be acquainted with both, for that one without the other will be of little duration. Seeing, therefore, it is of such importance to a prince to take upon him the nature and disposition of a beast, of all the whole flock he ought to imitate the lion and the fox; for the lion is in danger of toils and snares, and the fox of the wolf; so that he must be a fox to find out the snares, and a lion to fright away the wolves, but they who keep wholly to the lion have no true notion of themselves. A prince, therefore, who is wise and prudent, cannot or ought not to keep his parole, when the keeping of it is to his prejudice, and the causes for which he promised removed. Were men all good this doctrine was not to be taught, but because they are wicked and not likely to be punctual with you, you are not obliged to any such strictness with them; nor was there ever any prince that wanted lawful pretence to justify his breach of promise. I might instance in many modern examples, and show how many confederations, and peaces, and promises have been broken by the infidelity of princes, and how he that best personated the fox
had the better success. Nevertheless, it is of great
consequence to disguise your inclination, and to play
the hypocrite well; and men are so simple in their
temper and so submissive to their present necessities,
that he that is neat and cleanly in his collusions
shall never want people to practise them upon. I
cannot forbear one example which is still fresh in
our memory. Alexander VI. never did, nor thought
of, anything but cheating, and never wanted matter
to work upon; and though no man promised a thing
with greater asseveration, nor confirmed it with more
oaths and imprecations, and observed them less, yet
understanding the world well he never miscarried.

A prince, therefore, is not obliged to have all the
forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is
necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I
will be bold to affirm that, having them actually,
and employing them upon all occasions, they are
extremely prejudicial, whereas, having them only in
appearance, they turn to better account; it is
honourable to seem mild, and merciful, and cour-
teous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be
so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared
that you can act quite contrary upon occasion. And
this must be premised, that a prince, especially if come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being oftentimes necessitated, for the preservation of his State, to do things inhuman, uncharitable, and irreligious; and, therefore, it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs and variations of fortune; not forbearing to be good whilst it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. A prince, then, is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth but what is full of the five qualities aforesaid, and that to see and to hear him he appears all goodness, integrity, humanity, and religion, which last he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily, because more men do judge by the eye than by the touch; for everybody sees but few understand; everybody sees how you appear, but few know what in reality you are, and those few dare not oppose the opinion of the multitude, who have the majesty of their prince to defend them; and in the actions of all men, especially princes, where no man has power to judge, every one looks to the end. Let a prince, therefore, do what he can to preserve
his life, and continue his supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honourable, and be commended by everybody; because the people are always taken with the appearance and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people; those few who are wise taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon.

There is a prince at this time in being (but his name I shall conceal) who has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace; and yet had he exercised either the one or the other, they had robbed him before this both of his power and reputation.

CHAPTER XIX.

That Princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible.

And because in our discourse of the qualifications of a prince we have hitherto spoken only of those which are of greatest importance, we shall now speak briefly of the rest under these general heads. That a prince make it his business (as is partly hinted before) to avoid such things as may make him odious or contemptible, and as often as he does that he
plays his part very well, and shall meet no danger or inconveniences by the rest of his vices. Nothing, as I said before, makes a prince so insufferably odious as usurping his subjects' estates and debauching their wives, which are two things he ought studiously to forbear; for whilst the generality of the world live quietly upon their estates and unprejudiced in their honour, they live peaceably enough, and all his contention is only with the pride and ambition of some few persons who are many ways and with great ease to be restrained. But a prince is contemptible when he is counted effeminate, light, inconstant, pusillanimous, and irresolute; and of this he ought to be as careful as of a rock in the sea, and strive that in all his actions there may appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and fortitude, desiring that in the private affairs of his subjects his sentence and determination may be irrevocable, and himself to stand so in their opinion that none may think it possible either to delude or divert him. The prince who causes himself to be esteemed in that manner shall be highly redoubted, and if he be feared, people will not easily conspire against him, nor readily invade him, because he is known to be
an excellent person and formidable to his subjects; for a prince ought to be terrible in two places—at home to his subjects, and abroad to his equals, from whom he defends himself by good arms and good allies; for, if his power be good, his friends will not be wanting, and while his affairs are fixed at home, there will be no danger from abroad, unless they be disturbed by some former conspiracy; and upon any commotion *ab extra*, if he be composed at home, has lived as I prescribe, and not deserted himself, he will be able to bear up against any impression, according to the example of Nabis the Spartan. When things are well abroad his affairs at home will be safe enough, unless they be perplexed by some secret conspiracy, against which the prince sufficiently provides if he keeps himself from being hated or despised, and the people remain satisfied of him, which is a thing very necessary, as I have largely inculcated before. And one of the best remedies a prince can use against conspiracy is to keep himself from being hated or despised by the multitude: for nobody plots but expects by the death of the prince to gratify the people, and the thought of offending them will deter him from any such
enterprise, because in conspiracies the difficulties are infinite. By experience we find that many conjurations have been on foot, but few have succeeded, because no man can conspire alone, nor choose a confederate but out of those who are discontented; and no sooner shall you impart your mind to a malcontent but you give him opportunity to reconcile himself, because there is nothing he proposes to himself but he may expect from the discovery. So that the gain being certain on that side, and hazardous and uncertain on the other, he must be either an extraordinary friend to you or an implacable enemy to the prince if he does not betray you; in short, on the side of the conspirators there is nothing but fear and jealousy, and apprehension of punishment; but, on the prince's side, there is the majesty of the Government, the laws, the assistance of his friends and State, which defend him so effectually that, if the affections of the people be added to them, no man can be so rash and precipitate as to conspire; for if, before the execution of his design, the conspirator has reason to be afraid, in this case he has much more afterwards, having offended the people in the execution and left him-
self no refuge to fly to. Of this many examples may be produced, but I shall content myself with one which happened in the memory of our fathers. Hanibal Bentivogli, grandfather to this present Hanibal, was Prince of Bolonia, and killed by the Canneschi who conspired against him, none of his race being left behind but John, who was then in his cradle; the murder was no sooner committed but the people took arms and slew all the Canneschi, which proceeded only from the affection that the house of the Bentivogli had at that time among the populace in Bolonia, which was then so great that when Hanibal was dead, there being none of that family remaining in a capacity for the government of the State, upon information that at Florence there was a natural son of the said Bentivogli's, who till that time had passed only for the son of a smith, they sent ambassadors for him, and having conducted him honourably to that city, they gave him the Government, which he executed very well till the said John came of age. I conclude, therefore, a prince need not be much apprehensive of conspiracies whilst the people are his friends; but when they are dissatisfied, and have taken prejudice against him, there is
nothing nor no person which he ought not to fear. And it has been the constant care of all wise princes and all well-governed States not to reduce the nobility to despair nor the people to discontent, which is one of the most material things a prince is to prevent. Among the best-ordered monarchies of our times France is one, in which there are many good laws and constitutions tending to the liberty and preservation of the king. The first of them is the Parliament and the authority wherewith it is vested; for he who was the founder of that monarchy, being sensible of the ambition and insolence of the nobles, and judging it convenient to have them bridled and restrained: and knowing, on the other side, the hatred of the people against the nobility, and that it proceeded from fear, being willing to secure them, to exempt the king from the displeasure of the nobles if he sided with the Commons, or from the malice of the Commons if he inclined to the nobles, he erected a third judge, which, without any reflection upon the king, should keep the nobility under, and protect the people; nor could there be a better order, wiser nor of greater security to the king and the kingdom, from
whence we may deduce another observation—that princes are to leave things of injustice and envy to the ministry and execution of others, but acts of favour and grace are to be performed by themselves. To conclude, a prince is to value his grandees, but so as not to make the people hate him.

Contemplating the lives and deaths of several of the Roman emperors, it is possible many would think to find plenty of examples quite contrary to my opinion, forasmuch as some of them whose conduct was remarkable, and magnanimity obvious to everybody, were turned out of their authority, or murdered by the conspiracy of their subjects. To give a punctual answer, I should inquire into the qualities and conversations of the said emperors, and in so doing I should find the reason of their ruin to be the same, or very consonant to what I have opposed. And in part I will represent such things as are most notable to the consideration of him that reads the actions of our times, and I shall content myself with the examples of all the emperors which succeeded in the empire from Marcus the philosopher to Maximinus, and they were Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antoninus, his
son Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

It is first to be considered that, whereas in other Governments there was nothing to contend with but the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people, the Roman emperors had a third inconvenience to support against the avarice and cruelty of the soldiers, which was a thing of such difficult practice that it was the occasion of the destruction of many of them, it being very uneasy to please the subject and the soldier together; for the subject loves peace, and chooses therefore a prince that is gentle and mild; whereas the soldier prefers a martial prince, and one that is haughty, and rigid, and rapacious, which good qualities they are desirous he should exercise upon the people, that their pay might be increased, and their covetousness and cruelty satiated upon them. Hence it is, that those emperors who neither by art nor nature are endued with that address and reputation as is necessary for the restraining both of the one and the other, do always miscarry; and of them the greatest part, especially if but lately advanced to the empire, understanding the inconsistency of their two humours, incline to
satisfy the soldiers, without regarding how far the people are disobliged; which council is no more than is necessary; for seeing it cannot be avoided but princes must fall under the hatred of somebody, they ought diligently to contend that it be not of the multitude; if that be not to be obtained, their next great care is to be that they incur not the odium of such as are most potent among them. And, therefore, those emperors who were new, and had need of extraordinary support, adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people, which turned to their detriment or advantage, as the prince knew how to preserve his reputation with them. From the causes aforesaid, it happened that Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, and Alexander, being princes of more than ordinary modesty, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, courteous and bountiful, came all of them (except Marcus) to unfortunate ends. Marcus, indeed, lived and died in great honour, because he came to the empire by way of inheritance and succession, without being beholden either to soldiers or people, and being afterwards endued with many good qualities which recommended him, and made him venerable among them, he kept them both in
such order whilst he lived, and held them so strictly to their bounds, that he was never either hated or despised. But Pertinax was chosen emperor against the will of the soldiers, who being used to live licentiously under Commodus, they could not brook that regularity to which Pertinax endeavoured to bring them; so that having contracted the odium of the soldiers, and a certain disrespect and neglect by reason of his age, he was ruined in the very beginning of his reign; from whence it is observable that hatred is obtained two ways, by good works and bad; and, therefore, a prince, as I said before, being willing to retain his jurisdiction, is oftentimes compelled to be bad. For if the chief party, whether it be people, or army, or nobility, which you think most useful and of most consequence to you for the conservation of your dignity, be corrupt, you must follow their humour and indulge them, and in that case honesty and virtue are pernicious.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a prince of such great equity and goodness, it is reckoned among his praises that in the fourteen years of his empire there was no man put to death without a fair trial; nevertheless, being accounted effeminate,
and one that suffered himself to be managed by his mother, and falling by that means into disgrace, the army conspired and killed him. Examining, on the other side, the conduct of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them cruel and rapacious, and such as to satisfy the soldiers, omitted no kind of injury that could be exercised against the people, and all of them but Severus were unfortunate in their ends; for Severus was a prince of so great courage and magnanimity, that preserving the friendship of the army, though the people were oppressed, he made his whole reign happy, his virtues having represented him so admirable both to the soldiers and people, that these remained in a manner stupid and astonished, and the other obedient and contented. And because the actions of Severus were great in a new prince, I shall show in brief how he personated the fox and the lion, whose natures and properties are, as I said before, necessary for the imitation of a prince. Severus, therefore, knowing the laziness and inactivity of Julian the emperor, persuaded the army under his command in Scelavonia to go to Rome and revenge the death of Pertinax, who was murdered by
the Imperial Guards; and under that colour, without the least pretence to the empire, he marched his army towards Rome, and was in Italy before anything of his motion was known. Being arrived at Rome, the Senate were afraid of him, killed Julian, and elected Severus. After which beginning there remained two difficulties to be removed before he could be master of the whole empire; the one was in Asia, where Niger, General of the Asiatic army, had proclaimed himself emperor; the other in the West, where Albinus the General aspired to the same. And thinking it hazardous to declare against both, he resolved to oppose himself against Niger, and cajole and wheedle Albinus, to whom he wrote word: That being chosen emperor by the Senate, he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity, gave him the title of Cæsar, and by consent of the Senate admitted him his colleague, which Albinus embraced very willingly, and thought him in earnest; but when Severus had overcome Niger, put him to death, and settled the affairs of the East, being returned to Rome, he complained in the Senate against Albinus as a person who, contrary to his obligations for the benefits received from
him, had endeavoured treacherously to murder him; told them that he was obliged to march against him to punish his ingratitude, and afterwards following him into France, he executed his design, deprived him of his command, and put him to death. He, then, who strictly examines the actions of this prince will find him fierce as a lion, subtle as a fox, feared and reverenced by everybody, and no way odious to his army. Nor will it seem strange that he, though newly advanced to the empire, was able to defend it, seeing his great reputation protected him against the hatred which his people might have conceived against him by reason of his rapine. But his son Antoninus was an excellent person likewise endued with transcendent parts, which rendered him admirable to the people and grateful to the soldiers; for he was martial in his nature, patient of labour and hardship, and a great despiser of all sensuality and softness, which recommended him highly to his armies. Nevertheless, his fury and cruelty was so immoderately great, having upon several private and particular occasions put a great part of the people of Rome, and all the inhabitants of Alexandria, to death, that he fell into the hatred of the whole
world, and began to be feared by his confidents that were about him; so that he was killed by one of his captains in the middle of his camp. From whence it may be observed, that these kind of assassinations which follow upon a deliberate and obstinate resolution, cannot be prevented by a prince; for he who values not his own life can commit them when he pleases; but they are to be feared the less, because they happen but seldom, he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to those that are about him, of which error Antoninus was too guilty, having put the brother of the said captain to an ignominious death, threatened the captain daily, and yet continued him in his guards, which was a rash and pernicious act, and proved so in the end. But to come to Commodus, who had no hard task to preserve his empire, succeeding to it by way of inheritance, as son to Marcus, for that to satisfy the people and oblige the soldiers, he had no more to do but to follow the footsteps of his father. But being of a brutish and cruel disposition, to exercise his rapacity upon the people he indulged his army, and allowed them in all manner of licentiousness. Besides prostituting his dignity by descending many
times upon the theatre to fight with the gladiators, and committing many other acts which were vile and unworthy the majesty of an emperor, he became contemptible to the soldiers, and growing odious to one party and despicable to the other, they conspired and murdered him. Maximinus was likewise a martial prince, and addicted to the wars, and the army being weary of the effeminacy of Alexander, whom I have mentioned before, having slain him, they made Maximinus emperor, but he possessed it not long; for two things contributed to make him odious and despised. One was the meanness of his extraction, having kept sheep formerly in Thrace, which was known to all the world, and made him universally contemptible; the other was, that at his first coming to the empire, by not repairing immediately to Rome and putting himself into possession of his imperial seat, he had contracted the imputation of being cruel, having exercised more than ordinary severity by his prefects in Rome, and his lieutenants in all the rest of the empire; so that the whole world being provoked by the vilenes of his birth and detestation of his cruelty, in apprehension of his fury, Africa, the Senate, and all the people both in Italy and Rome,
conspired against him, and his own army joining
themselves with them in their leaguer before
Aquileia finding it difficult to be taken, weary of
his cruelties, and encouraged by the multitude of
his enemies, they set upon him and slew him.

I will not trouble myself with Heliogabalus,
Macrinus, or Julian, who, being all effeminate and
contemptible, were quickly extinguished. But I shall
conclude this discourse, and say that the princes of
our times are not obliged to satisfy the soldiers in
their respective governments by such extraordinary
ways; for though they are not altogether to be
neglected, yet the remedy and resolution is easy,
because none of these princes have entire armies,
brought up, and inveterated in their several govern-
ments and provinces, as the armies under the Roman
empire were. If, therefore, at that time it was neces-
sary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it
was because the soldiers were more potent. At
present it is more the interest of all princes (except
the Great Turk and the Soldan) to comply with the
people, because they are more considerable than the
soldiers. I except the Turk, because he has in his
Guards 12,000 foot and 15,000 horse constantly
about him, upon whom the strength and security of his empire depends, and it is necessary (postponing all other respect to the people) they be continued his friends. It is the same case with the Soldan, who, being wholly in the power of the soldiers, it is convenient that he also waive the people and insinuate with the army. And here it is to be noted that this government of the Soldans is different from all other monarchies, for it is not unlike the Papacy in Christendom, which can neither be called a new nor an hereditary principality, because the children of the deceased prince are neither heirs to his estate nor lords of his empire, but he who is chosen to succeed by those who have the faculty of election; which custom, being of old, the government cannot be called new, and by consequence is not subject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infested; because, though the person of the prince be new, and perhaps the title, yet the laws and orders of State are old, and disposed to receive him as if he were hereditary lord. But to return to our business: I say that whoever considers the aforesaid discourse shall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cause of the ruin of those emperors, and be able to judge how it
came about that, part of them taking one way in their administrations and part of them another, in both parties some were happy, and some unhappy at last. Pertinax and Alexander, being but upstart princes, it was not only vain but dangerous for them to imitate Marcus, who was emperor by right of succession. Again, it was no less pernicious for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to make Severus their pattern, not having force or virtue enough to follow his footsteps. So, then, if a new prince cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, and to regulate by the example of Severus is unnecessary, he is only to take that part from Severus that is necessary to the foundation of his State, and from Marcus what is convenient to keep and defend it gloriously when it is once established and firm.

CHAPTER XX.

Whether Citadels, and other things which Princes many times do, be profitable or dangerous.

SOME princes, for the greater security of their dominion, have disarmed their subjects; others have cantonized their countries; others have fomented factions
and animosities among them; some have applied themselves to flatter and insinuate with those who were suspicious in the beginning of their government; some have built castles, others have demolished them; and though in all these cases no certain or determined rule can be prescribed, unless we come to a particular consideration of the State where it is to be used, yet I shall speak of them all, as the matter itself will endure. A wise prince, therefore, was never known to disarm his subjects; rather, finding them unfurnished, he put arms into their hands, for by arming them and inuring them to warlike exercise, those arms are surely your own; they who were suspicious to you become faithful; they who are faithful are confirmed, and all your subjects become of your party; and because the whole multitude which submits to your government is not capable of being armed, if you be beneficial and obliging to those you do arm you may make the bolder with the rest, for the difference of your behaviour to the soldier binds him more firmly to your service; and the rest will excuse you, as judging them most worthy of reward who are most liable to danger. But when you disarm you disgust
them, and imply a diffidence in them, either for cowardice or treachery, and the one or the other is sufficient to give them an impression of hatred against you. And because you cannot subsist without soldiers, you will be forced to entertain mercenaries, whom I have formerly described; and if it were possible for the said mercenaries to be good, they could not be able to defend you against powerful adversaries and subjects disoblige[d]. Wherefore, as I have said, a new prince in his new government puts his subjects always into arms, as appears by several examples in history. But when a prince conquers a new State, and annexes it, as a member to his old, then it is necessary your subjects be disarmed, all but such as appeared for you in the conquest, and they are to be mollified by degrees, and brought into such a condition of laziness and effeminacy that in time your whole strength may devolve upon your own natural militia, which were trained up in your ancient dominion and are to be always about you. Our ancestors (and they were esteemed wise men) were wont to say that it was necessary to keep Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses, and accordingly, in several towns under
their subjection, they created and fomented factions and animosities, to keep them with more case. This, at a time when Italy was unsettled and in a certain kind of suspense, might be well enough done, but I do not take it at this time for any precept for us, being clearly of opinion that the making of factions never does good, but that, where the enemy approaches and the city is divided, it must necessarily, and that suddenly, be lost, because the weaker party will always fall off to the enemy, and the other cannot be able to defend it. The Venetians (as I guess) upon the same grounds nourished the factions of the Guelfs and the Ghibilins in the cities under their jurisdiction; and though they kept them from blood, yet they encouraged their dissensions, to the end that the citizens, being employed among themselves, should have no time to conspire against them; which, as appeared afterwards, did not answer expectation, for being defeated at Valia, one of the said factions took arms and turned the Venetians out of their State. Such methods, therefore, as these do argue weakness in the prince; for no government of any strength or consistence will suffer such divisions, because they are useful only in time of peace,
when perhaps they may contribute to the more easy management of their subjects, but when war comes the fallacy of those counsels is quickly discovered. Without doubt, princes grow great when they overcome the difficulties and impediments which are given them; and therefore Fortune, especially when she has a mind to exalt a new prince, who has greater need of reputation than a prince that is old and hereditary, raises him up enemies and encourages enterprises against him, that he may have opportunity to conquer them, and advance himself by such steps as his enemies had prepared. For which reason many have thought that a wise prince, when opportunity offers, ought, but with great cunning and address, to maintain some enmity against himself, that when time serves to destroy them, his own greatness may be increased.

Princes, and particularly those who are not of long standing, have found more fidelity and assistance from those whom they suspected at the beginning of their reign than from those who at first were their greatest confidants. Pandolfus Petrucci, Prince of Sienna, governed his State rather by those who were suspected than others. But this is not to be
treated of largely, because it varies according to the subjects. I shall only say this, that those men who in the beginning of his government opposed him, if they be of such quality as to want the support of other people, are easily wrought over to the prince, and more strictly engaged to be faithful, because they knew that it must be their good carriage for the future that must cancel the prejudice that is against them; and so the prince comes to receive more benefit by them than by those who, serving him more securely, do most commonly neglect his affairs.

And seeing the matter requires, I will not omit to remind a prince who is but newly advanced, and that by some inward favour and correspondence in the country, that he considers well what it was that disposed those parties to befriend him; if it be not affection to him, but pique and animosity to the old government, it will cost much trouble and difficulty to keep them his friends, because it will be impossible to satisfy them; and upon serious disquisition, ancient and modern examples will give us the reason, and we shall find it more easy to gain such persons as were satisfied with the former government, and by con-
sequence his enemies, than those who, being dis-
obliged, sided with him and assisted to subvert it.

It has been a custom among princes, for the greater
security of their territories, to build citadels and
fortresses to bridle and restrain such as would enter-
prise against them, and to serve as a refuge in times
of rebellion; and I approve the way because anciently
practised, yet no longer ago than in our days, Nicolo Vitelli was known to dismantle two forts in
the city of Castello, to secure his government; Guido-
baldo, Duke of Urbin, returning to his State from
whence Caesar Borgja had driven him, demolished
all the strong places in that province, and thereby
thought it more unlikely again to fall into the hands
of the enemy. The Bentivogli being returned to
Bologna used the same course. So that fortresses
are useful or not useful, according to the difference
of time, and if in one place they do good, they do as
much mischief in another. And the case may be
argued thus: That prince who is more afraid of his
subjects than neighbours, is to suffer them to stand;
the family of the Sforzas has and will suffer more
mischief by the Castle of Milan, which was built by
Francesco Sforza, than by all its other troubles what-
ever; so that the best fortification of all is not to be hated by the people, for your fortresses will not protect you if the people have you in detestation, because they shall no sooner take arms but strangers will fall in and sustain them. In our times there is not one instance to be produced of advantage which that course has brought to any prince, but to the Countess of Furly, when, upon the death of Hieronimo, her husband, by means of those castles she was able to withstand the popular fury, and expect till supplies came to her from Milan and resettled her in the government; and as times then stood, the people were not in a condition to be relieved by any stranger. But afterwards they stood her in no stead when Cæsar Borgia invaded her, and the people, being incensed, joined with her enemy. Wherefore it had been better for her, both then and at first, to have possessed the affections of the people than all the castles in the country. These things being considered, I approve both of him that builds those fortresses and of him that neglects them, but must needs condemn him who relies so much upon them as to despise the displeasure of the people.
CHAPTER XXI.

How a Prince is to demean himself to gain reputation.

NOTHING recommends a prince so highly to the world as great enterprises and noble expressions of his own valour and conduct. We have in our days Ferdinand, King of Aragon—the present King of Spain—who may, and not improperly, be called a new prince, being of a small and weak king become for fame and renown the greatest monarch in Christendom; and if his exploits be considered you will find them all brave, but some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he invaded the kingdom of Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation of his grandeur. He began it leisurely, and without suspicion of impediment, holding the barons of Castile employed in that service, and so intent upon that war that they dreamt not of any innovation, whilst in the mean time, before they were aware, he got reputation and authority over them. He found out a way of maintaining his army at the expense of the Church and the people, and by the length of that war to establish such order and discipline among his soldiers, that afterwards they gained him
many honourable victories. Besides this, to adapt him for greater enterprises (always making religion his pretence), by a kind of devout cruelty he destroyed and exterminated the Jews called Marrani, than which nothing could be more strange or deplorable. Under the same cloak of religion he invaded Africa, made his expedition into Italy, assaulted France, and began many great things which always kept the minds of his subjects in admiration and suspense, expecting what the event of his machinations would be. And these his enterprises had so sudden a spring and result one from the other that they gave no leisure to any man to be at quiet, or to continue anything against him. It is likewise of great advantage to a prince to give some rare example of his own administration at home (such is reported of Monsieur Bernardo da Milano), when there is occasion for somebody to perform anything extraordinary in the civil government, whether it be good or bad, and to find out such a way either to reward or punish him as may make him much talked of in the world. Above all, a prince is to have a care in all his actions to behave himself so as may give him the reputation of being
excellent as well as great. A prince is likewise much esteemed when he shows himself a sincere friend or a generous enemy—that is, when without any hesitation he declares himself in favour of one against another, which, as it is more frank and princely, so it is more profitable than to stand neuter; for if two of your potent neighbours be at war, they are either of such condition that you are to be afraid of the victor or not; in either of which cases it will be always more for your benefit to discover yourself freely, and make a fair war. For in the first cause, if you do not declare, you shall be a prey to him who overcomes, and it will be a pleasure and satisfaction to him that is conquered to see you his fellow-sufferer; nor will anybody either defend or receive you, and the reason is, because the conqueror will never understand them to be his friends who would not assist him in his distress; and he that is worsted will not receive you because you neglected to run his fortune with your arms in your hands. Antiochus, upon the invitation of the Etolians, passed into Greece to repel the Romans. Antiochus sent ambassadors to the Achaians, who were in amity with the Romans, to
persuade them to a neutrality, and the Romans sent to them to associate with them. The business coming to be debated in the Council of the Achaians, and Antiochus's ambassador pressing them to be neuters, the Roman ambassador replied:

"As to what he has remonstrated, that it is most useful and most consistent with the interest of your State not to engage yourselves in our war, there is nothing more contrary and pernicious; for if you do not concern yourselves you will assuredly become a prey to the conqueror, without any thanks or reputation; and it will always be, that he who has the least kindness for you will tempt you to be neuters, but they that are your friends will invite you to take up arms." And those princes who are ill-advised, to avoid some present danger follow the neutral way, are most commonly ruined; but when a prince discovers himself courageously in favour of one party, if he with whom you join overcome, though he be very powerful, and you seem to remain at his discretion, yet he is obliged to you, and must needs have a respect for you, and men are not so wicked with such signal and exemplary ingratitude to oppress you. Besides, victories are never so clear
and complete as to leave the conqueror without all sparks of reflection, and especially upon what is just. But if your confederate comes by the worst, you are received by him, and assisted whilst he is able, and becomest a companion of his fortune, which may possibly restore thee. In the second place, if they who contend be of such condition that they have no occasion to fear, let which will overcome, you are in prudence to declare yourself the sooner, because by assisting the one you contribute to the ruin of the other, whom, if your confederate had been wise, he ought rather to have preserved; so that he overcoming remains wholly at your discretion, and by your assistance he must of necessity overcome. And here it is to be noted, if he can avoid it, a prince is never to league himself with another more powerful than himself in an offensive war; because in that case if he overcomes you remain at his mercy, and princes ought to be as cautious as possible of falling under the discretion of other people. The Venetians, when there was no necessity for it, associated with France against the Duke of Milan, and that association was the cause of their ruin. But where it is not to be avoided, as happened to the Florentines when
the Pope and the Spaniard sent their armies against Lombardy, there a prince is to adhere for the reasons aforesaid. Nor is any prince or government to imagine that in those cases any certain counsel can be taken, because the affairs of this world are so ordered that in avoiding one mischief we fall commonly into another. But a man's wisdom is most conspicuous where he is able to distinguish of dangers and make choice of the least; moreover, a prince to show himself a virtuoso, and honourer of all that is excellent in any art whatsoever. He is likewise to encourage and assure his subjects that they may live quietly in peace, and exercise themselves in their several vocations, whether merchandize, agriculture, or any other employment whatever, to the end that one may not forbear improving or embellishing his estate for fear it should be taken from him, nor another advancing his trade in apprehension of taxes; but the prince is rather to excite them by propositions of reward, and immunities to all such as shall any way amplify his territory or power. He is obliged, likewise, at convenient times in the year to entertain the people by feastings and plays, and spectacles of recreation; and, because all
cities are divided into companies or wards, he ought to have respect to those societies, be merry with them sometimes, and give them some instance of his humanity and magnificence, but always retaining the majesty of his degree, which is never to be debased in any case whatever.

CHAPTER XXII.

Of the Secretaries of Princes.

The election of his ministers is of no small importance to a prince, for the first judgment that is made of him or his parts is from the persons he has about him. When they are wise and faithful, be sure the prince is discreet himself, who, as he knew how to choose them able at first, so he has known how to oblige them to be faithful; but, when his ministers are otherwise, it reflects shrewdly upon the prince, for commonly the first error he commits is in the election of his servants. No man knew Antonia da Venafro to be secretary to Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Sienna, but he could judge Pandolfo to be a prudent man for choosing such a one as his minister. In the capacities and parts of men there are three
sorts of degrees: one man understands of himself, another understands what is explained, and a third understands neither of himself nor by any explanation. The first is excellent, the second commendable, the third altogether unprofitable. If, therefore, Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he might be included in the second; for whenever a prince has the judgment to know the good and the bad of what is spoken or done, though his own invention be not excellent, he can distinguish a good servant from a bad, and exalt the one and correct the other; and the minister, despairing of deluding him, remains good in spite of his teeth. But the business is, how a prince may understand his minister, and the rule for that is infallible. When you observe your officer more careful of himself than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest and advantage, that man will never be a good minister, nor ought you ever to repose any confidence in him; for he who has the affairs of his prince in his hand ought to lay aside all thoughts of himself, and regard nothing but what is for the profit of his master. And, on the other side, to keep him faithful, the prince is as much concerned to do for him, by
honouring him, enriching him, giving him good offices and preferments, that the wealth and honour conferred by his master may keep him from looking out for himself, and the plenty and goodness of his offices make him afraid of a change, knowing that without his prince's favour he can never subsist. When, therefore, the prince and the minister are qualified in this manner they may depend one upon the other; but when it is otherwise with them the end must be bad, and one of them will be undone.

CHAPTER XXIII.

How Flatterers are to be avoided.

I will not pass by a thing of great consequence, being an error against which princes do hardly defend themselves, unless they be very wise and their judgment very good; and that is about flatterers, of which kind of cattle all histories are full; for men are generally so fond of their own actions, and so easily mistaken in them, that it is not without difficulty they defend themselves against those sort of people; and he that goes about to defend himself runs a great hazard of being despised; for there is no
other remedy against flatterers than to let everybody understand you are not disoblige[d] by telling the truth; yet if you suffer everybody to tell it you injure yourself and lessen your reverence. Wherefore a wise prince ought to go a third way, and select out of his State certain discreet men, to whom only he is to commit that liberty of speaking truth, and that of such things as he demands, and nothing else; but then he is to inquire of everything, hear their opinions, and resolve afterwards, as he pleases, and behave himself towards them in such sort that every [one may find with how much the more freedom he speaks, with so much the more kindness he is accepted; that besides them he will hearken to nobody; that he considers well before he resolves; and that his resolutions, once taken, are never to be altered. He that does otherwise shall either precipitate his affairs by means of his flatterers, or by variety of advices often change his designs, which will lessen his esteem and render him contemptible. To this purpose I shall instance in one modern example.

Father Lucas, a servant to Maximilian, the present emperor, giving a character of his Majesty, declared
him a person who never consulted anybody, and yet never acted according to his own judgment and inclination; and the reason was because he proceeded contrary to the prescriptions aforesaid—for the emperor is a close man, communicates his secrets to nobody, nor takes any man's advice; but when his determinations are to be executed and begin to be known in the world, those who are about him begin to discourage and dissuade him, and he, being good-natured, does presently desist. Hence it comes to pass that his resolutions of one day are dissolved in the next; no man knows what he desires or designs, nor no man can depend upon his resolutions.

A prince, therefore, is always to consult, but at his own, not other people's pleasure, and rather to deter people from giving their advice undemanded, but he ought not to be sparing in his demands, nor when he has demanded, impatient of hearing the truth; but if he understands that any suppressed it and forbore to speak out for fear of displeasing, then, and not till then, he is to show his displeasure. And because there are those who believe that a prince which creates an opinion of his prudence in the people, does it not by any excellence in his own nature, but by the
counsels of those who are about him, without doubt they are deceived; for this is a general and infallible rule—That that prince who has no wisdom of his own can never be well advised, unless by accident he commits all to the government and administration of some honest and discreet man. In this case it is possible things may be well ordered for awhile, but they can never continue, for his minister or vice-gerent in a short time will set up for himself; but if a prince who has no great judgment of his own consults with more than one, their counsels will never agree, nor he have ever the cunning to unite them. Every man will advise according to his own interest or caprice, and he not have the parts either to correct or discover it; and other counsellors are not to be found, for men will always prove bad, unless by necessity they are compelled to be good. So then it is clear—that good counsels, from whomsoever they come, proceed rather from the wisdom of the prince than the prince's wisdom from the goodness of his counsels.
CHAPTER XXIV.

How it came to pass that the Princes of Italy have most of them lost their dominions.

The qualities aforesaid being observed, they make a new prince appear in the number of the more ancient, and render him presently more firm and secure in his government than if he had descended to it by right of inheritance; for the actions of a new prince are liable to stricter observation than if he were hereditary, and when they are known to be virtuous gain more upon people and oblige them further than antiquity of blood, because men are more affected with present than past things, and when in their present condition they find themselves well, they content themselves with it, without looking out anywhere else, employing themselves wholly in defence of their prince, unless in other things he be defective to himself; so that thereby he will have double honour in having laid the foundation of a new principality, and embellished and fortified it with good laws, good force, good friends, and good example; whereas he multiplies his disgrace, who, being born prince, loses his inheritance by his own ill-management and
imprudence. And if the sovereign princes in Italy, who in our time have lost their dominions, be considered, as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in their beginning one common defect as to the management of their arms, for the reasons largely discoursed of before; besides, some of them will appear to have been hated by the people, or if they have had so much prudence as to preserve a friendship with them, they have been ignorant how to secure themselves against the grandees; for without these errors no States are lost that have money and strength enough to bring an army into the field. Philip of Macedon (not Alexander the Great's father, but he who was overcome by Titus Quintus) had no great force in comparison of the Romans and the Grecians which invaded him; yet, being a martial man, and one that understood how to insinuate with the people and oblige the nobility, he maintained war several years against both of them, and though at last he lost some towns, yet he kept his kingdom in spite of them. Those, therefore, of our princes who for many years together were settled in their principalities, if they lost them afterwards, they cannot accuse fortune, but their own
negligence and indiscretion for not having in quiet times considered they might change (and it is the common infirmity of mankind in a calm to make no reckoning of a tempest) when adversity approached; they thought more of making their escape than defence, resting their whole hopes upon this, that when the people were weary of the insolence of the conqueror, they would recall them again; which resolution is tolerable indeed when others are wanting, but to neglect all other remedies and trust only to that, is much to be condemned, for a man would never throw himself down that another might take him up; besides, that may not happen, or if it does, not with your security, because that kind of defence is poor and depends not on yourself, and no defences are good, certain, and lasting, which proceed not from the prince’s own courage and virtue.

CHAPTER XXV.

How far in human affairs Fortune may avail, and in what manner she may be resisted.

I am not ignorant that it is, and has been of old the opinion of many people, that the affairs of the world
are so governed by fortune and Divine Providence that man cannot by his wisdom correct them, or apply any remedy at all; from whence they would infer that we are not to labour and sweat, but to leave everything to its own tendency and event. This opinion has obtained more in our days by the many and frequent revolutions which have been and are still seen beyond all human conjecture. And, when I think of it seriously sometimes, I am in some measure inclined to it myself; nevertheless, that our own free will may not utterly be exploded, I conceive it may be true, that fortune may have the arbitrament of one-half of our actions, but that she leaves the other half, or little less, to be governed by ourselves. Fortune I do resemble to a rapid and impetuous river, which when swelled and enraged overthrows the plains, subverts the trees and the houses, forces away the earth from one place and carries it to another; everybody fears, everybody shuns, but nobody knows how to resist it; yet though it be thus furious sometimes, it does not follow but when it is quiet and calm men may by banks and fences, and other provisions, correct it in such manner that when it swells again it may be carried
off by some canal, or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive. So it is with fortune, which shows her power where there is no predisposed virtue to resist it, and turns all her force and impetuosity where she knows there are no banks, no fences to restrain her. If you consider Italy (the seat of all these revolutions), and what it was that caused them, you will find it an open field, without any bounds or ramparts to secure it; and that, had it been defended by the courage of their ancestors, as Germany and Spain and France have been, those inundations had never happened, or never made such devastation as they have done. And this I hold sufficient to have spoken in general against fortune. But restraining myself a little more to particulars, I say it is ordinary to see a prince happy one day and ruined the next, without discerning any difference in his humour or government; and this I impute to the reasons of which I have discoursed largely before; and one of them is, because that prince which relies wholly upon fortune, being subject to her variations, must of necessity be ruined. I believe, again, that prince may be happy whose manner of proceeding concurs with the times, and he unhappy who cannot
accommodate to them; for in things leading to the end of their designs (which every man has in his eye, and they are riches and honour), we see men have various methods of proceeding. Some with circumspection, others with heat; some with violence, others with cunning; some with patience, and others with fury; and every one, notwithstanding the diversity of their ways, may possibly attain them. Again, we see two persons equally cautious, one of them prospers, and the other miscarries; and on the other side, two equally happy by different measures, one being deliberate, and the other as hasty; and this proceeds from nothing but the condition of the times, which suits or does not suit with the manner of their proceedings. From hence arises what I have said, that two persons by different operations do attain the same end, whilst two others steer the same course, and one of them succeeds and the other is ruined. From hence, likewise, may be reduced the vicissitudes of good; for if to one who manages with deliberation and patience, the times and conjuncture of affairs come about so favourably that his conduct be in fashion, he must needs be happy; but if the face of affairs and the times change, and he changes not with
them, he is certainly ruined. Nor is there any man to be found so wise that knows how to accommodate or frame himself to all these varieties, both because he cannot deviate from that to which Nature has inclined him; as likewise because, if a man has constantly prospered in one way, it is no easy matter to persuade him to another; and he that is so cautious, being at a loss when time requires he should be vigorous, must of necessity be destroyed; whereas, if he could turn with the times, his fortune would never betray him. Pope Julius XI. in all his enterprises acted with passion and vehemence, and the times and accident of affairs were so suitable to his manner of proceeding that he prospered in whatever he undertook. Consider his expedition of Bolonia in the days of Monsieur Giovanni Bentivogli; the Venetians were against it, and the Kings of Spain and France were in treaty, and had a mind to it themselves; yet he with his promptitude and fury undertook it personally himself, and that activity of his kept both Spaniard and Venetian in suspense (the Venetians for fear, the Spaniards in hopes to recover the whole kingdom of Naples), and the King of France came over to his side; for seeing him in
motion, and desirous to make him his friend, and thereby to correct the insolence of the Venetian, he thought he could not deny him his assistance without manifest injustice; so that Julius with his rashness and huffing did that which never any other Pope could have done with all his cunning and insinuation, for had he deferred his departure from Rome till all things had been put into exact order, and his whole progress concluded, as any other Pope would have done, he could never have succeeded; the king of France would have pretended a thousand excuses, and others would have suggested twice as many fears. I will pass by the rest of his enterprises, which were all alike and prospered as well, and the shortness of his life secured him against change; for had the times fallen out so that he had been forced to proceed with accurate circumspection, he would have certainly been ruined, for he could never have left those ways to which his nature inclined him. I conclude, then, that whilst the obstinacy of princes consists with the motion of fortune, it is possible they may be happy; but when once they disagree, the poor prince comes certainly to the ground. I am of opinion, likewise, that it is better to be hot and
precipitate than cautious and apprehensive; for fortune is a woman, and must be hectored to keep her under; and it is visible every day she suffers herself to be managed by those who are brisk and audacious rather than by those who are cold and phlegmatic in their motions, and therefore, like a woman, she is always a friend to those who are young, because being less circumspect they attack her with more security and boldness.

CHAPTER XXVI.

An Exhortation to deliver Italy from the Barbarians.

HAVING weighed, therefore, all that is said before, and considered seriously with myself whether in this juncture of affairs in Italy the times were disposed for the advancement of a new prince, and whether there was competent matter that could give occasion to a virtuous and wise person to introduce such a form as would bring reputation to him and benefit to all his subjects, it seems to me that at this present so many things concur to the exaltation of a new prince that I do not know any time that has been more proper than this; and if, as I said before, for
the manifestation of the courage of Moses it was necessary that the Israelites should be captives in Egypt; for discovery of the magnanimity of Cyrus, that the Persians should be oppressed by the Medes; and for the illustration of the excellence of Theseus that the Athenians should be banished and dispersed; so to evince and demonstrate the courage of an Italian spirit it was necessary that Italy should be reduced to its present condition; that it should be in greater bondage than the Jews, in greater servitude than the Persians, and in greater dispersion than the Athenians; without head, without order, harassed, spoiled, overcome, overrun, and overflown with all kind of calamity; and though formerly some sparks of virtue have appeared in some persons that might give it hopes that God had ordained them for its redemption, yet it was found afterwards that in the very height and career of their exploits they were checked and forsaken by fortune, and poor Italy left half dead, expecting who would be her Samaritan to bind up her wounds, put an end to the sackings and devastations in Lombardy, the taxes and expilations in the kingdom of Naples and Tuscany, and cure her sores
which length of time had festered and imposthumated. It is manifest how she prays to God daily to send some person who may redeem her from the cruelty and insolence of the barbarians. It is manifest how prone and ready she is to follow the banner that any man will take up; nor is it at present to be discerned where she can repose her hopes with more probability than in your illustrious family, which by its own courage and interest and the favour of God and the Church (of which it is now chief), may be induced to make itself head in her redemption; which will be no hard matter to be effected if you lay before you the lives and actions of the persons above-named; who though they were rare and wonderful were yet but men, and not accommodated with so fair circumstances as you. Their enterprise was not more just nor easy, nor God Almighty more their friend than yours. You have justice on your side; for that war is just which is necessary, and it is piety to fight where no hope is left in anything else. The people are universally disposed, and where the disposition is so great the opposition can be but small, especially you taking your rules from those persons which I have proposed to you for a model.
Besides, many things that they did were supernatural, and by God's immediate conduct the sea opened, a cloud directed, a rock afforded water, it rained manna, all these things are recompensed in your grandeur, and the rest remains to be executed by you. God will not do everything immediately, because He will not deprive us of our free will and the honour that devolves upon us. Nor is it any wonder if none of the aforenamed Italians have been able to do that which may be hoped for from your illustrious family; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and so long continuation of war, their military virtue seems spent and extinguished, the reason is, their old discipline was not good, and nobody was able to direct a better. Nothing makes so much to the honour of a new prince as new laws and new orders invented by him, which, if they be well founded, and carry anything of grandeur along with them, do render him venerable and wonderful, and Italy is susceptible enough of any new form. Their courage is great enough in the soldier if it be not wanting in the officer; witness the duels and combats, in which the Italians have generally the better by their force and dexterity and stratagem; but come to their
battles, and they have oftener the worst, and all from the inexperience of their commanders; for those who pretend to have skill will never obey, and every one thinks he has skill, there having been nobody to this very day raised by his virtue and fortune to that height of reputation as to prevail with others to obey him. Hence it came that, in so long time, in the many wars during the last twenty years, whenever an army consisted wholly of Italians it was certainly beaten; and this may be testified by Tarus, Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, and Mestri. If, therefore, your illustrious family be inclined to follow the examples of those excellent persons who redeemed their countries, it is necessary, as a true fundamental of all great enterprises, to provide yourselves with forces of your own subjects, for you cannot have more faithful nor better soldiers than they. And though all of them be good, yet altogether they will be much better when they find themselves not only commanded but preferred and caressed by a prince of their own. It is necessary, therefore, to be furnished with these forces before you can be able with Italian virtue to vindicate your country from the oppression of strangers. And though the Swiss and Spanish infantry be counted terrible, they have both
of them their defects; and a third sort may be composed that may not only encounter but be confident to beat them; for the Spanish foot cannot deal with horse, and the Swiss are not invincible when they meet with foot as obstinate as themselves. It has been seen by experience, and would be so again, the Spaniards cannot sustain the fury of the French cavalry, and the Swiss have been overthrown by the infantry of Spain. And though of this last we have seen no perfect experiment, yet we had a competent essay at the battle of Ravenna, where the Spanish foot being engaged with the German battalions (which observe the same order and discipline with the Swiss), the Spaniards, by the agility of their bodies and the protection of their bucklers, broke in under their pikes and killed them securely, while the poor Germans were incapable to defend themselves; and had not the Spaniards been charged by the horse, the German foot had been certainly cut off. It is possible, therefore, the defect of both those foot being known, to institute a third which may buckle with the horse and be in no fear of their foot; which will be effected not by the variation of their arms but by changing their discipline. And these are some of those things which, being newly reformed, give
great grandeur and reputation to any new prince. This opportunity, therefore, is by no means to be slipped, that Italy, after so long expectation, may see some hopes of deliverance. Nor can it be expressed with what joy, with what impatience of revenge, with what fidelity, with what compassion, with what tears such a champion would be received into all the provinces that have suffered by those barbarous inundations. What gates would be shut against him? What people would deny him obedience? What malice would oppose him? What true Italian would refuse to follow him? There is not, there is not anybody but abhors and nauseates this barbarous domination. Let your illustrious family, then, address itself to the work with as much courage and confidence as just enterprises are undertaken; that under their ensigns our country may be recovered and under their conduct Petrarch's prophecy may be fulfilled, who has promised that—

_Virtu contr' al furore_
_Prendera l'arme, and fia il combatter Corto._
_Che l'antico valore_
_Nè gli Italici curr' non è ancor morto._

Virtue shall arm 'gainst rage, and in short fight
Prove the Roman valour's not extinguish’d quite.
THE ORIGINAL OF THE WORDS GUELF AND Ghibilin, so much mentioned in history.

NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR.

These two factions, so famous in history, were eminent in Italy two ages before Castruccio was born. Machiavelli in his treatise of the wars of that country, affirms that Pistoia was the first place where those names of distinction were used, but the account wherewith the public libraries supply me runs thus: These two words, Guelf and Ghibilin, deduce their original from a schism which molested the Church in the year 1130 by the competition of two Popes, Innocent II. and Anaclet. The greatest part of Christendom acknowledged Innocent, who was particularly supported by the emperors of the West. Anaclet, the anti-pope, had persuaded into his interests Roger, Comte de Naples and Sicily, a martial prince, and descended from the Normans, who had conquered that country. The pretence of this double election having kept a war on foot eight years together, which was still favourable to Roger, the Emperor Conrad III. marched himself at the head of an army of Germans into Italy, leaving his grandson, Prince Henry, to come after. Roger, to oppose
him with men of his own nation, allured to the defence of his countries Guelf, Duke of Bavaria. During the course of this war, which began in the year 1139, it happened sometimes that the emperor's army was commanded by the said Prince Henry, who was brought up in a village in Germany called Ghibilin, whose situation being very pleasant made the very name of it dear to him. One day, the armies being drawn up and ready to engage, the Bavarians, to encourage their comrades, cried out in their language, "A Guelf! a Guelf!" and the emperor's troops, being at the same time as well disposed to their general, to comply with the kindness he had for that place, cried out on the other side, "A Ghibilin! a Ghibilin!" These words seemed barbarous to the Italians that were with Roger, who came to Guelf to know what they meant. He told them the Pope's party were intended by the word Guelf, and the emperor's by the word Ghibilin. From that time those names grew so common in both armies that by them they answered their "Who goes there?" and they were given to the Italians according to their several sides. It is true, at first, they were used to discriminate only Anaclet's party from the emperor's;
but afterwards, Roger having vanquished and taken prisoner Pope Innocent, as the price of his liberty he obliged him to erect the countries of Naples and Sicily into kingdoms, by which treaty Roger being taken off from the interest of the anti-pope, and engaging entirely with the Church, he affixed the name of Guelf to the Pope’s party, and confirmed the name Ghibilin to the faction of the emperor.

The Italians would fain have the credit of the etymology themselves, and by a certain jingling of words, and that mightily strained, would have Guelf derived from guardatori di fe, because, forsooth, it is they who defend the faith of the Church. And that by corruption the word Ghibilin was formed from guida belli, that is, guidatori di bataglia, a great title, and suitable to the majesty of the empire.

Be it which way it will, these two factions were in the height of their emulation two hundred years after, that is to say, about the year 1320, which was very near the time that Castruccio was in his prosperity. And in Europe the face of affairs stood thus.

The Popes, driven from Rome by the violence of the emperors of the West, had transferred the Holy Chair to Avignon in France. In the year 1320 it
was possessed by John XXII., a prince of himself firm and entire, but one who, by the precipitate counsels of other people, had excommunicated the Emperor Louis of the house of Bavaria, and been too busy with his fulminations against five more princes of Italy, who, being treated by him like tyrants, confederated against him. Their names were Castruccio, Sovereign of Lucca; Scaliger, Lord of Verona; the Marquess d'Esti, Lord of Ferrara and Visconti; and Gonzague, the first sovereign of Milan, and the other of Mantoua, which created troubles to Italy.

The empire of the East was at that time torn and distracted by the ambition of the Paliologi and others, whilst in the meantime the Sultan Oreban, son of Ottoman, swept away Lycaonia, Phrygia, and all the coast of the Hellespont from the Greeks. The empire of the West was then in dispute betwixt Frederick of Austria and Louis of Bavaria, whom Machiavel, by mistake or inadvertency, has called Frederick; Louis, after long and bloody wars, overcame his competitor, and made several voyages into Italy to invigorate and reinforce Castruccio and the Ghibilins.
France was governed by Philip le Long, who, at the solicitation of Pope John, passed an army into Italy to the relief of the Guelfs, which army was commanded by Philip de Valois, afterwards king; but his expedition did not answer expectation; for either the cunning or bribes of the Ghibilins had dispersed the storm which our preparations threatened upon Lombardy, or our forces were recalled upon some secret apprehension of a fourth war with the English, or by the vast projects of a fifth expedition to the Holy Land.

Spain was divided into five kingdoms, each of which had its peculiar king; four of them were Christians, and one a Mahometan.

Navar had the same King with France. Philip the Long found a way to extend the Salic law into that country, and defeat his niece, Jane of France, daughter of Lewis Hutin, of both kingdoms at once.

Alphonso XI., as Mariana calls him (the XII. as Garibay), had at that time the sceptre of Castile, but his minority transferred the conduct of affairs into the hands of the two Infanti, Don Pedro and Don John, insomuch as by the jealousy and division betwixt the two regents, that kingdom was exposed
to such disorders as are inseparable from the minority of a prince. At length the two Infanti were slain in the year 1320, in a fight which their rashness caused them to lose to the Moors under the walls of Granada.

Aragon was in obedience to Don Jacques, the second of that name; he was brother to Frederick, who reigned in Sicily to the prejudice of Robert, a prince of the House of Anjou. This Robert was King of Naples, sided with the Guelfs, and leagued himself sundry times with the Florentines against Castruccio. James, King of Aragon, designing to establish himself in Italy, and judging that the conquests which he meditated upon the Isles of Corsica and Sardinia depended much upon the concord of his subjects at home, he caused a general assembly of his estates to be held in the year 1320, in which was concluded the union of the kingdoms of Aragon and Valentia with the principality of Catalonia.

Don Denis reigned in Portugal, a person eminent among his subjects for magnificent building, and in great veneration for his piety and justice. But the felicity of his reign was disturbed by domestic broils which he had with his son, the infant Don Alphonso,
who succeeded him in the crown. Don Denis instituted the Order of Christ in the year 1320.

The Moor, Ismael, first of that name, had the monarchy of Granada; the battle which he gained in 1320, against the two Infanti of Castile, revived the affairs of that nation, which were in their declension before, and gave new alarms to all Spain.

The king and kingdom of England were both governed by favourites at that time. Edward II. gave his authority and confidence, one while to Gaveston, and then to the two Spencers; and this weakness and imprudence of his created so many discontents, and rendered him so odious to the people, that after much trouble to quit himself of an impostor who pretended to the crown, he was forced to go through a cruel war against the nobility, and another no less dangerous against Robert Bruce, King of Scotland. These great stirs and commotions could not but give some jealousies to France, which, seeing the provinces that the English had on that side the sea perpetually in arms, was obliged to keep upon so strong a guard as was little different from an open war.

It is not, then, to be admired, the affairs of
Europe being in this confusion, if Italy was left in prey to the Guelfs and the Ghibilins, and gave opportunity to the laying the foundation of so many principalities, that the most part of them are still in existence. But it is certain that neither Paulus Jovius, Girolamo Briani, Il Biondo, nor the rest of the historians who have written of the wars and concussions of these two factions, have left anything comparable to the adventures of Castruccio; they have lent me, indeed, some circumstances for the illustration and ornament of this history, and I have been forced to paraphrase upon five or six of the sayings of Castruccio to give them their true grace, and make them intelligible; I know not whether I have followed the just temperament that is to be observed in a translation. It is vicious to assume such liberty as the history will not bear, but on the other, to tie one's self up to the same, and same quantity of words, is as disingenuous and servile. It is true, the same commas and stops were by no means to be neglected, were all treatises that are translated like the fallacious answer of a divine to Braccio Montone, Sovereign of Persia; which Braccio being a Ghibilin as well as Castruccio,
departed for the siege of Aquila, a town in the kingdom of Naples, and being impatient to know his success, upon application to an astrologer he received this answer: *Ibis redibis non morieris in bello*; which, if punctuated thus, *Ibis, redibis non, morieris in bello*, threatened the said Braccio with the unfortunateness of his expedition; whereas, altering it thus, *Ibis, redibis, non morieris in bello*, portended quite contrary. An ambiguity like this was sent also to Manfred, King of Sicily, not long before he was defeated by Charles of Anjou: *No Carlo Sara Vitoriosi del re Manfredo*, and ought to be interpreted with great exactness and accuracy, the mistake of a comma being as much as a man's life is worth. There is another kind of tyranny likewise, and that is when the text of the author is to regulate in a point of religion; but here we are not under any such necessities, and he who, in a quarrellsome caprice, to defame my translation would compare every line, and put the English words all along under the Italian, would make a new and pleasant kind of dictionary, and the beauties which are peculiar to each language would be excellently presented.
IT seems, most excellent friends, to those who consider it, very strange that all, or the greatest part of them, who in this world have performed anything extraordinary, and raised themselves above the pitch of their contemporaries, have had their births and beginnings mean and obscure, or else infested and perplexed with all the difficulties that fortune could present. For all of them having been exposed to wild beasts when they were young, or being descended from base parentage, and ashamed of their extraction, they have declared themselves sons of Jupiter or some other deity, of which sort the number being so great, and their story so well known, to repeat them would be both superfluous and troublesome. The reason, I suppose to be, that fortune, willing to demonstrate to the world that it is not any one’s prudence, but she that raises men to be great, begins to show and exercise her power at a time in which prudence
can pretend to no share in us; that all our successes may be acknowledged to her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of this sort, who in respect of the times in which he lived, and the place in which he was born, performed great things; for in his beginning he was neither more happy or more eminent than the rest, as you shall understand in my description of his life, which I have thought good to transmit to posterity, having observed many things in it, both for virtue and event, of extraordinary example; and to you it seemed most proper to direct it, as persons more delighted with honourable and heroic actions than any I know besides.

I say, then, the family of the Castracani is reckoned among the most illustrious families in the city of Lucca, though at present, according to the fatality of all worldly things, it seems to be extinct. Out of this house there was born in former times one Antonio, who entering himself into Orders, was made a canon of St. Mitchel in Lucca, and in token of honour called Monsieur Antoin. He had no kindred but one sister, who was married long before to one Buonaccorso Cinami. Buonaccorso being dead, and she being a widow, she lived with her brother, with re-
solution to marry no more. Behind the house in which he dwelt Master Anthony had a vineyard, which, bordering upon several gardens, was accessible from several parts, and without much difficulty. It happened that one morning about sunrise, Madam Dianora (for that was the sister's name), walking out into the vineyard to gather herbs for a salad, as women frequently do, she heard a rustling under the leaves, and turning towards it, she fancied it cried; advancing up towards it, she saw the hands and face of a child, which tumbling up and down in the leaves, seemed to call for relief. Madam Dianora, partly astonished and partly afraid, took it up very tenderly, carried it home, washed it, and having put it in clean clothes, she presented it to Master Antony, who understanding the case, and seeing the infant, was no less affected with wonder and compassion than his sister before him. Debating with themselves what course was to be taken, it was concluded to bring it up, Anthony being a priest, and she having no children. They christened it Castruccio, by the name of their father, and looked to it as carefully as it had been their own. Castruccio's graces increased with his years, and his wit was so pregnant they put
him to nothing but he took it very well. Anthony designed him for a priest, and to resign his canonship and other benefices one day, and according to that design he gave him education; but he could not find that Castruccio had inclination to that kind of life; on the contrary, he perceived his natural disposition tending quite another way.

In short, Castruccio was scarce fourteen years old, but abating by little and little of his awe and respect to Antonio and Dianora, he began to neglect his studies, to devote himself to arms, and taking great delight in wrestling and running and such violent exercises, his mettle was so well suited with the strength of his body that none of his companions were able to cope with him. He troubled himself very little with reading, unless it was such things as might instruct him for war, or acquaint him with the great actions of some eminent commander, which did not only disquiet Antonio, but afflicted him.

There was at that time in Lucca a gentleman called Francisco, of the house of the Guinigi, a handsome man, very rich, and remarkable for many good qualities, which recommended him to one of the first ranks in the town. He had borne arms all his life
long, and for the most part under the Viscontis, Dukes of Milan. He had with them engaged for the Ghibilins, and the city of Lucca looked upon him as the very life of their party. It was at the time when these two great factions (the Guelfs and the Ghibilins) shared all Italy betwixt them, divided the popes and the emperors, engaged in their different interests the inhabitants of the same town and the members of the same family. Francisco, accompanied usually by persons of quality of his cabal, walked often before the place of St. Michael, not far from the palace of the Podestat or Governor. In that market-place he took notice of Castruccio, who was oftentimes playing there amongst his schoolfellows and comrades. He observed the youth always prescribed such sports to the rest as he had chosen on purpose to prepare him for the war. Francisco could easily perceive how much the agility of Castruccio advanced him above his companions, and he as easily perceived that he assumed an authority over them, and they on their part paid him a reverence, and such a one as was accompanied with kindness and zeal. Francisco took a great fancy to the boy, inquired what he was, and being informed by some who were by, he had a
month’s mind to have him himself; calling him to him one day, he asked him if he did not prefer a gentleman’s family, where he might learn to ride the great horse, and exercise his arms, before the cloister of a churchman, where he must spin out his days in idleness and melancholy. He no sooner mentioned horses and arms but Castruccio was ready to have leaped out of his skin, but recollecting himself, a sentiment of modesty kept him from answering, till the fine words of Francisco having given him more confidence, he told him that if he had the liberty of choosing, he had rather a thousand times be employed as a gentleman than in the way for which he was designed. His resolution was so pleasing to Francisco that not long after he made a visit to Antonio, and begged Castruccio of him, in so pressing and yet so civil a manner, that Antonio, finding it impossible to master the natural inclinations of the youth, delivered him to Francisco.

By this means Castruccio changed his education, and it is not to be believed with what easiness he improved in those exercises which are fit for a gentleman to learn. It was to be admired with what address and vigour he mounted his horse, with
what grace he managed his lance, and with what comeliness his sword; and this his dexterity distinguished him so highly from the crowd of his companions, that it would have been imprudence in any one of them to have contended with him, either at the barrierci or justs. To all these advantages he had an engaging way with him, that obliged wherever he came; his actions and his words seemed premeditate and studied, so careful and so regular he was lest he should say or do anything that might anyway offend. He carried himself always with respect to his superiors, with modesty to his equals, and with civility and complaisance to those who were beneath him, so that these good qualities did not only gain him the affection of Francisco's whole family, but the love and esteem of the whole city of Lucca.

He was eighteen years old when the faction of the Guelfs drove the Ghibilins out of Pania. Visconti, Prince of Milan, a zealous partisan of the Ghibilins, solicited succours from Francisco Guinigi, who casting his eyes upon Castruccio, as the first mark of his affection made him lieutenant of a company of foot, and marched with him to Visconti. The first
campaign this new lieutenant made put him into such reputation that he eclipsed the glory of all the rest who served in that war. He gave so great and so many testimonies, both of his courage and conduct, that his fame was spread all over Lombardy. When also he came back to Lucca, and observed the town had doubled the respect which they had for him before, he applied himself to make new friendships, and to that purpose made use of all the courtesy and insinuation that is necessary in that case.

Not long after Francisco Guinigi fell sick, and finding himself near his end, having but one son of about thirteen years of age, called Pagolo, he sent for Castruccio, and committed the tuition of his son and the management of his estate into his hands, and having gently remembered Castruccio that he was the person who raised him, he begged that he would show the same generosity towards Pagolo as he had done towards him, and if anything was due to the bounty of the father to return it upon his son. He fancied he discerned in the countenance of Castruccio all the marks and indications of a generous mind, and died without being disturbed with the least suspicion of his ingratitude.
The trust and his administration of so great an estate made Castruccio more considerable than before, but they created him likewise some enemies, and lessened the affection which some had had for him; for, knowing him to be of an enterprising spirit, many began to fancy his designs were tyrannical and to oppress the liberty of his country. The Signor Giorgio Opizi, chief of the Guelf's faction in Lucca, was the most to be apprehended of all those that accused Castruccio with that abominable ambition. Opizi was of opinion that the death of Francisco Guinigi, head of the adverse party, would leave him master of the town, but he quickly found that the single reputation of Castruccio would be a new impediment to his usurpation; so that, thinking to rob him of the affections of the people, he spread false reports and aspersed him wherever he came. At first these calumniations troubled Castruccio but little, but at length they alarmed him to the purpose, for he suspected that Opizi would not fail to set him at odds with the lieutenant which Robert King of Naples had settled in Lucca, and that if that governor was his enemy he should in a short time be turned out of the town. And against so great danger his provision was this.
The town of Pisa was then under the government of Huguccione de Fagivola, originally of the town of Arrezzo. Being chosen captain by the Pisans, he had made himself their sovereign, and having given protection to certain Ghibilins who were banished from Lucca, Castruccio entered into secret intelligence by the privity of Huguccione, and being assured of his assistance, he resolved the poor exiles should be restored. To this effect he agreed with his friends in Lucca, who were of his counsel, and jealous as himself of the power of the Opizi. All necessary measures were taken by the conspirators. Castruccio had the care of fortifying privately a tower in the city, called the Tower of Honour. He furnished it with ammunition in case he should be forced to defend it, and having appointed the night for the execution of their design, Huguccione failed not at the precise hour to be at the rendezvous betwixt Lucca and the neighbouring mountains. Upon a signal given to Castruccio, he advanced towards the gate of St. Peter, and set fire to the antiport next the fields, whilst Castruccio broke down another on the other side of the town. In the meantime his associates cried out, "To your arms!" to excite the
people to rise, and thereby put all things into confusion. Huguccione entered with his troops, and having seized upon the town, he caused all the Opizi to be murdered and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands. The governor for the King of Naples was turned out, and the government of the town altered as Huguccione directed, who, to complete the desolations of Lucca, banished no less than a hundred of the best families that belonged to it. The miserable exiles fled part to Florence and part to Pistoia, two towns of the faction of the Guelfs, and for that reason enemies to Huguccione and the prevailing party in Lucca.

The Florentines and whole faction of the Guelfs, apprehending his great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the Ghibilins in Tuscany, they entered into consultation which way those exiles might be restored. They set out a considerable army, and encamped at Monte Carlo to open themselves a passage to Lucca. Huguccione, on his side, drew the Lucca troops together, and put them under the command of Castruccio, and then joining with his own from Pisa, and reinforcing them with a squadron of German horse which he got out of Lom-
bardy, he marched out to encounter the Florentines. Whereupon the Florentines quitted their post at Monte Carlo, and entrenching betwixt Monte Catino and Pescia, Huguccione possessed himself of the quarter which they had left. Their armies being within two miles' distance one from the other, their horse met daily and skirmished, and they had come certainly to a peremptory battle had not Huguccione fallen ill just in the nick. His indisposition forcing him from the camp to look out for better accommodation in Monte Carlo, he left the command of the army to Castruccio. His retirement, which discouraged his own men, and made them think of protracting the battle, animated the Florentines, but brought no great advantage to their affairs. In short, the Florentines, perceiving their enemies without a general, began to despise them, and Castruccio, observing how much they were elated, endeavoured to augment it. He pretended great consternation, and to make his fear the more credible, he gave orders that his troops should be drawn up within the lines, but with positive inhibition for any of them to go forth, though not a moment passed but the Florentines provoked them, but all to no purpose.
Besides that this pretended terror in Castruccio re-doubled the rashness of the enemy, and perfectly blinded them, he drew another advantage from it, which was to discover exactly the disposition of their army and the order of their march. When he had well observed them, and tempted their temerity as much as he thought fit, he resolved to fight them the next bravado they made, and omitting nothing that might encourage his soldiers, he assured them of victory if they followed his commands. He had observed that the weakest and worst armed of their soldiers were disposed still in their wings, and their best placed in the body. Castruccio drew up in the same order, but distributed his soldiers quite contrary, for the worst and most unserviceable he placed in the body and his best men in the wings. In this posture he drew out of the trenches, and had scarce formed his battalia before the enemy appeared, and with his usual insolence. Castruccio commanded that the body should march slowly, but the two wings were to advance as fast as they could; so that when they came to engage, there was only the wings that could fight, for Castruccio's body having lagged by command, the Florentine body had too far to march
before they could charge them, so as they remained idle, being neither able to do anything against the main body that was designed to oppose them nor sustain those who were engaged in the wings; so it happened that the Florentine wings, composed of the refuse of their soldiers, were easily broken by Castruccio's, which consisted of his best; and when the wings of the enemy (which were drawn up before their body, so as the whole army was ranged in the figure of a half-moon) were routed, they turned tail, ran among their own body, which was marching behind them, and put all into confusion.

The loss was very great to the Florentines; they left above 10,000 men dead upon the place; their best officers, and the bravest of the Guelfs perished there unfortunately, and to make the defeat the more lamentable, there were several Reformades which died there of extraordinary quality. Among the rest, Piero, brother to Robert, King of Naples; Carlo, nephew to the said king; Philip, Lord of Tarentum, who were all come, in gallantry, to make that campaign with the Florentines. But that which made all the more wonderful was, that Castruccio lost not above 300 men, though unhappily one of Huguc-
cione's sons were of that number. His name was Francesco, who, fighting briskly at the head of the volunteers, for want of good conduct was slain at the very first charge. So eminent a victory as this must needs put Castruccio into a reputation beyond expression; but Huguccione had liked to have died with mere jealousy. He foresaw that nothing of all this would redound to him but the vain honour of commanding in chief, and that the real advantage would all fall to his lieutenant; so that to use him at that rate was to rob him of his sovereignty. Whereupon, nettled exceedingly, in great envy of his fortune he resolved he should die. Whilst he was in this black resolution, and attended nothing but some specious pretence to get Castruccio to him, and so draw him into his net, it happened that Agnolo Micheli, a person of great alliance as any in Lucca, was murdered by one who took sanctuary in Castruccio's house, and was protected; Huguccione's officers pursued and demanded the criminal, but Castruccio denied them, and suffered him to escape. Huguccione, who was then at Pisa, unwilling to lose so fair an opportunity to revenge himself, sent for one of his sons called Nerli, whom he put before into
possession of the sovereignty of Lucca, commands him to repair thither with all speed, and get Castruccio to his house, under pretence of supping with some of the most eminent in the town; and private orders were given for the making him away. Nerli laid his ambush for Castruccio very handsomely; for, suspecting nothing, he came to the feast, and was arrested before he went out of the palace. But Nerli, being over circumspect, and imagining it might work some alteration in the spirits of the people if he killed him bluntly without any formality, wrote to his father to know how he should dispose of him. Huguccione, mad at his unseasonable prudence, departed from Pisa at the head of 400 horse to go himself in person to dispatch Castruccio; but Huguccione was scarce got to Bagni before the Pisans revolted, cut his deputy's throat, and slew all his family that were left behind; and that he might be sure they were in earnest, they chose the Conte de Guerardesca, and made him their governor. Though he had news of this rebellion before his arrival at Lucca, yet he thought it inconvenient to return; on the contrary, he made all the haste thither that he could, to be there, if possible, before
the report, lest, if the news got before him, it might have ill effect upon the Luccheses, and prevail with them to exclude him their city. But the Luccheses had heard it before, had such designs of their own, and the liberty of Castruccio was the thing they were to pretend. Huguccione was admitted, but his presence was not sufficient to keep them in their duties. They began to assemble in parties, to whisper and speak slightly of him in private, then to murmur, then to tumultuate, and taking arms by degrees, they came boldly and demanded Castruccio should be enlarged; and this they did in so positive and audacious a manner that Huguccione, apprehending the consequences, delivered him to them. Castruccio, not contented with that, conceiving vaster designs than formerly, and egged on by an equal impulse of honour and revenge, he assembled his friends, and taking the benefit of the favourable disposition of the people, he resolved to oppose himself against Huguccione, and forcing of him out of Lucca with all his party, Huguccione retired into Lombardy to the Lords of Scala, where, not long after, he died very poor.

This was a happy turn for Castruccio, from the
incommodities of a prison to the supremacy of a prince; and yet this was not enough. Finding himself accompanied by a great number of his friends, which encouraged him, and by the whole body of the people, which flattered his ambition, he caused himself to be chosen captain-general of all their forces for a twelvemonth; and resolving to perform some eminent action that might justify their choice, he undertook the reduction of several places which had revolted from that city in favour of Huguccione. Having to this purpose entered into strict alliance with the city of Pisa, they sent him supplies, and he marched with them to besiege Serezane. But the place being very strong, before he could carry it he was obliged to build a fortress as near it as he could. This new post in two months' time rendered him master of the whole country, and is the same fort that at this day is called Serezanello, repaired since, and much enlarged by the Florentines. Supported by the credit of so glorious an exploit, he reduced Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza very easily; he seized likewise upon the whole country of Lunigiana, and to secure his communication with Lombardy he took Pont Remoli by force, and drove out Anastasio.
Palavicini, the sovereign; so that full of glory he returned to Lucca, where the people thronged to meet him, and received him with all possible demonstrations of joy.

This was the happiest conjuncture for Castruccio in the world, for having been so discreet before to make his interest with the most considerable of the Luccheses, and among the rest Poggio, Portico, Baccansachi, and Cecco Guinigi, the favour of these great men concurring with the inclination of the people, and everything else contributing to his happiness, he was solemnly chosen their sovereign prince.

About this time Frederick de Baviera, King of the Romans, passed out of Germany into Italy, to be crowned emperor there. Castruccio, who had already wrought himself in some measure into his favour, put himself at the head of 500 horse and went to wait upon him, having left as his deputy in Lucca Pagolo Guinigi, his pupil, whom he had treated all along as he had been his own son, in consideration of the benefits he had received from his father. Frederick received Castruccio with much kindness, and having done him several honours, and granted him many prerogatives, he made him his lieutenant
in the whole province of Tuscany; besides all this, the inhabitants of Pisa (at the same time mutinying against their governor, Gerardesca, and driving him out of the town), to defend themselves against his resentment, addressed to Frederick for protection, and he gave the sovereignty of that town to Castruccio. His choice was not unpleasing to the inhabitants, who knew not where to find a better support against the faction of the Guelfs, and particularly against the attempts of the Florentines.

After this Frederick returned into Germany, having made a lieutenant-general of all Italy, and left him in Rome. There was not at that time, either in Lombardy or Tuscany, any of the Ghibilins of the emperor's party but looked upon Castruccio as the true head of their faction. Those who were banished their country upon that score fled to him for protection, and promised unanimously that if he could restore them to their estates they would serve him so effectually that the sovereignty of their country should be the recompense of his kindness. The chief of them were the Guidi, Scolari, Uberti, Gerozzi, Nardi and Buomoccorsi, all exiles of Florence. So that, flattered by their promises and encouraged by the strength of his
own force, he entertained a design of making himself master of Tuscany, and to give more reputation to his affairs he entered into a league with Matteo Visconti, Prince of Milan. He put out a proclamation afterwards that all his subjects which were capable to bear arms should be ready at a certain warning to put themselves into service; and for the better order of the muster roll by which his militia was to be regulated, the city of Lucca having five gates he divided the whole country into five parts, and disposed every soldier under his officer with so much exactness that in a short time he could march with 20,000 men, besides what he could draw out of Pisa.

Whilst he was fortifying himself with soldiers and friends, it fell out that the Guelfs in Plaisansa, having driven out the Ghibilins, and received considerable succours from Florence, and the King of Naples came thundering down upon the territories of the Prince of Milan, the Prince desired Castruccio to give the Florentines diversion, to carry the war into their country, to withdraw them from Lombardy, and thereby to put them upon the defensive; Castruccio desired no more, and fell with a flying army into the valley of Arno, took Fucechio.
and San Miniato, and ravaged the country so effectually that the Florentines were constrained to call back their troops out of Lombardy; but the necessity of another diversion called back Castruccio to the recovery of Lucca. In his absence, the family of the Poggi, which had been always his friends, and contributed more to his elevation than any of the rest, regretting that they had not been rewarded according to the merits of their services, conspired with several others of the inhabitants to bring the city to revolt. They began the tumult one morning, and having put themselves in arms they killed the chief officer which Castruccio had established for the administration of justice. But whilst they were disposing themselves to push on their sedition, Stephen Poggio, an old man of a peaceable temper, and one who had not meddled at all in the conspiracy of his relations, made use of the authority he had with them, caused them to lay down their arms, and offered his intercession to Castruccio that they might obtain their demands. Upon the first notice of this commotion, Castruccio drew a party out of his army, and leaving the rest under the command of Pagolo Guinigi, he marched with all diligence back
to Lucca, where, finding things quieter than he expected, he knew very well how to make his advantage of so temperate a submission, and disposed his troops and his friends in all the posts that might make him master of the town. Stephano Poggio, who thought in this juncture he had highly obliged Castruccio, came to make him a visit, and judged it unnecessary to beg anything of him; all that he requested was that he would pardon his family, allow something to their ancient services, and give some little indulgence to the transports of their youth. Castruccio received him with much affection, and told him that he was more pleased to find those troubles appeased than he had been offended at the news of their commotion; and having pressed him to bring the malcontents to him, he added, that he thanked his stars for giving him such an opportunity of signalizing his clemency. Upon Stephano's impor-
tunity and Castruccio's promise, they came all to attend him; but Castruccio apprehending that this new service of Stephano might some time or other be reproached to him again, he resolved to make a signal example; and accordingly, regulating himself by the severe politics of usurpers, who upon such
nice and critical occasions make no bones to sacrifice the innocence of a particular man to the conservation of the multitude, he commanded that the mutineers, and Stephano with them, should be conducted to prison, and from thence to execution.

Whilst he was thus employed the Florentines recovered San Miniato, and Castruccio holding it imprudence to keep in the field whilst he was insecure in the town, resolved to give some relaxation to his arms. He endeavoured privately to feel how the Florentines stood disposed to a truce, and (the war having exhausted their coffers) he found them so coming, that it was concluded for two years, upon condition that either party should retain what was then in their possession.

Castruccio being disentangled from his foreign embarrassments, applied himself wholly to his security at home, and under several pretences to quit himself of all those who were likely to dispute his sovereignty of Lucca, not sparing his confiscations and proscriptions against the exiles, nor the execution of any who were under his hands. To excuse himself he gave out that he had too much experience already of the infidelity of those people to trust them again;
but a strong citadel which he erected in the city was the true way to continue his authority; and to give the more terror to the citizens, he caused the houses of his adversaries to be demolished, and the citadel to be built of their materials. His peace with the Florentines and his fortifications at Lucca employed him not so much as to lessen his thoughts how he might make himself greater; being unwilling again to come to an open war, he entertained private correspondences, both on one side and the other. He had an ardent desire to make himself master of the town of Pistoia, persuading himself it would give him footing in Florence; and in this prospect he held a secret commerce of amity with the different parties which were predominant in Pistoia. This double intelligence was managed with that slyness and delicacy that each of them believed they were particularly in his confidence. It was a long time that these two opposite cabals had divided, or rather distracted that city. The one, called the faction of the Bianchi, had Bastiano da Possente for its head; and the other, called the Neri, was commanded by Jacopo de Gia. Each of them, boiling with desire to supplant its competitor, reposed much upon the
promises of Castruccio. And these two heads of the factions, who had long been suspected to one another, took arms at length both at a time. Jacopo posted himself towards the gate that goes to Florence, and Bastiano towards that which leads to Lucca. At first it was in debate severally by each of them whether they should call in the Florentines; but finding Castruccio more active, and his forces better soldiers, each of them sent privately to him to solicit his assistance. Castruccio carried it very demurely, and promised succour to both. He told Jacopo that in person he would relieve him; and to Bastiano he sent word he would do it by Pagolo Guinigi his lieutenant-general, and the person of the world he loved best, for he regarded him as his son. Having acquainted them both that they should expect their supplies about midnight, he agreed with Pagolo, and causing him to march with part of his troops to join with Bastiano at one gate, he with the rest advanced the common road towards Jacopo. At both gates they were admitted as friends; but no sooner were they entered, but upon a signal given Bastiano was killed on one side with all his chief friends, and Jacopo and his friends escaped no
better on the other; the rest of their parties betaking to their heels, the whole town was left at Castruccio's devoting. He came in person to reassure the magistrates, and brought them out of the palace whither they had fled to secure themselves. Having called the people together, he promised to cancel all the old debts, did many acts of grace, lessened their imposts, and prevailed upon them to be obedient by the force of his caresses and new privileges which he gave them. This profuseness of kindness had coaxed, likewise, the inhabitants of the country. They came in great throngs to salute and recognize their new prince, who sent them all home again in peace, all mightily taken with his virtues, and possessed with hopes of his extraordinary benefits.

There was about this time some mutinies in Rome, by reason of the dearness of provisions. The scarcity that was suffered proceeded from the absence of the Popes, who kept then their pontifical residence at Avignon, and it added much to the revolt that the Romans could not endure to be governed by a German. This national animosity was the occasion of frequent murders and perpetual disorder. Errico,
the Emperor's lieutenant-general, found himself too weak to apply any remedy, and apprehending (not without cause) that the Romans had private intelligence with the King of Naples, that if their forces should join he should be forced out of Rome and the Pope be restored. He concluded, therefore, his safest recourse would be to Castruccio; so that he sent to him for supplies, and begged of him that he would come along with them in person. Castruccio made no scruple of the voyage, being equally transported to be able to do a meritorious piece of service to the Emperor, and put himself in a condition to be regarded at Rome, and looked upon as the moderator of their affairs whenever the Emperor should be absent. Leaving, therefore, the care of Lucca to the charge of Pagolo Guinigi, and contenting himself only with a convoy of 200 horse, he came to Rome, and was received by Errico with all possible honour. His presence having received the authority of the Emperor, he took a gentle way to pacify the people. The first thing he did was to provide plenty of all things, causing store of corn to be brought thither from Pisa, to take off the pretence of their revolt; after which, mingling very discreetly his
favours and his chastisements, he reduced all the chief citizens to their obedience to Errico; in acknowledgment of which Castruccio was made Senator of Rome, and several honours conferred upon him with more than ordinary ceremony. The day of his promotion he came forth in a habit suitable to his dignity, but enriched with a delicate embroidery, with two devices wrought in artificially, one before and the other behind. The first was before, and in these words (as devout as common): "He is as it pleases God;" and behind in these, "And shall be what God will have him."

Whilst these things were in transaction, the Florentines, incensed that, to the prejudice of their truce, Castruccio had surprised the town of Pistoia, resolved to recover it by force, and thought it not likely to be difficult if they took the opportunity of his absence. Among the fugitives from Pistoia who had saved themselves in Florence there were two principally considerable, Cecchi and Baldini. They were men in action, and had always retained a private correspondence with their friends in Pistoia; and they managed all things so dexterously for a revolt that they caused a good party of Florentines to enter one
night into the town, who restored them their liberty, with the destruction of all Castruccio's party.

This news being brought to Rome touched Castruccio to the quick, who, taking leave of Errico, with large journeys came directly to Lucca.

The Florentines had notice of his return, and resolved stoutly to begin the war upon him, that he might not have leisure to prepare; wherefore, having obliged all that (like themselves) were favourers of the Guelfish faction, to put themselves forward in some extraordinary manner, they raised a strong army, and marched with all diligence to possess themselves first of the valley of Nievole, to facilitate their communication with Pistoia. Castruccio, on his side, with what forces he could get together, marched directly for Monte Carlo, and having intelligence where the enemy was encamped, and how numerous their army, he judged the danger would be as great should he go and confront them in the plain of Pistoia, as to attend them in the valley of Pescia. He concluded, therefore, to draw them, if he could, into the straits of Seravalle, for narrow passes and rough and difficult ways were convenient for a small army as his was, which consisted of not above 12,000
men, and would be a disadvantage to the Florentines who were 40,000 complete. Wherefore, though he was well enough satisfied of the courage of his army, and understood the worth of every common soldier, yet he thought good to withdraw out of that campaign country, lest he should suffer himself to be overwhelmed with the multitude of his enemies.

Seravalle is a castle betwixt Pescia and Pistoia, situate upon a hill which, on that side, puts a stop to the valley of Nicvole. This castle stands not upon the road, but is about two flight shot higher, and the passage down into the valley is rather strait than steep; for the declension is very gradual to the place where the waters divide, and pass to discharge themselves into the lake of Tucechio, and that passage is so strait that twenty men in front take up the whole breadth. There it was that Castruccio designed to engage the enemy, as well to give the advantage of the strait to the smallness of his own army as to keep them from being sensible of the vast numbers of the Florentines, and prevent the terror which they might inspire. The castle of Seravalle belonged to the Signor Manfredi, a German, who had made himself lord of it.
long before Castruccio had seized upon Pistoia, and kept it by common consent both of the inhabitants of Pistoia and Lucca, either because he kept his neutrality very strictly with both, or because the castle was so strong of itself it needed to fear neither. Castruccio, knowing the importance of that place from the beginning, found a way to gain intelligence with a person who lived in the castle. The night before the day of the battle, by the ministry of this man, Castruccio caused 400 of his soldiers to enter, who cut the throat of Manfredi, and seized on the castle. Having secured so considerable a post without noise, he endeavoured to persuade the enemy that he would not stir from Monte Carlo, thereby to draw them into his clutches, and make them haste with all speed to gain the avenues to the Val de Nievoile, and this plot of his jumped exactly with the Florentine design. For they, having no mind that Pistoia should be the theatre of the war, and being willing to remove it into the vale, they encamped above Seravalle, with intention to have passed the straits the next day, not imagining in the least that the castle was surprised. Castruccio having notice of their motion, about midnight drew
his army out of their quarters, and stole privately before break of day to the foot of Seravalle. The accident was odd, for, as he marched up the hill on one side, the enemy marched up on the other; caused his foot to advance by the way of the common road, but he drew out a party of 400 horse, and commanded them towards the left, on that side towards the castle. There were 400 of the enemy's horse that were a forlorn to their army, and the whole infantry followed them, but their scouts were no sooner at top of the hill, when, on a sudden, they fell foul upon the troops of Castruccio. They were strangely surprised; for, knowing nothing of the taking of the castle, they could not imagine the enemy would come to meet them; insomuch that, before they had leisure to put themselves into posture, they were constrained to engage tumultuously with those troops which were drawn up in good order, but they in confusion. Not but some of the Florentine cavaliers behaved themselves gallantly, but the noise of so unexpected an encounter put them presently to a stand, and being diffused in the army, it put all into great disorder and fear. The horse and the foot fell foul upon one another, and
both upon the baggage. Want of ground rendered the experience of the officers of no use, and the straitness of the pass confounded all their military cunning. The first troops that Castruccio charged upon the top of the hill were immediately routed, and the small resistance they made was not so much the defect of their courage as the effect of the place, with the incommodity of which, and the strangeness of the surprise, they were constrained to give ground. There was no way left for them to run; on their flanks the mountains were inaccessible, their enemies were in the front, and their own army in the rear. In the meantime, as this charge of Castruccio was not sufficient to stagger the enemy's battle, he drew out a party of foot, and sent them to join with the horse in the castle of Seravalle. This body in reserve, having possession of the hills, and falling upon the flank of the Florentines, forced them to give ground and yield to the wild incommodity of the place and the violence and fierceness of the enemy. The rear-guard ran, and having got into the plain that looks towards Pistoia, every man shifted as well as he could.

This defeat was bloody and great; among the
multitude of prisoners there were many of the principal officers; among the rest, three noble Florentines, Bandino di Rossi, Francesco Brunilleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, without mentioning several considerable Tuscans, and many of the King of Naples' subjects, who, by their Prince's order, were in the service of the Florentine. Upon the first tidings of their defeat the Pistoians turned the Guelfs' faction out of town, and came with their keys and presented them to Castruccio, who, pursuing his victory, carried Prato and all the towns in that plain, as well beyond as on this side the Arno. After which he encamped with his army in the plain of Peretola, two miles from Florence, where he continued braving the city, and passed several days in the enjoyment of his good fortune, parting the spoil and coining of money, thereby exercising with great ostentation a kind of sovereign right over their territory; and releasing something of the rigour of his discipline, he gave his soldiers liberty to insult as they pleased over the conquered; and to make his triumph the more remarkable, nothing could serve the ruin but naked women must run courses on horseback under the very walls of the city. But this gallantry and
ostentation entertained him but lightly, or rather served but as a colour to hide his greater designs; for in the meantime he found a way to corrupt Lupacci, Frescobaldi, and some certain other gentlemen in the town, who were to have delivered him a gate, and brought him into Florence in the night, had not their conspiracy been discovered and defeated afterward by the punishment of the accomplices.

This great town being so straitened and so long blocked up that the inhabitants, seeing no other way of preserving their liberty than by engaging it to the King of Naples, sent ambassadors to that Prince, and offered to throw themselves into his arms. It was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer, but for the general interest of the whole faction of the Guelfs, which without that could subsist no longer in Tuscany. The terms being agreed, the treaty concluded, and the Florentines to pay him annually two hundred thousand florins, he sent them four thousand horse, under the command of Prince Carlo his son.

During this negotiation, an unexpected accident happened, which put Castruccio into a cooler
temper, and made him give the Florentines breath in spite of his teeth. There was a new conspiracy against him at Pisa, not to be suppressed by his presence. Benedetto Lanfranchi, one of the chief citizens in the town, was the author of it; Benedetto, troubled to see his country subject to the tyranny of a Lucchese, undertook to surprise the citadel, force out the garrison, and cut the throats of all that were friends to Castruccio. But as in those kind of conjurations, if a small number be able to keep things secret, it is not sufficient to put them in execution; and therefore, whilst Lanfranchi was endeavouring to hook in more associates, he met with those who were false, and discovered all to Castruccio. Two noble Florentines, Cecchi and Guidi, who were fled to Pisa, were suspected to be the traitors; and the suspicion of that perfidy left an ill stain upon their reputation; which way soever it was, Castruccio put Lanfranchi to death, banished his whole family, and several of the chief Pisans were left shorter by the head.

This plot discovering to Castruccio that the fidelity of the towns of Pistoia and Pisa would be always easily shaken, he put all things in practice
that cunning or open force could suggest to keep them in their duties. But whilst his thoughts were upon the tenters about so important a care, the Florentines had some respite to recover their senses, and expect the Neapolitan succours, which being at length arrived under the conduct of Prince Carlo, a general council was held of the whole faction of the Guelfs. Upon the resolution taken there an army was raised, the strongest that ever had been set out by that party, for it amounted to 30,000 foot and 10,000 horse. When their forces were ready, it was debated in the council of war whether they should begin with the siege of Pistoia or Pisa. The latter carried it, for it was fancied the conspiracy of the Pisans was so recent that in probability it had left some seeds for a second revolt; besides, the conquest of Pisa would bring Pistoia along with it.

This great army opened their campaign in the beginning of May, 1328. Lastra, Signia, Monte Lugo and Empoli were taken immediately, and it advanced afterwards to besiege San Miniato. But Castruccio, without discomposure, either by the greatness of their force, or the swiftness of their progress, believed rather that the favourable instant
was arrived in which fortune was to put into his hands the supreme authority of Tuscany; and therefore, judging this effort of the enemy at Pisa would succeed no better than their designs at Seravalle, he came and entrenched at Fucechio with 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse, having put 5,000 foot in Pisa under the command of Pagolo Guinigi.

Fucechio is a castle seated so advantageously that there is not a better post in all the plain of Pisa; for it stands upon a little eminence equally distant from the two rivers Arno and Gusciana. The place of their encampment could have been nowhere better chosen; for, unless the enemy divided, and came upon them in two bodies, which must needs weaken them much, they could not cut off the provisions which came to Castruccio both from Lucca and Pisa. To come and face them in their trenches would be rashly to engage themselves betwixt his army and Pagolo's. To turn towards Pisa they must pass the river Arno, and leave the enemy upon their backs, which was an attempt as dangerous as the other. Castruccio's design was to make them pitch upon the last; and to invite them the better to pass over the river, instead of bringing
down his line to the bank, as he might very well have done, he turned it off short towards the walls of Fucechio, not so much to shelter himself under the said walls, but cunningly to leave the enemy such a space free as might tempt them to pass the river. And in the whole art of war there is nothing so subtle as the election of posts and encampments, and that was Castruccio's masterpiece.

The enemy having taken San Miniato, consulted for some time whether they should fall upon Pisa or Castruccio in his camp. At length, all things well considered, it was concluded to march straight toward him. The river Arno was at that time so low it was fordable, but with trouble; for the horse passed up to the saddle, and the foot with proportion. At last, on the 10th of June, in the morning, the Florentines put themselves into battalia, and began to pass the river with a party of their horse and a body of 10,000 foot. Castruccio having deliberated all things, and provided for more than one event, commanded 1,000 foot along the river, above the passage where the enemy appeared, and sent a thousand more to post themselves below it; and then advancing himself at the head of 5,000
foot and 3,000 horse, he came on courageously against the enemy, as half of them were passed. The Florentine foot, tired with the incommodity of their passage, and the weight of their arms, advanced but faintly against him; and for their horse, they that passed first had made the bottom so loose and so slippery that there was no pass for those who were to follow. On the contrary, their horses either stuck fast in the mud, or their legs came up and they threw their riders into the water, where many of them were drowned. So that the Florentines, perceiving their attempt there was not like to succeed, he recovered the bank, and marching a little higher, they searched for a better place. But wherever they made their point, and endeavoured to go over, Castruccio opposed them with the infantry he had drawn out, which being armed lightly with targets and darts, were everywhere immediately, charged the enemy both in the front and the flank, and setting up at the same time most hideous shouts, the Florentine horse being frightened with noise, and wounded with darts, either ran back or threw their riders under their feet. As to the Florentines who had passed first, they maintained
their ground with a great deal of gallantry, and till then the loss was equal on both sides; for if Castruccio doubled his endeavours to force back the enemy into the river, the enemy was no less zealous to gain as much ground as might serve for drawing up their army when it should get over. Both generals were very busy in the encouragement of their soldiers, both with exhortation and example. Castruccio to vilify the enemy, remonstrated to his army that they were the same people they had beat before at Seravalle; the Florentines represented to their troops how infamous it would be for so numerous an army as theirs to be worsted by a handful of men. But Castruccio, observing the battle grew tedious, and his own men began to be as weary as the enemy, and that there were as many wounded and dead on the one side as the other, he caused another body of 5,000 foot to advance; as soon as they were got up to the rear of their companions, those who had been fighting all the while, and were then in the front, were commanded to open to the right and left, and wheel off into the rear, whilst the other advanced into the ground they had forsaken; but whilst this was in agitation, the
Florentines gained something upon them, but they enjoyed it not long; for being to deal with fresh men, they were quickly disordered, and followed with that vigour they threw themselves into the river. As to the horse, both of the one side and the other, no advantage was to be observed. Castruccio, being sensible that in number his was much inferior to the enemy, had commanded his troops to entertain their horse with slight skirmishing, only to gain time; for believing his foot able to beat the enemy's, he intended afterwards to join them with his horse, and fall both together upon the cavalry of the Florentines. The Florentines tried another passage above the first, thinking thereby to have flanked Castruccio afterwards; but the bank on the other side being bad, and defended by the enemy's foot, they were repulsed again, and in as great disorder as before. Then Castruccio came up to them, and charged them so smartly in all parts that they were totally defeated; so that of so vast an army scarce a third part were saved, and several of their chief officers taken. Prince Carlo saved himself at Empoli with Michael Falconi, and Thadeo Albizi, commissaries-general of the Florentine army; one
may easily imagine the plunder was great, and the slaughter no less. In short, according to the most exact computation, there were slain on the Florentine side 20,231 men; on the side of Castruccio but 1,570.

Here it was that fortune began to be weary of the great actions of Castruccio, and, inconstant as she was, instead of giving him long life that might have crowned his felicity, as if she had been jealous of his glory, she interposed with the only obstacle that was able to interrupt the prosperity of so incomparable a man.

This illustrious hero, tired with the fatigues of a battle as painful as glorious, coming out of the fight with his imagination full of great things that might follow, and running over in his mind the probability of his good fortune, believing no hopes were left for the enemy's loss, nor no bounds for his victory, he marched directly for the gate of Fucchio. It having been always his principle to be first on horseback, and last that came out of the field, he rested there some time, not out of ostentation, but to thank and caress the soldiers as they returned from the pursuit, and withal to be ready, in case the
enemy should rally. Whilst he was standing there, covered with sweat, his heart panting, and out of breath, an unlucky cold wind came from the other side of the Arno, and with a pestiferous quality so affected his blood that he fell immediately into the cold fit of an ague. At first he neglected it, though he found a general alteration, as believing himself sufficiently hardened against the injuries of the air, but this negligence was very pernicious. The next night his fit increased, and his fever was so violent his physicians gave him over.

The universal sadness of the soldiers made his triumphant troops look as melancholy as if they had been beaten. All his officers stood about him with tears in their eyes; but having taken them particularly by the hand, and desired them to withdraw, he caused Pagolo Guinigi to be called, took him in his arms, and with a feeble but affectionate voice he spake to him as follows: "Had I imagined, dear son, that fortune would have stopped my course in the midst of the way that conducted me to glory, and so soon interrupted the felicity of my arms, I would have better enjoyed the fruit of my pains. 'Tis possible I should not have left your territory so large, but I
should have endeavoured to have left it more quiet, by creating fewer enemies to myself, and less envy to you. I should have contented myself, dear son, with the sovereignty of Lucca and Pisa, and instead of intending the conquest of Pistoia, and contracting the hatred of the Florentines by so many affronts, I should have endeavoured by all means possible to have gained their affection. By so doing, if I had not lengthened my days, I should have made them at least more happy, and left you more quiet and secure. But fortune, who will have the ordering of all human affairs, gave me not so much judgment as was necessary to know her, nor so much time as was requisite to master her. You have heard (for everybody has told you, and I never denied it) how I came into your father's house, young, inconsiderable, without hopes of advancement; in a word, in so mean a condition, that without his kindness I could never have satisfied the ambition of my nature. Your father brought me up with the same care and tenderness as if I had been his own; and I do acknowledge, if ever I gave any testimonies of valour and magnanimity, they were but the effects of those great examples which he set me, and the fair educa-
tion I had from him conducted me to that height which, not only you, but all the world has admired. When he came to die he committed to my care and faith both your person and interest; have I betrayed his confidence in anything? Can you complain that my generosity has not been answerable to his? My heart does not reproach me by any ingratitude. I have not only preserved to you the fortune of your father, but, to leave you the fruit of my labours and success, I have declined all overtures of marriage, lest, happening to have children of my own, my natural affection for them should have destroyed my friendship for you, and lessened the acknowledgment which I owed to his bounty. It touches, it touches, dear charge, when we speak of these things. You cannot comprehend the satisfaction I receive to leave you master of so puissant a State; nor can you imagine how it troubles me to leave it so unsettled and perplexed. The city of Lucca is under your subjection, but be sure it is not pleased with its condition. Pisa likewise is yours, but you know the natural inconstancy of that people. Though it has been often subdued, and passed from one servitude to another, yet it will always disdain to pay obedience
to any native of Lucca; and have a care how you regulate your politics in relation to this jealousy, which is inseparable from persons of different countries. The town of Pistoia is a place that ought always to leave upon your spirit some suspicion and umbrage of their fidelity. Besides that, it is divided within itself; the ill-treatment which it has received from us will most sensibly excite it against our family. But the worst of all is, the Florentines are your neighbours, and you know mortally offended, as having been worsted by me perpetually. But that is not sufficient to suppress them. They will be now overjoyed, and insult more upon the news of my death than if they had conquered all Tuscany. As to the succours you are to expect I will not dissemble with you. You can hope for none but from the Emperor or Princes of Milan, and you will be deceived if you expect any from them; they are either too slow, or too busy, or too remote. Depend not, therefore, upon anything but your own conduct, upon the memory of my achievements, and the consternation which my victory has brought upon our enemy. It will be no little advantage to you if you can allure the Florentines to an accommodation, and
their fear, without doubt, sufficiently inclines them. Let your comportment with them for the future be different from mine; and as I have always provoked them, and believed nothing could so much contribute to my happiness as to deal with them as enemies: let it be your care to desire their amity, and found not your repose upon anything so much as an alliance with them. Nothing in this life imports us so deep as the knowledge of our own tempers and how to employ them; but this science belongs most properly to those who would govern; and it is necessary for such to spin out their lives in the luxuries of peace when they find themselves unfit for warlike executions. My advice, therefore, dear charge is, that you would live in repose, and if you will make the advantage of the troubles of my life to sweeten your own you will remember to follow it. Farewell, I am going, and with this double satisfaction that, as I have left you the possession of a large empire, so I have left you such precepts as will secure it to you."

Castruccio ended this passionate discourse by griping Pagolo by the hand, who heard him all the while with tears in his eyes. And as the last instance of his gratitude, this great person called for all the
brave and faithful officers of his army, whether of Lucca, Pisa or Pistoia, and having recommended to them the interests of Pagolo, he obliged them to an oath of allegiance, and as that oath was solemnly taken the great conqueror surrendered his soul. Never was victorious army so sad, never any prince so lamented, nor any memory so venerable. His exequies were honourably celebrated, and his body buried in the church of St. Francis in Lucca. Pagolo succeeded, but not with the virtue and fortune of his predecessor; for not long after he lost Pistoia and then Pisa, and much ado he had to keep the sovereignty of Lucca, yet that continued in his family to the fourth generation.

These great actions do sufficiently prove that Castruccio was not only a man rare in his own age, but would have been the same in any former. His stature was higher and his proportions better than ordinary. His aspect was charming, and he had so much grace and goodness in his accost that never man went unsatisfied from his conversation. His hair was inclining to red, and he wore it short above his ears. Wherever he went, snow, hail or rain, let the weather be what it would, his head was always
uncovered. He had all the qualities that make a man great. Grateful to his friends, terrible to his enemies, just with his subjects, crafty with strangers, and where fraud would do the business he never troubled himself to conquer by force. No man was more forward to encounter with danger, nor no man more careful to get off. He used to say that men ought to try all things and be terrified at nothing; for it was clear God Almighty was a lover of courage, because he made valiant men the ministers of His judgments and corrected the poor-spirited by them. He had a strange presence of wit, and made his repartees with admirable quickness; he would rally very handsomely; sometimes he would be very pleasant and innocent, and sometimes as bitter and poignant. When occasion offered fairly, as he never spared anybody, so he was never offended when he was bitten himself. We have some of his answers which he gave with much wit, and others of other people's which he heard with as much patience.

He caused a bird to be bought one day, and gave a ducat for it; one of his acquaintance blaming him for giving so much: "You," says Castruccio, "would have given a penny for it yourself?" The other answering
yes; "then," says Castruccio, "you would have paid dearer than I, for a ducat is not so much with me."

Having a flatterer about him who plagued him with perpetual requests, in great scorn Castruccio spit upon his clothes; the flatterer replied wittily: "A fisherman to get a pitiful little fish is dabbled up to the neck, and shall I be afraid of a little spittle that am catching a whale?" Castruccio was pleased with his answer and rewarded him for it.

A certain hypocrite, who loved his dinner as well as he, reproached Castruccio one day by the luxury and extravagance of his table. "If that were a sin," replied Castruccio, "there would not be so much feasting upon holy days."

Passing, one day, through a street where there lodged certain women of but indifferent reputation, and seeing a young man come from them who blushed, and was in mighty confusion that Castruccio had seen him: "Friend," says Castruccio, "you should not be ashamed when you come out, but when you go in."

He was always of an opinion that a conqueror ought not to give too much liberty to his new subjects, which, upon a time, he explained very
subtilely to some who understood him. Having a knot given him that was very fast tied, he was desired to undo it, and having tried a good while to no purpose: "My friend," said he aloud, "if a thing that is tied can give me so much trouble, I shall be much worse when once it is loosed."

He was often troubled with the assiduities of a person who pretended to be a philosopher, and was always molesting his entertainments with his admonitions and morals. Castruccio, weary of his insolence at his table, told him, "You philosophers are like dogs, you never go anywhere but where you may have something to bite." The philosopher replied: "No, sir, we are more like physicians, and go only to those who have extraordinary need of us."

Passing, one day, from Pisa to Leghorn by water, a great tempest arose on a sudden, and put Castruccio into some apprehension, which one of the company observed, and told him, by way of reproach, that he wondered such a man as Castruccio should be frightened, when he found no such passion in himself. Castruccio replied: "You have no reason, sir, to be afraid, for every man values his life according to its worth."
One asked him, one time, what he should do to make himself esteemed. He replied: "When you are invited to a feast, have a care you do not set a wooden statue upon a joined stool."

A fellow boasting to him one day how many books he had read, Castruccio told him: "It would have been more credit to have remembered half of them."

A great drinker, who was always debauching, used to value himself very much upon this score, that though his belly was always full of wine, he never was drunk. Castruccio told him, "A quart pot was the same."

A friend of his, seeing him engaged in an amour with a pretty young lass, blamed him very seriously that he suffered himself to be so taken by a woman. "You are deceived, sir," said he, "she is taken by me."

One found fault with him exceedingly for being so delicate and so expensive in his diet. "You would not," said Castruccio, "spend half so much in yours?" And being answered, no, "then," replied Castruccio, "you are a greater miser than I am an epicure."
He was invited, one evening, to supper by Faddeo Bernardi, a Lucchese, a very rich and sumptuous citizen. Being arrived at the house, and conducted by Faddeo into a room exceedingly well hung, the pavement of mosaic work wrought curiously into flowers, and leaves, and branches, which yielded a most excellent verdure, Castruccio admired it exceedingly, and pretending to have occasion to spit, he turned about this way and that way, and at last spit in Faddeo's face. Faddeo was much troubled, but Castruccio excused it, and told him, "he thought he could have spit nowhere to have offended him less."

One asking very seriously how Cæsar died, he answered as seriously: "Would I might die like him."

One of his courtiers having an ambition to regale him, made a ball one night, and invited him to it; Castruccio came, entertained himself among the ladies, and being in a good humour, fell a dancing and solacing among them, and doing some impertinencies which did not stand with the gravity of his rank; being admonished by one of his friends that it would detract from his esteem, he told him: "I thank
you, sir, for your caution, but he that is counted wise all day will never be thought a fool at night.”

One coming to him to beg a boon that Castruccio was unwilling to grant, Castruccio declined him, and would not seem for to hear, whereupon the petitioner threw himself upon the ground, and put his head to Castruccio’s feet; Castruccio reproving him, the other replied: “You yourself are the cause you heard so little when I stood up; I had a mind to see whether your ears were upon your toes,” which answer got him more than he desired.

He was wont to say, “The way to hell was very easy, for men went thither upon their backs, and could find it with their eyes shut.”

Another desiring a favour of him with a thousand impertinent and superfluous words: “Hark you, friend,” says Castruccio, “when you would have anything with me for the future, send another man to beg it.”

Another great talker having tired him with a tedious discourse, excused himself at last, and told him he was afraid he had wearied him. “No, indeed, sir,” replied Castruccio, “for I did not mind one word that you said.”
He used to droll upon a person who, having been a handsome boy, proved as handsome a man. "His spite," said he, "has been always against married people; when he was a boy he debauched men from their wives, and now he debauches women from their husbands."

He saw an envious man laugh, and asked him: "Do you laugh," said he, "that things go well with yourself, or ill with other people."

When he was under the tutelage of Francesco Guinigi, one of his comrades asking him, merrily, what he should give him for a box at his ear, Castruccio answered immediately, "A helmet, if you please."

He was forced to put a citizen of Lucca to death who formerly had been a great instrument of his advancement, and being reproached by somebody for dealing so severely with an old friend: "No," says he, "you are mistaken, it was with a new foe."

Castruccio compared the prudence of those persons who, though they pretended to marry, would never be brought to it, to the discretion of those people who, though they talked much of going to sea, kept constantly at land.
He used to say he wondered much at one custom among men: when they buy anything curious, either of crystal or glass, they sound it, and employ all their senses to be sure it be good, but in choosing a wife they use nothing but their sight, as if she was taken only to be looked upon.

He was of opinion that after his death there would be a general alteration, and being asked when he came to die how he would be buried, he replied: "With my face downward, for I am sure in a short time this country will be turned topsy turvy, and then I shall be in the same posture with other men."

Whilst he was in controversy with Huguccione, but had him in great veneration for his bravery and conduct, being asked in discourse whether for the salvation of his soul he never had any thoughts of turning monk, he answered, no, for to him it seemed very strange if Friar Lazarone should go to Paradise and Huguccione de Faggivola to hell.

Being asked what time was most proper for a man to eat to keep himself in health he answered: "The rich when they are hungry, and the poor when they can."
Seeing a friend of his make use of his servant to put up his breeches, he told him: "I hope ere long you'll have one to feed you."

Seeing over the door of a certain person this inscription in Latin: "God keep this house from ill people," he cried: "Then the master must never come into it."

Passing by a little house with a great gate, he said: "If they have not a care this house will run away through the gate."

Being in discourse with the ambassador of the King of Naples about the settlement of their frontiers upon some controversy betwixt them, the ambassador asked him in a huff: "Why then, sir, you are not afraid of our king?" Castruccio replied gently, "Is your king a good man or a bad?" Being answered, a good, "Why then," said Castruccio, "would you have me afraid of a good man?"

We might add many other answers of his, all full of weight as well as wit; but these shall suffice. He died in the forty-fourth year of his age, and from the time he came first to appear in the world, in his good and his bad fortune he expressed always an equality
and steadiness of spirit; and as he left several monuments of his prosperity and good fortune behind him, so he was not ashamed to leave some memorials of his adversity. When he was delivered from Huguccione's imprisonment, he caused the irons with which he was manacled to be hung in the most public place in his palace, where they are to be seen to this day, being willing that posterity might know that, how fortunate soever he was in the main, he was not totally exempt from distress.

That which is still remarkable is, that having equalled the great actions of Scipio, and Philip the father of Alexander, he died as they did, in the forty-fourth year of his age; and doubtless he would have surpassed them both, had he found as favourable dispositions at Lucca as one of them did in Macedon and the other in Rome.
THE MURDER OF VITELLI,
AND OTHERS OF THE FAMILY OF THE URSINI,
BY DUKE VALENTINE.

DUKE VALENTINE was returned from Lombardy, whither he had gone to excuse himself in relation to certain calumnies objected against him by the Florentines about the revolt of Arezzo and other towns in the Vale de Chiana, and being come to Imola, upon consultation with his friends, he concluded upon his expedition against Giovanni Bentivogli, Sovereign of Bolonia, because Duke Valentine had a mind to reduce that city, and make it chief of his duchy of Romagna; of which the Vitelli, Orsini, and their followers having notice, it appeared to them all that the said Duke Valentine grew too potent, and that upon the taking Bologna, it was to be feared he would endeavour to exterminate them, and make himself the only great man in Italy. Hereupon, a diet was held at Magione in Perugia, where there met the Cardinal Pagolo, the Duke da Gravina Orsini
Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliveretto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, Sovereign of Perugia, and Antonio da Venafro sent from Pandolfo Petrucci, as head of Sienna. Upon serious deliberation about the greatness and disposition of the Duke, it was concluded very necessary to restrain him in time; otherwise there was great danger of a general destruction. Resolving, therefore, to desire aid of the Florentines, and to continue their amity with the Bentivogli, they sent ambassadors to both, promising their assistance to the one, and begging the assistance of the other against the common enemy. This diet was quickly noised all over Italy, and such of Duke Valentine's subjects as were discontented (among whom were the Urbinati), began to hold up their heads and hope for a revolution. While the people were in this suspense certain of the inhabitants of Urbino laid a plot to surprise the castle of San Leo, which at that time was kept for the Duke, and the manner was thus: the governor of the castle was busy in repairing it, and mending the fortifications; to which purpose having commanded great quantities of timber to be brought in, the conspirators contrived that certain of the biggest pieces should be laid as by
accident upon the bridge, which they knew could not be craned up without a great deal of difficulty; whilst the guards were employed in hoisting the timber, they took their opportunity, seized upon the bridge, and then upon the castle, which was no sooner known to be taken but the whole country revolted and called in their old Duke; yet, not so much upon the surprise of that castle as their expectations from the diet at Magione, by means of which they did not question to be protected. The diet, understanding the revolt of Urbino, concluded no time was to be lost, and having drawn their forces together, they advanced, if any town was remaining to the Duke, to reduce it immediately. They sent a new embassy to the Florentines to solicit their concurrence against the common enemy, to remonstrate their success, and to convince them that such an opportunity, being lost, was not to be expected again. But the Florentines had an old pique to the Vitelli and Ursini upon several accounts, so that they did not only not join with them but they sent their secretary, Nicolo Machiavelli, to the Duke, to offer him reception or assistance, which he pleased to elect. The Duke was at Imola at that time in great consternation; for unexpectedly
on a sudden, when he dreamed nothing of it, his soldiers revolted, and left him with a war at his doors, and no force to repel it. But taking heart upon the Florentine compliment, he resolved, with the few forces he had left, to protract and spin out the war, and by propositions and practices of agreement gain time till he could provide himself better, which he did two ways—by sending to the King of France, and by giving advance money to all men-at-arms and cavalry that would come in. Notwithstanding all this, the Ursini proceeded, and marched on towards Fossombrone, where, being faced by a party of the Duke's, they charged them and beat them. The news of that defeat put the Duke upon new counsels, to try if he could stop that humour by any practice of accord; and being excellent at dissembling, he omitted nothing that might persuade them that they were the aggressors, and had taken up arms first against him; that what was in his hands he would willingly surrender; that the name of prince was enough for him, and, if they pleased, the principality should be theirs; and he deluded them so far that they sent Signor Pagolo to him to treat about a peace, and in the meantime granted a cessation of
arms. However, the Duke put no stop to his recruits, but reinforced himself daily with all possible diligence; and that his supplies might not be discovered, he dispersed them as they came all over Romagna. Whilst these things were in transaction, a supply of 500 lances arrived to him from France; and though by their help he found himself strong enough to confront his enemy in the field, yet he judged it more secure and profitable to go on with the cheat, and not break off the capitulation that then was on foot. And he acted it so well that a peace was concluded, their old pensions confirmed, 4,000 ducats paid down, a solemn engagement given not to disturb the Bentivogli. He made an alliance with Giovanni, and declared that he could not, and had no power, to constrain any of them to come personally to him, unless they pleased to do it themselves. They promised on their part to restore the duchy of Urbino, and whatever else they had taken from him; to serve him in all his enterprises, not to make war without his leave, nor hire themselves to anybody else. These articles being signed, Guid’ Ubaldo, Duke of Urbin, fled again to Venice, having dismantled all the castles and strongholds in his duchy
before he departed; for having a confidence in the people, he would not that those places which he could not defend himself should be possessed by the enemy, and made use of to keep his friends in sub-
jectation.

But Duke Valentine, having finished the agree-
ment, and disposed his army into quarters all over Romagna, about the end of November removed from Imola to Cesena, where he continued several days in consultation with certain commissioners sent from the Vitelli and Ursini (who were then with their troops in the duchy of Urbino), about what new enterprise they were next to undertake; and because nothing was concluded, Oliveretto da Fermo was sent to propose to him, if he thought good, an expedition into Tuscany; if not, that they might join, and set down before Sinigaglia. The Duke replied that the Florentines were his friends, and he could not with honour carry the war into Tuscany, but their proposal for Sinigaglia he embraced very willingly. Having beleaguered the town, it was not long before they had news it was taken, but the castle held out, for the governor refused to surrender to anybody but the Duke, whereupon they entreated
him to come. The Duke thought this a fair opportunity, and the better because he went not of himself, but upon their invitation; and to make them the more secure, he dismissed his French, and sent them back into Lombardy; only he retained a hundred lances, under the command of his kinsman, Monsieur de Candale. Departing about the end of December from Cesena, he went to Fano, where, with all the cunning and artifice he could use, he persuaded the Vitelli and Ursini to stay with the army till he came, remonstrating to them that such jealousies and suspicions as those must needs weaken their alliance and render it unendurable, and that for his part he was a man who desired to make use as well of the counsels as the arms of his friends. And though Vitellozzo opposed it very much (for by the death of his brother he had been taught how unwise it was to offend a prince first, and then put himself in his hands), nevertheless, persuaded by Paulo Ursino, who underhand was corrupted by presents and promises from the Duke, he consented to stay. Here-upon, the Duke upon his departure, the 30th of December, 1502, imparted his design to eight of his principal intimates (amongst whom Don Michael
and Monsignor d'Euna were two), and appointed that when Vitellozzo, Pagolo Ursini, the Duke de Gravina, and Oliveretto should come to meet him, two of his favourites should be sure to order it so as to get one of the Ursini betwixt them (assigning every couple his man), and entertain them till they came to Sinigaglia, with express injunction not to part with them upon any terms till they were brought to the Duke's lodgings and taken into custody. After this he ordered his whole army, horse and foot (which consisted of 2,000 of the first and 1,000 of the latter), to be ready drawn up upon the banks of the Metauro, about five miles distant from Fano, and to expect his arrival. Being come up to them upon the Metauro, he commanded out 200 horse as a forlorn, and then causing the foot to march, he brought up the rear himself with the remainder.

Fano and Sinigaglia are two cities in La Marca, seated upon the bank of the Adriatic Sea, distant one from the other about fifteen miles, so that travelling up towards Sinigaglia, the bottom of the mountains on the right hand are so near the sea they are almost washed by the water, and at the greatest distance they are not above two miles. The city
from these mountains is not above a flight shot, and
the tide comes up within less than a mile. By the
side of this town there is a little river which runs
close by the wall next Fano, and is in sight of the
road, so that he who comes to Sinigaglia passes a
long way under the mountains, and being come to
the river which runs by Sinigaglia, turns on the left-
hand upon the bank, which within a bow shot brings
him to a bridge over the said river almost right
against the gate; before the gate there is a little
bourg with a market-place, one side of which is
shouldered up by the bank of the river. The Vitelli
and Ursini, having concluded to attend the Duke
themselves and to pay their personal respects, to
make room for his men had drawn off their own and
disposed them into certain castles at the distance of
six miles, only they had left in Sinigaglia Oliveretto
with a party of about 1,000 foot and 150 horse which
were quartered in the said bourg. Things being in
this order, Duke Valentine approached; but when
his horse in the van came up to the bridge they did
not pass, but opening to the right and left and wheel-
ing away, they made room for the foot, who marched
immediately into the town. Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and
the Duke de Gravina, advanced upon their mules to wait upon Duke Valentine. Vitellozzo, was unarmed, in a cap lined with green, very sad and melancholy, as if he had some foresight of his destiny, which, considering his former courage and exploits, was admired by everybody; and it is said that when he came from his house, in order to meeting Duke Valentine at Sinigaglia, he took his last leave very solemnly of everybody. He recommended his family and its fortunes to the chief of his officers, and admonished his grandchildren not so much to commemorate the fortune as the magnanimity of their ancestors. These three princes being arrived in the presence of Duke Valentine, saluted him with great civility, and were as civilly received; and each of them, as soon as they were well observed by the persons appointed to secure them, were singled and disposed betwixt two of them. But the Duke perceiving that Oliveretto was wanting, who was left behind with his regiment, and had drawn it up in the marketplace for the greater formality, he winked upon Don Michael, to whom the care of Oliveretto was assigned, that he should be sure to provide he might not escape. Upon this intimation Don Michael clapped spurs to
his horse and rode before, and being come up to Oliveretto, he told him it was inconvenient to keep his men to their arms, for unless they were sent presently to their quarters they would be taken up for the Duke's; wherefore he persuaded him to dismiss them, and go with him to the Duke. Oliveretto following his counsel, went along with him to the Duke, who no sooner saw him but he called him to him, and Oliveretto having paid his ceremony fell in with the rest. Being come into the town and come up to the Duke's quarters, they all dismounted and attended him up, where, being carried by him into a private chamber, they were instantly arrested and made prisoners. The Duke immediately mounted and commanded their soldiers should be all of them disarmed; Oliveretto's regiment being so near at hand were plundered into the bargain. The brigades which belonged to Vitelli and Ursini being at greater distance, and having notice what had happened to their generals, had time to unite; and remembering the discipline and courage of their masters, they kept close together, and marched away in spite both of the country people and their enemies. But Duke Valentine's soldiers, not content with the pillage of
Oliveretto's soldiers, fell foul upon the town, and had not the Duke, by the death of several of them, repressed their insolence, Sinigaglia had been ruined. The night coming on, and the tumults appeased, the Duke began to think of his prisoners, resolved Vitellozzo and Oliveretto should die; and having caused them to be guarded into a convenient place, he commanded they should be strangled; but they said nothing at their deaths that was answerable to their lives; for Vitellozzo begged only that the Pope might be supplicated in his behalf for a plenary indulgence. Oliveretto impeached Vitellozzo, and laid all upon his back. Pagolo and the Duke de Gravina were continued alive, till the Duke had information that his Holiness at Rome had seized upon the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of Florence, and Monsieur Jacopo da Santa Croce, upon which news, on the 18th of January, they also were both strangled in the castle of Piene after the same manner.
THE MARRIAGE OF BELPHEGOR.

It is recorded in the ancient chronicles of Florence that a certain holy person, whose life was the admiration of that age, falling one day into a trance, had a very strange apparition; it seemed to him that the souls of married men that came trooping in great numbers to hell, cried out all of them as they passed that their marriage was the cause of their misery, and their wives the occasion of their coming thither. Minos, Radamanth, and the whole infernal privy council were amazed at the clamour; at first they could not believe there was anything in the business, but at last, observing the same complaints continually multiplied, they thought it fit to make Pluto acquainted. Pluto, understanding the report, without imparting anything to his wife, who had taken physic that week and kept her chamber, resolved the matter should be accurately examined, and such course be taken as was likeliest to
make the speediest discovery of the truth; he issued out his writs immediately, and assembled his courts; his princes, dukes, counts and barons were all present; never was senate so full, nor never was affair of that importance before it; the holy father that beheld all affirms positively that Pluto delivered himself in this manner:

"Right trusty and well-beloved,

"Though our kingdom was assigned us from heaven, and the fatal decree has anciently determined our dominion; though that sentence be irrevocable, and above the cognisance of any human power, yet seeing his prudence is most safe that is dictated by laws, and his judgment most solid that is fortified with others, we are resolved to take your counsels along with us, which way we are to steer in an affair that otherwise may prove, in time, of great dishonour to our Government. The souls of married men that are continually flocking into our dominions do unanimously exclaim against their wives as the only persons that send them tumbling hither. To us it seems impossible; yet, forasmuch as a peremptory and determinate sentence upon their bare allegations, would not
suit with our Satanical mercy, so a careless pretermission on the other side could not be without reflection on our justice. That matters of such importance, therefore, may have their due disquisition, and our administration be defended from obloquy or scandal; that no inconvenience may follow for want of deliberation, and that some better expedient may be found out than ourselves have happily thought on, we have thought good to call you together, being confident and assured by the assistance of your counsels, the honour and reputation of our empire will be continued as unquestionable for the future as it has been preserved hitherto by our own proper care and solicitude."

There was not one present but acknowledged it a business of importance, and well worthy an exact consideration; it was the opinion of the whole board that all imaginable means was to be used to find out the truth; but what means that was could not be agreed on. Some were of opinion a single person was to be despatched into this world and no more; others judged it better to send several, and that the discovery would be more certain from the experience of many than of one; and a third sort, more brisk and severe
in their counsels, thought that clutter unnecessary, and that clapping good store of them together upon the rack would be enough doubtless to extort a confession. However, it was at last carried by the plurality of voices that a single person only should be sent, and in this resolution the whole company acquiesced; nevertheless, there being nobody found that would voluntarily undertake the employment, it was concluded the election should be by lot; and at the same time, having made their billets and shuffled them, the lot fell upon Belphegor.

One may say, and say true, that fortune never decided anything so justly, for Belphegor was no ordinary devil, and Pluto, having made him formerly generalissimo of his armies, it is to be presumed he was no novice; for all this he had a month's mind to be quit of his embassy; but, the order being unalterable, he was forced to submit, and accept these conditions that were solemnly decreed—"That a hundred thousand ducats should be paid him immediately to defray the expenses of his journey; that he should assume the shape of a man; that he should take a woman to his wedded wife, and live with her, if possible, ten years; that at the end of
the term, pretending to die, he should give her the slip, repair immediately to his old quarters, and make affidavit upon his own experience of all the pleasures and calamities of matrimony." It was declared to him also that, during this metamorphosis, he was to be subject to the pains and misfortunes of humanity, as sickness, imprisonment, and poverty; but that if, by his cunning and dexterity, he could disentangle himself, it should be allowed him, and not imputed as any scandal or reproach. Belphegor accepts the conditions, receives his ducats, and having drawn a spruce party of horse out of his guards, and furnished himself with pages and footmen and good store, he set out immediately for this world, and arrived at Florence in a very fair equipage; he chose that place above all others for the convenience of improving his money, and putting it to interest with greater advantage. He called himself Don Roderick of Castile; he took a very noble house in the Fauxburg of All Saints, and that his quality might be undiscovered, he gave out that he was a Spaniard; that, being young, he took a voyage into Syria, that he had dwelt some time in Aleppo, where he had got most part of his estate,
but, being weary there, he was come into Italy, as a country more agreeable with his humour, with intention, if any fair opportunity was offered, to marry. Don Roderick seemed to be a very handsome man, about thirty years of age; and in a short time after his arrival he made it evident enough that he was rich, and by his liberality that he knew how to make the best use of them, insomuch that several gentlemen of Florence, that had more daughters than money, took all possible pains to insinuate how welcome he should be into their alliance. Don Roderick, that had choice of mistresses, preferred one that was transcendentally handsome before them all; the story says she was called Honesta, and was the daughter of Americ Donati, who had three more also to marry, and three sons between twenty or twenty-five years of age. But though Seigneur Americ was of one of the noblest families of Florence, yet he was looked upon as down the wind, and one that was overlaid with too many children, and the unavoidable charges of his nobility; but Don Roderick took an order for that, defraying the whole expense of his wedding out of his own purse, managing all things with that splendour and magnificence that there was nothing
omitted that was desirable upon such an occasion. It was mentioned before, as one of the conditions proposed to Belphegor, that as soon as he was out of the infernal dominions he should be subject to all the passions of mankind, and accordingly he began immediately to take delight in the honours and gallantry of the world; and, as cunning a devil as he was, to be wheedled with the flatteries and applauses of men; but that which delighted him so much cost him dear; besides that he had not been long with Honesta, but he fell stark mad in love with her, and finding something or other extraordinary in her, that I cannot think of, he was so far enamoured he never thought himself happy before, insomuch as when she was melancholy, or out of humour, he would curse his commission, and take his corporal oath his very life was tedious. On the other side, it was not to be forgot that Honesta, marrying Roderick, and bringing him beauty and nobility instead of a portion, she thought it not fit to leave her pride and intractableness behind her; these two good qualities were so eminently in her that Roderick, who had been used to Lucifer's, and had more than once experienced it, swore point-blank his wife's in-
solence was beyond it, for when she once found the fondness and passion her husband had for her, believing she could manage him with a switch and order him as she pleased, she carried herself like his sovereign, and handled him without pity or respect; and if it happened he denied her anything, she gave him immediately to understand that she was also as eloquent in scolding as others of her quality. By this you may judge what a cooler this was to Don Roderick; nevertheless, the consideration of his father-in-law, his wife's brothers, the kindred he had by that blessed marriage, but above all the passion and tenderness he had for her, made him endure all patiently. I shall not mention the expense of her clothes, which though never so rich, he was forced to change every week, according to the ordinary vanity of the ladies in Florence. Besides these there were other things which were of no less inconvenience; he was forced, to preserve the peace, to assist his father-in-law in the marriage of his other daughters, which cost him a good round sum; moreover, that all things might go well, and his correspondence continue with his consort, he was glad to send one of her brothers into the Levant
with woollen stuffs, another into France and Spain with silks, and to furnish the third with wherewithal to set up a goldsmith's shop in Florence, all which afflictions together were sufficient to discompose any devil of a thousand, yet he had other thrown into the bargain. There is not any town in all Italy more extravagant in their expenses, in their carnivals and feasts of St. John, than Florence; and Honesta upon that occasion must needs have her Roderick outdo all people of his rank, in the sumptuousness of his entertainments, in the magnificence of his balls, and other divertisements that are usual at those times. He suffered all these calamities for the same reasons he endured the rest; and though perhaps these difficulties were very hard and unpleasant, he would have thought them supportable could he have been satisfied his patience would have procured any quietness in his family, and that he might have peaceably attended the hour of his destruction. But Don Roderick found the clear contrary; besides the expense you have heard she occasioned, her insolence was accompanied with a thousand other inconveniences, insomuch as he could keep neither officer nor servant in his house above three days together.
This was severe trouble to him to find it was impossible for him to keep anybody about him, though never so well experienced or affected to his affairs; nor indeed could anybody blame them for taking their leaves, when the devils themselves that he brought along with him did choose rather to return and toast the bottoms of their feet against the fire of hell than live in this world under the dominion of so super-devilish a woman. Roderick's life being thus miserably uncomfortable, and the stock that he had reserved exhausted by her extravagant expenses, he was reduced to that pass he subsisted only upon the hopes of the advantage he should make by the return of some vessels he had sent into the East and West. And whereas before he had very good credit in that town, to continue it and keep up his port he borrowed money of such as are used in that place to put it out; but those kind of people being such as are not usually sleepy or negligent in their affairs, they took notice immediately he was not over punctual to his day. His purse being already empty, and he reduced to the highest extremity, at one dash he receives news of two as disastrous accidents as could possibly befall
him. The first was that one of Honesta's brothers had lost at hazard all that Roderick had entrusted in his hands; and the other was no more welcome, which was that his other brother-in-law, returning into Italy, was himself cast away and all his goods. The business was no sooner known in Florence but his creditors had a meeting, where, giving him over for one that was irrecoverably lost, and not daring to discover themselves, because the time of payment was not yet come, they concluded he was to be watched very close, lest he should choose them, and show them a light pair of heels. Don Roderick of Castile, on the other side, considering with himself his affairs were past remedy, and also the term he was obliged to by the infernal law, resolves to take horse and be gone without any more ado, which he performed without much difficulty, living conveniently for that by the Port del Prato; yet he was no sooner marched off but the alarm was taken by his creditors. They repair immediately to the magistrates, and pursue him not only with post and officers, but lest a certain number of ducats should debauch that kind of cattle, who are no better in Italy than other places, and prevail with them for an
abatement of their speed, they follow him themselves in a full body with impatience of hearing some tidings of him. Roderick, in the meantime, was no fool, but considered very well what he had to do. As soon as he was galloped about half a league from the town he leaves the highway and his horse with it, the country being enclosed and full of ditches on both sides, and was forced to make the rest of his journey on foot, which he did very successfully, for wandering up and down under the shelter of the vines and reeds that abound much in those parts, he arrived at last at Peretola, at the house of Jean Matteo del Bricca, bailiff to Jean del Bene.

By very good fortune he meets Matteo carrying fodder to his cattle; he accosts him immediately, and promises him, as he was a gentleman, that if he would deliver him from the catchpoles that were in pursuit of him, with design to clap him up and starve him in prison, he had an invention in his pate would make him rich out of hand, and of this he would give such evidence before he departed as should assure him of his truth and fidelity; "and if I do not," says he, with a damned imprecation, "I will be content to be delivered up into their clutches
that persecute me." Now you must understand that, though Matteo was an hind and a peasant, yet the fellow had cunning enough, and knew on which side his bread was buttered. He considered, if he undertook him and miscarried, he had nothing to lose; and that if he succeeded, he should be made for ever. Without any more ado, therefore, he promises him protection, and, clapping him close upon a dunghill that was before the gate, he covered himself over with brush-faggots and reeds, and such other fuel as lay there in readiness for the fire; and, indeed, he was no sooner in his retirement, but in came the creditors with full cry. They swaggered and laid about them like lords, but all to no purpose. Matteo could not be persuaded to confess so much as he saw him; insomuch as marching on still in the pursuit, but with as little success as they came thither, they gave Roderick and their money over for lost, and returned to Florence every jot as wise as they were before. The coast being clear in this manner, and the alarm over, Matteo steals to the closet where he had left Roderick, gives him a little fresh air, and conjures him to be as good as his word. Roderick was very honest in that point, and, I dare say, never
any devil, as to matters of gratitude, had more of a gentleman. He gave him thanks for the great obligation he had received; he swore, over and over again, he would do whatever lay in his power to discharge himself of his promise, and in the heat and height of his compliments, to convince him he meant as he said, he gives him the whole story as you have had it, and at last told him the very way he had pitched upon to make him a prince. "Know, then," says he, "that whenever you hear of any lady that is possessed, 'tis no other devil but I that have possessed her; and be sure I will never leave her till you come yourself and force me from my quarters, after which you have wit enough to make your own terms for your payment." They had very few words more; he only gave him the summerset once or twice, and showed him two or three juggling tricks, and vanished.

Awhile after there was a great noise about the town that Monsieur Ambrosio Amidei's daughter, that was married to Bonaculo Thebalducci's son, was possessed. Her father and mother did not fail to use all the remedies usual in so deplorable a case. They brought before her St. Zanobe's head
and St. J. Galbert's cloak, which was nuts to Belphegor, and made him nothing but laugh. There was nobody in her but Don Roderick de Castile, who was as ingenious a gentleman-devil as one would wish; and that the world might take notice that this was no fantastic imagination, nor fit of the nightmare, nor any such trifle, but that she was really possessed, she spake Latin better than Tully ever wrote, disputed in philosophy, and discovered the secrets and sins of several people that were there; who were very much surprised to find the devil concern himself with those kind of affairs.

Amongst the rest was one holy father he did great discourtesy to, in blurting out before the whole company as if he had kept a young lass four years together in his cell, in the habit of a young monk; and, after all this, let anybody judge whether the possession was not like to be true. Ambrosio, in the meantime, was in great affliction for his daughter. He had tried all the ways that physic or religion could propose, but to no purpose; so as he was brought to the highest point of despair, when Matteo came to him, and undertook the cure of his daughter.
if he would give him five hundred florins, which he designed to lay out in land at Peretola. In short, Matteo was an honest fellow, and would have done the miracle gratis, and like a gentleman, but his pockets were hollow, and he had great occasion for money at that time. Signor Ambrosio accepts the conditions, and Matteo falls to work. He began very civilly, with certain masses and other ceremonies, that he might appear the more formal in the business: at length he stole to the lady's ear, calls Roderick, and tells him he was come thither to him and did require him to be as good as his word. "Content," says Roderick, "and that you may see I shall deal with you like a person of quality, take notice, that because this expedition is not enough to enrich you and do your business, I will befriend you more than once; for which reason, as soon as I am departed from hence, away I'll march into the daughter of Charles, King of Naples, and don't fear but I'll stick to her till you come to exorcise me, so as there you may make up your markets at a blow, and become considerable for ever; but be sure after that I be troubled with you no more." And as soon as he had said so, "whip," says he, out of the
lady, and was gone, to the great joy and astonishment of the whole town.

Belphegor, in the meantime, was as good as his word, as he promised Matteo. Away he goes, and in two or three days' time it was all over Italy that the daughter of Charles, King of Naples, was in the same condition, which was good news for Matteo, who was at this bout to gain the philosopher's stone. In short, he tried all means possible: the monks went to work with their prayers and their crosses, but to no purpose; the devil would not budge till Matteo came himself, who had formerly obliged him. The king had news of what had happened at Florence, and sends away immediately for Matteo to his Court, who came accordingly, and, after some few ceremonious formalities, counterfeited for concealment of the mystery, he cures his daughter. However, Roderick, before his departure, as is reported in the chronicle, accosted him in this manner: "You see, Matteo, I have been as good as my word; you see you are become rich in a trice, and may take your ease for the future; so as, if I be not mistaken, I have discharged myself to you very honestly, hereafter have a care how you
come near me, for, as hitherto I have done you knight-service, henceforward I will do you as much mischief as I can." Matteo being returned to Florence very wealthy (for the King of Naples had given him above five thousand ducats), he thought of nothing now but enjoying that peaceably he had got, never imagining Roderick would do him any harm; but his designs were much frustrated by a report out of France that Louis the Seventh's daughter was possessed as the former. Matteo was in great trouble; on the one side, he was not ignorant of the power of that prince, on the other, he remembered Roderick's last words. The king used all means possible, but without any success; he was told what feats Matteo had done, and despatched a post to him immediately to desire his company at Paris; but Matteo, pretending I know not what indispositions that rendered him incapable of serving his Majesty, the king was forced to write to the magistrates, who sent away Matteo immediately.

Being arrived at Paris, he was in great affliction, because he knew not which way for his life to perform what was expected from him. At last he goes
to the king and tells him that true it was, indeed, he had formerly wrought some cures in that kind, but that it was not in reason to be expected he could dispossess all people he met with, seeing there were some devils so refractory and cross-grained neither threats nor enchantments, nor devotion itself, would do any good on. That he said not this out of any repugnancy or unwillingness to do as he was desired, but that in case his endeavours were ineffectual he might have his majesty's pardon. The king was stark mad at the story, and told him in plain terms if he did not rout the devil out of his daughter, as he had done out of others, he would hang him forthwith; for he saw no reason why miracles were not as feasible at Paris as at Florence and Naples. These words touched Matteo to the quick; he thought there was no pleasure to be taken in being hanged in that manner, and that what the king had said was without any equivocation. However, he recollected himself a little, or at least pretended so, and calling for the princess that was possessed, he makes his approaches, and whispering her in the ear, told Roderick he was his very humble servant, and put him in mind of the good office he
had done him when he delivered him out of the talons of the law; adding withal, that if he left him in the lurch, in the extremity of danger he was then in, the whole world would cry out on his ingratitude. Roderick heard him with no more patience than needs must; he swaggers, swears, storms, and lays about him like a devil in good earnest, gives him a thousand and a thousand ill words, but they could distinguish only these few at the last: "How now, you rascally traitor, have you the impudence to come near me again? Have you forgot it was I that made you your fortune? but I'll make all the world see, and you too, that I can take away as well as give; besides which, you shall not fail to be hanged before you get away from Paris." Poor Matteo, seeing no other remedy for his misfortunes, he fell a thinking some other way, and having sent back the lady to her chamber, he made this speech to the king: "Sir, I have told you before that there are certain ill-natured capricious spirits one knows not which way to deal withal, and of this sort is that which possesses your daughter; if what we shall administer might be sufficient, your majesty shall be happy in your desire, and mine also; but if things
prove otherwise, and your majesty be not satisfied with my endeavours, I shall submit, and your majesty may deal with me as I deserve; in the meantime, I desire your majesty would give order a theatre be erected in the churchyard of Notre Dame, big enough to receive all the nobility and clergy in the town. Let this theatre, if your majesty think good, be hung with cloth of gold, and other rich stuffs, and an altar set up in the middle on Sunday next; I would desire your majesty to be there, with all the princes and nobility in Paris, and after a grand Mass is sung, let the princess be brought also. Besides this, it is necessary there should be twenty persons at least, with trumpets, horns, drums, hautboys, and cymbals, ready in some by-place, when I throw up my cap into the air, to advance towards the theatre with all the noise they can make, which music, with some other ingredients that I have, will send the devil packing from the princess. The king gave order all things should be done as Matteo requested, and Sunday being come, and the theatre thronged with a multitude of persons of quality, and the churchyard of Notre Dame full of people, the princess was led in by two bishops
and followed by several lords of the court; Roderick was in a terrible amaze to behold so magnificent a preparation, and pondering with himself, was overheard to pronounce these words: "I would fain know what this rascally peasant means to do; I have seen many places, I have more than once seen the whole pomp of heaven, nor am I ignorant of what is most formidable in hell, yet can I not tell what to make of this; but I'll handle him like a rogue, as he is, and if I fail Pluto requite me." Matteo came up close to him and desired him very civilly to depart; but Roderick cried out: "Oh the wondrous cunning that is in you! Do you think by this whimsey to save yourself from my power and the indignation of the king? But think what you will, you scoundrel, I am resolved you shall hang for it, or else let me pass for the most miserable, poor-spirited devil in the world." Matteo persisted in his request, but Belphegor gave him worse language than before; but all that frightened not Matteo, for without losing more time he threw his hat up in the air, and at an instant the trumpets, horns, and all the rest of the music struck up, and advanced towards the theatre;
Roderick was startled at the noise, and made it manifest that there are some devils as fearful as men; and not able to imagine the reason, he called out to Matteo, and asked what was the matter. Matteo being a cunning rogue every inch of him, as if he had been terribly frightened, informs him thus: "Alas! poor Roderick," says he, "'tis your wife Honesta is come to seek you at Paris." He said no more, but it is not to be imagined what disorder these four or five words put the devil into; they took away his wit and judgment, so as without any consideration, whether the news was possible or not, without speaking one word, away he stole from the princess, choosing rather to go back into hell and give up his accounts there, than to return again into the thraldom of matrimony, that had already cost him so many sorrows and dangers. As soon as he arrived he demanded audience, and in the presence of Pluto, Æacus, Minos, and Radamanthus, all of them councillors of State, he declared that the souls of men were in the right on it, and that it was their wives that sent them to hell. Matteo that had been too crafty for the devil, returns to Florence in great triumph; the chronicle mentions not any great
matter the King gave him, but it says, that having gained sufficiently by the two former, he esteemed himself very happy that he had escaped hanging at Paris.
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The kings and kingdom of France are at this time more rich and more powerful than ever, and for these following reasons: first,

The Crown passing by succession of blood is become rich, because in case where the king has no sons to succeed him in his paternal estate, it falls all to the Crown; and this having many times happened has been a great corroboration, as particularly in the duchy of Anjou; and at present the same is like to fall out to this king, who having no sons, the duchy of Orleans, and State of Milan (his hereditary countries) are like to devolve upon the Crown; so that at this day most of the good towns in France are in the Crown, and few remaining to particular persons.

A second great reason of the strength of that king is, that whereas heretofore France was not entire, but subject to several great barons, who were
able not only to expostulate, but to contend with the
king (as the Dukes of Guienn and Burbon did for-
merly) the said barons are now most obsequious and
dutiful.

A third reason is, because formerly all the neigh-
bouring princes were ready upon every occasion to
invade the kingdom of France; the Dukes of
Burgundy, Brittany, Guienne, or Flanders, being
always tempting them thereunto, and giving them
access, passage, and reception, as it happened when
the English had wars with France, by their confe-
deracy with the Duke of Bretagne, they got admission
into that country, and gave the king of France his
hands full. And in like manner the Duke of
Burgundy was as troublesome, by means of the Duke
of Bourbon. But now Bretagne, Guienne, the Bour-
bonois, and greatest part of Burgundy being united
to that Crown, and very loyal and faithful, those
neighbouring princes do not only want their old
confederates to invite and assist them, but they have
them for their enemies; so that the king of France
is more strong, and his adversaries more weak.

Another reason may be, that at this day the
richest and most potent of the barons are of the
blood royal; so that upon defect of those who are before them, the Crown may come to them, upon which score they are firm to it, hoping that some time or other it may fall either to them or their posterity; whereas to mutiny or oppose it might prejudice their succession, as it happened to this King Louis when he was taken in the battle of Bretagne, where in favour of the Duke of Bretagne he was personally in service against the French. Upon the death of King Charles, the Crown being legally in Louis, it was disputed whether that fault and defection of his should not be a bar to his succession; and had it not been that he was very rich, by means of his frugality, and able to bear the port of that dignity at his own expense, and the next heir Monsignore d'Angolisme an infant, he had lost it; but for these reasons, and some favour which he had besides, Louis was created king.

The last reason is, because the States of the barons in France are not divided among the heirs (as in Germany and several parts of Italy), but descend still to the eldest sons who are the right heirs; and the younger sons are left, by some little assistance from their elder brothers, to shift for
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themselves; whereupon they betake themselves generally to the wars, endeavouring to advance themselves that way, and raise themselves fortunes. And hence it is the Frenchmen at arms are better at this day, and stand fair for preferment.

The French infantry cannot be good; for it being long since they had any war, they must needs want experience. Besides, in the country the towns are full of tradesmen and mechanics, all of them so curbed and cowed by the nobles that they are grown pusillanimous and base; and therefore the King of France having found them unfit, makes no use of them in his wars, unless it be of his Gascoigns, who are something better than the rest; and the reason is, because bordering upon the Spaniards, they are constantly upon duty, or communicate something of their nature. But for some years since they have shown themselves better thieves than soldiers; nevertheless, in defending and assaulting of towns they do well enough, but in the field they are but indifferent, quite contrary to the Germans and Swiss, who are not to be dealt with in the field, but in storming or defending a town they are good for nothing; and I suppose it proceeds from hence that they
cannot in both cases keep the same order which they observe in the field. Wherefore the King of France makes use of Swiss and lance-knights, because his men-at-arms dare not rely upon his Gascoigns in time of service. And if his foot were as good as his men-at-arms, no doubt but the king of France would be able to defend himself against all the princes in Europe.

The French are naturally more fierce and hot than dexterous and strong, and if resisted handsomely in their first charge they slacken and cool, and grow as timorous as women. They are likewise impatient of distress or incommodity, and grow so careless by degrees that it is no hard matter, finding them in disorder, to master and overcome them.

And of this experience has been many times had in the kingdom of Naples, and last of all at Farigliano, where they were twice as many as the Spaniards, and it was expected every hour when they should have swallowed them up. Nevertheless, because winter came on, and the weather grew bad, they began to straggle into the neighbouring towns, where they might be at more ease, and thereby leaving their camp weak and out of order, the
Spaniards fell upon them and beat them beyond all expectation. And it would have been the same with the Venetians, who had never lost the battle of Vaila had they forborne following the French example but for ten days. But the fury of Bartolomeo d'Alviano was too hot for them. The same happened again to the Spaniards at Ravenna, who might have certainly ruined the French, in respect of their ill government and want of provisions, which were intercepted on that side towards Ferrara by the Venetians, and towards Bologna by the Spaniards themselves; but by the rashness of some and the indiscretion of others the French got the victory; and though, as it was, it was bloody enough, yet it had been much more had the strength of their army consisted in the same kind of men; but the French force lying in his men-at-arms, and the Spaniards force in their foot, the slaughter was the less. He, therefore, who would conquer the French must be sure to preserve himself against their first impetus and attack, and in so doing he shall be sure to prevail; for Cæsar's character of them is true, "At first they are more than men, at last less than women."
France in respect of its greatness and the convenience of its rivers is opulent and rich; for their commodities and labour are worth little or nothing, by reason of the scarcity of money among the people, which is so great it is with difficulty that they are able to raise so much as will pay the impositions of their lords, though they are generally but small; the reason is because everybody gathers to sell as he has occasion, and nobody can stay to finish his harvest as it should be. So that if there should be anybody (which is seldom seen) so rich as to be a bushel of corn beforehand, everybody having of their own, there would be nobody to buy it; and the gentlemen of what they receive of their tenants, except it be for clothes, spend little or nothing; for cattle and poultry and fish and venison they have enough of their own. So that all the money comes into the hands of the lords, and doubtless at this time they are exceedingly rich; for the people are so poor he that has but a florin believes himself a prince.

The prelates of France carry away two-fifths of the revenue of that kingdom, because there are several bishops who have temporal as well as spiritual revenues, who having provisions enough of their own
to keep their houses, spend not a farthing of their income, but hoard it up according to the natural covetousness of the prelates and religious; and that which accrues to the chapters and colleges it is laid out in plate and jewels and ornaments for the decoration of their chapels; so that betwixt what is laid out upon their churches, and what is laid up by the prelates, their money and their movables is of an immense value.

In all counsels for the government and administration of the affairs of that kingdom, the prelates are always the greatest number, the other lords not regarding it so much as knowing the execution must come through their hands. So that both sides are contented, one to ordain, the other to execute, though there are many times some of the ancient and more experienced soldiers taken in to direct the prelates in such things as are out of their sphere.

The benefices in France, by virtue of a custom and law derived anciently from the Popes, are conferred by the colleges; insomuch as the canons, when their archbishop or bishop dies, calling an assembly to dispose of their benefices to them that are thought most worthy, whence it comes that they are frequently divided among themselves, because as many are pre-
ferred by favour and bribery as by piety and worth. And it is the same with the monks in the election of their abbots. The other inferior benefices are in the gift of the bishops. If the king at any time would entrench upon this law, and choose a bishop at his own pleasure, he must do it by force, for they will deny him possession; and though, perhaps, it be forced, that king is no sooner dead but his bishop shall be sure to be dispossessed and another put in his place.

The French are naturally covetous, and desirous of other people's goods, which they will lavish and squander as prodigally as their own. A Frenchman shall cheat and rob you, and in a breath meet, and eat, and spend it as merrily with you as you could have done yourself; which is contrary to the humour of the Spaniard, for if he gets anything of you, you must look for nothing again.

The French are in great fear of the English, for the great inroads and devastations which they have made ancienly in that kingdom; insomuch that among the common people the name of English is terrible to this day—those poor wretches not being able to distinguish that the French are otherwise
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constituted now than they were then, for that now they are armed, good soldiers, and united, having possession of those States upon which the English did formerly rely, as the duchy of Burgundy and the duchy of Bretagne; and on the other side, the English are not so well disciplined, for it is so long since they had any war there is not a man of them who ever looked an enemy in the face; and besides, there is nobody left to join with them, if they should land, but only the archduke.

They are afraid likewise of the Spaniards, by reason of their sagacity and vigilance. But whenever that king invades France he does it with great disadvantage, for from the place from whence he must march to that part of the Pyrenees by which he must pass into France the distance is so great, and the country so barren, that every time the Spaniards attempt any such thing, either by the way of Perpignan or Gehenna, they must needs be much incommoded, not only for want of supplies but for want of victuals to sustain them in so tedious a march, because the country behind them is scarce habitable for its fertility, and that which is inhabited has scarce withal for the inhabitants; so that in these respects,
towards the Pyrenees, the French are in little apprehension of the Spaniard.

Of the Flemings the French likewise are in no fear, for by reason of the coldness of their country they do not gather enough for their own subsistence, especially of corn and wine, with which they are forced to supply themselves out of Burgundy, Picardy, and other places in France. Moreover, the people of Flanders live generally of their own manufactures, which they vend at the fairs in France,—that is, at Paris and Lyons, for towards the seaside they have no utterance for anything, and towards Germany it is the same, for there are more of their commodities made than in Flanders; so that, whenever their commerce with the French is cut off, they will have nowhere to put off their commodities, nor nowhere to supply themselves with victuals. So that, without irresistible necessity, the Flemings will never have any controversy with the French.

But of the Swiss the French are in no little fear, by reason of their vicinity, and the sudden incursions to which they are subject from them, against which it is impossible to make any competent provision in time, because they make their depredations and incursions
with more ease and dexterity than other nations, in respect that they have neither artillery nor horse; but though the French have towns and countries very near them, yet, being well fortified and manned, the Swiss never make any great progress. Besides, the disposition of the Swiss is more apt to battle and fighting in the field than to the storming or defending of towns; and it is very unwillingly, if ever, the French come to cope with them upon the frontiers, for having no foot that is able to bear up with the Swiss, their men-at-arms, without foot, can do nothing. Moreover, the country is so qualified that there is not room enough for the men-at-arms and cavalry to draw up and manage to advantage, and the Swiss are not easily tempted from their borders into the plain, nor to leave such strong and well-provided towns, as I mentioned before, upon their backs, lest by them their supplies should be intercepted, and perhaps their retreat be obstructed.

On the side towards Italy they are in no fear, in respect of the Apennine Mountains, and the strong places which they have at the foot of them; so that whoever invades the dominion of France in those parts must be sure to overcome, or by reason of the
barrenness of the country about he will hazard to be famished, or compelled to leave those towns behind him, which would be madness, or to attack them at disadvantage, which would be worse. So that on the side of Italy they are in no danger, for the reasons aforesaid; and, moreover, there is not a prince in Italy able to undertake him, nor are the Italians now in such unity as in the days of the Romans.

Towards the south the kingdom of France is in no apprehension, because it is washed by the sea on that side, and accommodated with ports always full of ships (partly of the king's, and partly of other petty princes), sufficient to defend their coasts from any sudden impression; and against anything premeditated they will have time enough to prepare, for it requires time to make a solemn invasion, and the preparation will be discovered by somebody; besides, for further security, there are always parties of men-at-arms scouring upon the coasts.

Their expense in keeping of their towns is not so great, for the French subjects are very dutiful, and the fortresses are not kept at the charge of the kingdom; and on the borders (where garrisons, and by consequence expense would be more necessary) those
flying bodies of men-at-arms save them that charge. For against any extraordinary insult there will be time enough to provide, for that requires time to be fitted, and more to be executed.

The people of France are very humble and obedient, and have their king in mighty veneration. They live at very little expense by reason of their great plenty, and everybody hath something of his own. Their clothing is coarse, of very cheap stuff, and they use no kind of silks, neither the men nor the women, for if they should, they should be obnoxious to the gentry, who would certainly be even with them.

The bishoprics in France, according to modern computation, are 146; and the archbishoprics, eighteen.

The parishes are reckoned 1,000,700, and the abbeys 740. Of the priories there is no account.

Of the ordinary and extraordinary entries of the Crown I could get no exact account. I inquired of several, and all told me they were as the king pleased to require. Yet some persons told me that that part of his ordinary revenue which arises out of his gabels upon wine, and bread, and flesh, and the like, amounts
to 1,700,000 crowns; and his extraordinary, by taxes, amounts as he pleases, but in case they fall short he has another string to his bow, and that is by way of loans, which are seldom repaid. The letters to that purpose do commonly run thus:—"Sir,—The king recommends himself to you; and having at this time pressing occasion for money, he desires you would furnish him with the sum contained in this letter." Which sums are paid in to the next receiver, and there are of them in every town who receive all the profits and revenue accruing to the kings by gabels, taxes, loans, or otherwise.

Those towns which are subject to the Crown have no rules or orders but what his majesty is pleased to set them, for raising of money, either by taxes or otherwise.

The authority of the barons over their subjects, and half their revenues, consists in bread, and wine, and flesh, as aforesaid, and so much a year for hearth-money, but it must not exceed sixpence or eightpence a hearth, to be paid every three months. Taxes and loans they cannot require without the consent of the king, which he grants very rarely.

The Crown receives no other advantage from them
than in the revenue for salt, and never taxes them but upon extraordinary occasion.

The king's order in his extraordinary expenses, both in war and peace, is to command the treasurers to pay the soldiers, which they do by tickets of assignment. The pensioners and gentlemen repair to the generals with their tickets from month to month, where they are entered; and, having received a new policy from three months to three months, the pensioners and gentlemen go then to the receivers of the respective provinces where they live, and are paid immediately.

The gentlemen belonging to the king are 200, their pay twenty crowns a month, and paid as aforesaid. Each 100 has a captain.

The pensioners are no set number, and their pensions are as uncertain, being more or less as it pleases the king. They are in a way of preferment, and therefore there is no exact rule for them.

The office of the receivers-general of France is to receive so much for fire and so much for taxes by consent of the king; and to take care that both ordinary and extraordinary expenses be paid at the time, and discharges given as aforesaid.
The treasurers have the keeping of the money, and pay it according to their orders from the generals.

The office of the grand chancellor is judicial and definitive. He can pardon and condemn as he pleases, and that even in capital causes, without the consent of the king. In causes where the clients are contumaciously litigious, he can prefix them a day for the determination of their suit. He can confer benefices, but that must be with the king's consent, for those grants are passed by the king's letters under the broad seal, wherefore that seal is kept by the said chancellor. His salary is 10,000 francs per annum, and 11,000 more for his table, which table is intended for the repast and entertainment of such gentlemen, lawyers and councillors as follow in his train, when they think fit either to dine or sup with him.

The sum which the king of England received annually from the king of France was 50,000 francs, in consideration of certain disbursements by the present king of England's father, in the duchy of Bretagne, but the time of that payment is expired.

At present there is in France but one grand seneschal; when there are more (I do not mean grand
seneschals, for there is never but one), their authority is over the militia both in ordinary and extraordinary, whom for the dignity of their office they are obliged to obey.

The governors of the provinces are as many as the king pleases, and have their commission for life or years, and their salaries great or little, as he thinks good to appoint; the other governors, to the very inferior officers in every little town, have all their commissions from the king, for you must know there is no office in that kingdom but is either given or sold by that king.

Of the quantity of distributions for the gentlemen and the pensioners there is no certain account, but as to them the king’s warrant is sufficient, for they are not liable to the Chamber of Accounts.

The office of the Chamber of Accounts is to view and audit the accounts of all such as have anything to do in the king’s moneys, as the generals, the treasurers, and the receivers.

The University of Paris is paid out of the rents of the foundations of the colleges, but very narrowly.

The parliaments are five—of Paris, of Roan, of
Tholose, Burdeaux and Dauphine, from either of which there is no appeal.

The universities at first were but four—at Paris, Orleans, Bourgi and Poictiers, to which these at Tours and Angiers have been added since, but they are very inconsiderable.

The standing army is as great, both for number of men and artillery, as the king pleases, and are quartered and disposed according to orders from him. Yet every great town upon the frontiers have artillery and ammunition of their own, and within these two years several more have been cast in several places of the said kingdom, at the charge of the town where they were made; and to re-imburse themselves they are allowed a toll of a penny a head for all cattle, and as much for every bushel of corn whilst the kingdom is under no danger of invasion. The standing force is divided into four bodies, which are disposed into four several posts for the security of the country—that is to say, into Guienna, Piccardy, Burgundy, and Provence, but no precise number is observed in any, for they are lessened, or increased, and removed from one place to another, as they have occasion to suspect.
I have with some diligence inquired what moneys were assigned every year for the charges of the king's household, and his privy purse, and I find it is what he pleases himself.

His archers are 400, designed for the guard of his person, among which there are two Scotch. Their salary is 300 francs a man every year, and a coat of the king's livery. But there are twenty-four constantly at the king's elbow, and their salary is 400 francs per annum.

His German foot-guards consisted formerly of 300 men, with each of them a pension of ten francs a month, and two suits of apparel a year—that is, coats and shoes, one for summer, and the other for winter; but of these foot there were 100 more particularly near the king, their salary being twelve francs per month, and their coats of silk, which was begun in the time of King Charles.

The harbingers are those who are sent before to take up lodgings for the Court; they are thirty-two in number, and each of them has a salary of 300 francs every year, and a coat of the king's livery. Their marshals or chief officers are four, and have each of them 600 francs per annum. In taking up
their lodgings, their method is, they divide themselves into four parties; one marshal (or his lieutenant, in case he cannot wait himself) stays where the Court departed, to see all things rectified betwixt the followers of the Court and the masters of the houses. Another of them goes along with the Court; a third where the king lies that night; and the fourth where he lies the next; by which means they keep so exact an order that they are no sooner arrived but every man knows his lodging, and is furnished with everything got ready to his hand.

The provost del hostel is a person who follows always the person of the king, and his office is judiciary. Wherever the Court goes his bench is the first, and in all towns where he comes the people may appeal to him as to their lieutenant. His ordinary salary is 6,000 francs. He has under him two judges in civil causes, paid by the king, each of them 600 francs per annum; he has likewise under him a lieutenant-criminal, and thirty archers paid as aforesaid. Those who are taken by this provost upon any criminal account cannot appeal to the parliament. He despatches all, both in civil and criminal affairs, and if the plaintiff and defendant
appear once before him it is enough—their business is determined.

The masters of the king's household are eight, but there is no certain rule for their salary, for some have 100 francs per annum, some more, some less, as it pleases the king, over whom there is a grand master with a salary of 11,000 francs per annum, and his authority is only over the rest.

The jurisdiction of the admiral of France is over all the fleet and ships and ports belonging to that kingdom. He can seize and make what ships he pleases, and dispose of them as he thinks good when he has done. His salary is 10,000 francs.

The knights of the king's order have no certain number, depending wholly upon the king's pleasure. When they are created they swear to defend the Crown, and never upon any terms to be engaged against it. They can never be degraded or deprived of their dignity but by death. The highest of their pensions is 4,000 francs per annum; some have less, for all are not equal.

The chamberlain's office is to wait upon the king, to see to his chamber, and to advise him; and indeed his chamberlains are persons of the principal
reputation in his kingdom; their pensions are six, eight, and ten thousand francs per annum, and sometimes nothing, for the king does often confer those places upon some great and rich stranger whom he has a mind to oblige; but though they have no pensions, they are exempted from all gabels, and have their diet in Court at the next table to the king's.

The master of the horse is to be always about the king; his authority is over the twelve equerries and the same that the grand seneschal, the grand master, and the grand chamberlain's is over those who are under them. He has the care of the king's horses and harness, helps him up and down, and carries the sword before him.

The lords of the king's council have pensions of betwixt six and eight thousand francs per annum at the pleasure of his majesty; their names at present are, Monseigneur di Parigi, Mons. di Buonaglia, the Bailiff of Amiens, Mons. du Russi, and the Grand Chancellor; but Rubertet and Mons. di Parigi govern all.

There is no table kept for them since the death of the Cardinal of Roan, for when the grand chancellor
is absent, Parigi does that office for him, and takes them with him.

The title which the King of France pretends to the state of Milan is this: his grandfather married a daughter of the Duke of Milan, who died without heir males.

Duke Giovanni Galeazzo had two daughters, women grown, and I know not how many sons. Of the ladies, one was called Madonna Valentina, and was married to Lewis, Duke of Orleans, grandfather to this present king, descended lineally from King Pippin. Duke John Galeazzo being dead, his son Philip succeeded him, who died without legitimate issue, leaving only one natural daughter behind him. Afterwards, that state was usurped illegally by the Sforzeschi, as is reported, because they pretend it fell to the heirs of the said Madonna Valentina, and that from the very day in which the Duke of Orleans married with the house of Milan, he added to the three lilies in his coat of arms the snake, which is to be seen at this day.

In every parish in France there is a person called a frank archer, who is paid by the parish, and is obliged to be always ready with a good horse and
arms to wait upon the king whenever they are required, whether abroad in time of war, or at home upon any other occasion; they are bound likewise to ride up and down for the security of such places as are liable to inroads or any ways suspected; and according to the number of the parishes, they are 1,700,000 men.

Their lodgings are appointed by the harbingers according to every man's office, and usually the richest men quarter the greatest courtiers; and that neither the lodger nor landlord may have reason to complain, the Court has appointed a rate or rule to be observed generally for all people, and that is a sou or penny a day for their chamber, in which there is to be bed, and chairs, and stools, and all things that are necessary.

There is an allowance likewise of twopence a day to every man for linen, as towels and napkins, and for vinegar and verjuice; their linen is to be changed at least twice every week, but there being great plenty in that country, they change oftener as lodgers desire it; besides which, they are obliged to keep their beds made, and their chambers swept and clean.

There is allowance likewise of twopence a day for
the standing of every man's horse; they are not bound to provide any thing for them, only to keep their stalls clean, and carry out the dung.

Some there are who pay less, as their landlords are good-natured, or they can make any shift; but this is the ordinary rule of the Court.

The English title to the crown of France, upon my best inquiry, I find to be thus: Charles the Sixth of France married his lawful daughter Katharine to Henry the Fifth, son and heir to Henry the Fourth, King of England. In the articles of marriage (no notice being taken of Charles the Seventh, who was afterwards King of France), besides the dower that was given with Katharine, Charles the Sixth, father to the said Katharine, instituted Henry the Fifth of England his son-in-law, and to be married to the said Katharine, heir to that kingdom of France; and in case the said Henry should die before the said Charles, and the said Henry leave sons that were legitimate behind him, that then the sons of the said King Henry should succeed to the said kingdom of France, upon the death of the said Charles the Sixth, which was contrary to law, because Charles the Seventh was prejudiced thereby, and was afterwards
of no validity or effect, against which the English pretend that Charles the Seventh was illegitimate.

    The archbishoprics in England are two,
    The bishoprics two-and-twenty, and
    The parishes 52,000.
THE STATE OF GERMANY.

Of the power of Germany nobody can doubt, because it abounds so exceedingly in men, and money, and arms. As to its wealth, there is not a free town in the whole country but has a public stock aforehand of its own, and some say Argentina (Strasburg) alone has a million of florins constantly in bank. The reason of their opulence is because they have nothing to exhaust them but their fortifications and furnishing their magazines, for reparations and recruits cost them but little. In the latter they have a very good way, for they have always in their public stores meat and drink and firing for a twelvemonth; besides, to entertain the industry of their people, they have wherewithal to set the poor on work, in case of any siege, a complete year together, so as they may subsist upon their own labour without being burthensome to the town. Their soldiers are
but little expense to them, for they are always well armed and well exercised; and on their festival days, instead of the common recreations, one takes his musket, another his pike, one one sort of arms, another another, and, practising among themselves, they grow very ready and dexterous; and after they are arrived at some degree of perfection, they have certain honours and salaries conferred upon them, which is the greatest part of their charge. So that in every free town the public treasury is rich.

The reason likewise why the private persons are rich is this—because they live with great parsimony, and indeed little better than if they were poor, for they are at no expense in their clothes, their buildings, nor the furnishing of their houses. If they have bread, and flesh, and anything to keep them from the cold, they are well enough; and he that wants them is contented, and makes some shift or other without them. Two florins will serve them in clothes ten years, and, according to his degree, every man lives at this rate. They do not trouble themselves for everything they want, but only for those things that are absolutely necessary, and by that means their necessities are much fewer than
ours; the result of which custom is this—their money goes not out of their country, they contenting themselves with their own native productions, whilst in the meantime every man is permitted to bring in what treasure he pleases into Germany, to purchase their commodities and manufactures, which, in a manner, supplies all Italy; and their gain is so much the more, by how much a small part of the profit of their labours recruits them with materials for new.

Thus do they live at liberty and enjoy their own humours, for which reason they will not be got to the wars but upon extraordinary pay, and that will not do it neither, unless they be commanded by their own magistrates; wherefore, an emperor has need of more money than another prince, because, if men be in a good condition already, they are not easily allured to the wars.

As things stand now, the free States must unite with the princes before any great exploit can be undertaken by the emperor; or else they must enterprise it themselves, which they would be able to do. But neither the one or the other desires the greatness of the emperor; for if ever he should get
those free States into his hands, he should be strong
enough to overpower the princes, and reduce them
to such a degree of subjection that he would
manage them as he pleased himself, as the kings of
France have done formerly in that country, and
particularly King Louis, who by force of arms and the
cutting off some few persons brought them to their
present obedience. The same thing would happen
to the States, if the princes should be cajoled; they
would lose their freedoms, be wholly at the disposi-
tion of the emperor, and be forced to be satisfied
with what he would vouchsafe to afford them. The
distance and division betwixt the free States and
the princes is supposed to proceed from the different
humours in that country, which in general are two;
the Swiss are become enemies to all Germany,
and the princes to the emperor. It may seem
strange, perhaps, that the Swiss and free States
should be at variance and enmity, seeing the preser-
vation of their liberty and securing themselves
against the princes is the common interest of both;
but their discord is from this, that the Swiss are
not only enemies to the princes, but to all gentlemen
whatever, and in their country they have neither
the one nor the other, but live without distinction of persons (unless in their magistrates) in the most levelling liberty in the world. This practice of the Swiss makes all the gentlemen which are remaining in any of the free towns afraid of them; so that they employ their whole industry in keeping their States at a distance with them, and preventing any intelligence betwixt them. Moreover, all of those States who have been soldiers, and had their education in the wars, are mortally their enemies, moved thereunto by emulation and envy; because they themselves are not so famous abroad, and their animosity is so great that they never meet in the field, let their numbers be small or great, but they fall together by the ears.

As to the enmity betwixt the princes and the free towns and the Swiss, I need say no more, it being so generally known, as likewise of the jealousies betwixt the emperor and the princes. You must understand that the emperor's principal apprehension is of the princes, and not being able to correct them alone, he has made use of the assistance of these free States, and not long since entertained the Swiss into his alliance, by whose means he thought
himself in a very good condition. So that these common dissensions being considered, and the particular piques and suspicions betwixt one prince and one State and another, it is no easy matter to unite the empire; and yet it is necessary it should be united before any great thing can be performed by the emperor. And though he who believes Germany in a condition to do great things, because there is visibly no prince who has the power, or indeed the courage, to oppose the designs of the emperor, as formerly has been done, yet he must know that it is a great impediment to an emperor not to be assisted by those princes; for though perhaps a prince dares not contend with him, he dares deny him his assistance; and if he dares not deny him that, he dares break his promise upon occasion; and if he dares not do that, will at least make so bold to defer and delay the performance so long that when his supplies do come they shall do the emperor no good; all which things do infinitely disturb and embarrass his designs. And this was found to be true when the emperor would the first time have passed into Italy, in spite both of the French and the Venetian; in a diet held at that time in Constance, he was promised
by the several free States in Germany a supply of 

. . . thousand foot and 3,000 horse, yet he could never get of them together above 5,000; and that because by that time the forces of one State came up, another was ready to depart, their time being expired, and some sent money in lieu; upon which score that enterprise was lost.

The strength of Germany consists in the free towns rather than in the princes, for the princes are of two sorts, temporal and spiritual. The temporal princes are brought very low, partly by themselves (every principality being cantonized and distributed to several princes by constitution of their inheritances, which are observed very strictly in those countries), and partly having been much weakened by the emperor and his assistance from the said States; so that now the amity of the temporal princes is of little importance. There are likewise spiritual princes, whose territories, if not cantonized and divided by those hereditary customs, are yet so weakened and enervated by the ambition of their own free towns, and the favour that the emperor shows them, that the electoral archbishops and the rest have little or no power in the great and chief
towns of their own dominions; from whence it comes to pass that, being divided at home, they cannot favour the enterprises of the emperor, though they would themselves. But to come to the free and the imperial towns, which are the strength of that country, as being rich and well governed. Those towns, for several reasons, are grown cooler in the assertion of their liberties, and much more in the acquisition of new, and that which they do not desire for themselves they do not care another should have. Besides, they are so many, and every one to be commanded by a general of their own, that their supplies, when they are disposed to send them, come but very slow, and when they do come are not so useful as they should be, and of this we have an example not many years since. The Swiss invaded the State of Maximilian and Suevia; the emperor contracted with the free towns to repel them, and they obliged themselves to assist him with an army of 14,000 men; but he never got half of them, and the reason was as aforesaid—when the forces of one town came up another marched off—inso much that the emperor, despairing of success, came to an agreement with the Swiss and left Basil in their possession. And if
in this case, where their own interest was concerned, they have acted at this rate, it may be guessed how they will behave themselves in the concerns of other men; so that all these things laid together, though their power be great, yet it can turn but to little account to the emperor. And the Venetians, by their conversation and commerce with the merchants of Germany, in all their transactions hitherto with the emperor, have understood him better than anybody else, and dealt more honourably by him; for had they been in any apprehension of his power, they would have insisted upon some caution, either by way of money or towns; and if they had seen any possibility of uniting the whole power of the empire, they would never have opposed it; but knowing that to be impossible, it made them the more confident, and gave them hopes of success. If, therefore, in a single city the affairs of the multitude are negligently managed, in a province they will be much worse. Moreover, those little States are sensible that an acquisition in Italy or elsewhere would fall to the princes and not to them, because they might enjoy them personally, which could not be done by a commonwealth; and, where the reward
is likely to be unequal, people will not willingly be at an equal expense. Their power, therefore, is great, but of little importance; and he who peruses what has been said before, and considers what has been done for several years past, will find how little it is to be relied upon.

The German men-at-arms are well mounted, and many of them well enough armed, but their horses are heavy and inactive; and it is to be observed that in their encounters with the Italians or French they can do nothing at all, not for any fault in the men, but the accoutrement of their horses; for their saddles being little and weak, and without bows, every little jostle tumbles them upon the ground; and another of their great disadvantages is, that the lower part of their bodies are never armed, whereby, not being able to defend against the first impression, in which the excellence of those soldiers consist, they lie exposed, upon the close, to the short swords of the enemy, and may be wounded, both themselves and horses, in those disarmed places, and it is in the power of every foot man to pull them off their horses, and rip them up when they have done; and then as to the management
of their horses they are too heavy to do anything at all.

Their foot are very good, and very personable men, contrary to the Swiss, who are but small, rough-hewn, and not handsome at all; but they arm themselves, unless it be some few, only with a pike and a sword, that they might be the more dexterous and nimble, and light; and their saying used to be, that they arm themselves no better because they feared nothing but the artillery, against which no breastplate, or crosslet, or gorget would secure them; other weapons they despise, for it is said their order is so good, and they stand so firm to one another, it is impossible to break into them, or come near them if their pikes be long enough. They are excellent in a field fight, but for the storming of a town they are good for nothing, and but little to defend one; and generally, where the men cannot keep their old orders and manage themselves with room enough, they are worth but little. Of this experience has been seen where they have been engaged with the Italians, or assaulted any town, as at Padua, where they came off very ill, though on the other side, in the field they had done well
enough. For, in the battle of Ravenna, betwixt the French and the Spaniards, if it had not been for their lance-knights, the French had been beaten, for whilst the men-at-arms were confronted and engaged with one another, the Spanish had the better of the French; and had disordered their Gascoigns, so that, had not the Germans came in and relieved them, they had been utterly broken; and the same was seen lately when the Spanish king made war upon the French in Guienna, the Spaniards were more fearful of a body of 10,000 German foot, which the King of France had in his service, than all the rest of his army, therefore they declined coming to a battle with all the art they could use.

THE END.
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